Financial Democracy, 08 Nov 2008
For Prof. R.J. Shiller, the root of the subprime mortgage crisis in the US is a myth, the belief that real estate prices must strongly trend upward for demographic reasons.
He proves that the price of real estate, to the contrary, is trending lower. What went up are the quality and the dimension of the average individual houses. But what about `land'? Didn't Mark Twain recommend strongly: `Go for land. They've stopped producing it.'? R.J. Shiller remarks cleverly that only 2,6 % of US land is used for urbanization.
Another factor of the bubble was psychological: the human herd instinct. There was a social contagion of boom thinking.
A third, more specific, factor was the deliberate governmental policy to promote home-ownership as much as possible. This should be good for the Party.

When the real estate bubble burst, it disrupted immediately the credit markets. Aggressive mortgage lenders never worried about repayment risks. They repackaged the mortgages, got top ratings from the rating agencies and sold their packages to third parties all over the world.
But even more importantly, the crisis damaged the `social fabric', the way of life of millions of families and also human relationships (through aggressive creditors). It created an atmosphere of distrust, of hoarding, with runs on banks; in one word, it gave rise to a psychological environment that could lead to a severe and long depression, which would hurt every citizen. Therefore, the subprime crisis must be solved.

Prof. R.J. Shiller makes a distinction between the short term and the long term solution.
In the short term, there should be a massive bail-out in order to prevent an escalation of the crisis and of the economic downturn.
In the long term, the US government should create a basic social contract and protect every citizen against major misfortune. It should impose financial democracy through standardized full disclosure documents so that everybody should get better information about all the risks involved. Without affecting individual privacy, indicators should be created about the real value of real estate. Those should lead to a more efficient pricing of houses and to a stabilization of the market. Prof. R.J. Shiller did not only recommend these policies, but created an indicator himself.

With an open and clear-sighted mind, Prof. Shiller wrote a small, but essential, book about a dramatic worldwide crisis, without losing the `human touch'. It is an essential read for all those interested in the future of mankind.


Thoughtful, straightforward diagnosis and prescription, 18 Sep 2008
Robert Shiller, the prescient author of the book Irrational Exuberance, offers an insightful examination of the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis, and suggests a list of potential measures for the future. He lays the blame for the subprime crisis on the same oblivious fiscal attitudes that led to the technology bubble of the 1990s and the real estate bubble of the 2000s. Both bubbles involved excessive lending and resulted in severe losses for capital providers. His prescription for dealing with the crisis involves a range of policy measures. In the short term, he calls for bailouts for low-income borrowers who got drawn into subprime scams that they did not understand. For the long term, he proposes a new framework for financial institutions, more transparent information, simpler contracts, improved risk-management markets, equity insurance and home loans linked to income, among other measures. Both his diagnosis and his prescription will be controversial, no doubt, but getAbstract thinks his book is a necessary text for anyone who wants to understand what's happened, and how to survive it and learn from it.

Short and radical, 30 Aug 2008
Robert Shiller has written some very interesting things over the years. In my opinion Irrational Exuberance is still one of the best books to read about stockmarkets, and in the New Financial Order he set out some new ideas for democratising finance so that it better serves the public. This short book (the previous reviewer is right to say it's more of a pamphlet) draws a bit on the ideas mapped out in the New Financial Order as a way out of the current mess.

To massively over-simplify, Shiller says we need a mix of short-term sticking plasters and longer-term reforms. In respect of the former camp he says we have to accept bailouts as a necessary evil, even though it goes against the moral hazard arguments. he also suggests setting up a revamped Homeowners Loan Corporation which would take on mortgages as collateral for loans to mortgage lenders in return for influencing the form future mortgages take (in order that they offer a better deal to homeowners).

Turning to the longer term Shiller sets out 6 key policies - comprehensive financial advice (based on fees rather than commssions), the establishment of a consumer finance watchdog, the creation of more default financial options (not just pensions, mortgage arrangements could also be included), improved financial disclosure, to improve accountability, the creation of better financial databases which would help provide consumers with better advice and more tailored products, and finally and most radically the creation of new units of economic measurement, based on what things actually cost.

There are big plus points about this book. First, Shiller is willing to think big. he's effectively arguing for more financial innovation, not less, but also that the process should be carried out in a way that meets the needs of the public. Secondly he warns against scapegoating the financial sector. In the epilogue he argues that we should be focusing on the systems that went wrong, rather than seeking to punish the industry as a whole. As tempting as it might be to try to stick the boot into the super-rich in the City, that isn't really going to take us very far. Shiller instead is setting out some challenging ideas for how we might stop this kind of crisis arising again.

an essential handbook for bubble spotters, 05 Aug 2008
Shiller's is a concise attempt to elaborate in just seven chapters the genesis of the housing bubble (a psychological carry-over from the dotcom bubble), explode its myths ("prices always go up"), explore its scale and the dangers of its deepening impact (it's bad), assert the need to maintain confidence in our economic and financial institutions by aggressive action (comparing the US and European responses to the Great Depression), and then explore longer-term, more fundamental reforms and innovations that will create a population much more attuned to economic risk.

Shiller says his inspiration was John Maynard Keynes 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace', which I take to mean that getting the subprime solution wrong could have devastating consequences.

At less than 200 pages of wide-margined type, lightly annotated and with no bibliography, there is something of the emergency pamphlet about this book. And Shiller is advocating a much speedier and more deep-rooted response to the crisis, which, as of a few weeks ago, he felt was still not being taken seriously enough.

There are many recommendations, but if the scale of the problem is as suggested, I'd argue that it's a book that everyone who lives in a house (and who is of reading age) should own; just don't buy ten and try to rent them out.

The Knackered Hack

Financial Democracy, 08 Nov 2008
For Prof. R.J. Shiller, the root of the subprime mortgage crisis in the US is a myth, the belief that real estate prices must strongly trend upward for demographic reasons.
He proves that the price of real estate, to the contrary, is trending lower. What went up are the quality and the dimension of the average individual houses. But what about `land'? Didn't Mark Twain recommend strongly: `Go for land. They've stopped producing it.'? R.J. Shiller remarks cleverly that only 2,6 % of US land is used for urbanization.
Another factor of the bubble was psychological: the human herd instinct. There was a social contagion of boom thinking.
A third, more specific, factor was the deliberate governmental policy to promote home-ownership as much as possible. This should be good for the Party.

When the real estate bubble burst, it disrupted immediately the credit markets. Aggressive mortgage lenders never worried about repayment risks. They repackaged the mortgages, got top ratings from the rating agencies and sold their packages to third parties all over the world.
But even more importantly, the crisis damaged the `social fabric', the way of life of millions of families and also human relationships (through aggressive creditors). It created an atmosphere of distrust, of hoarding, with runs on banks; in one word, it gave rise to a psychological environment that could lead to a severe and long depression, which would hurt every citizen. Therefore, the subprime crisis must be solved.

Prof. R.J. Shiller makes a distinction between the short term and the long term solution.
In the short term, there should be a massive bail-out in order to prevent an escalation of the crisis and of the economic downturn.
In the long term, the US government should create a basic social contract and protect every citizen against major misfortune. It should impose financial democracy through standardized full disclosure documents so that everybody should get better information about all the risks involved. Without affecting individual privacy, indicators should be created about the real value of real estate. Those should lead to a more efficient pricing of houses and to a stabilization of the market. Prof. R.J. Shiller did not only recommend these policies, but created an indicator himself.

With an open and clear-sighted mind, Prof. Shiller wrote a small, but essential, book about a dramatic worldwide crisis, without losing the `human touch'. It is an essential read for all those interested in the future of mankind.


Thoughtful, straightforward diagnosis and prescription, 18 Sep 2008
Robert Shiller, the prescient author of the book Irrational Exuberance, offers an insightful examination of the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis, and suggests a list of potential measures for the future. He lays the blame for the subprime crisis on the same oblivious fiscal attitudes that led to the technology bubble of the 1990s and the real estate bubble of the 2000s. Both bubbles involved excessive lending and resulted in severe losses for capital providers. His prescription for dealing with the crisis involves a range of policy measures. In the short term, he calls for bailouts for low-income borrowers who got drawn into subprime scams that they did not understand. For the long term, he proposes a new framework for financial institutions, more transparent information, simpler contracts, improved risk-management markets, equity insurance and home loans linked to income, among other measures. Both his diagnosis and his prescription will be controversial, no doubt, but getAbstract thinks his book is a necessary text for anyone who wants to understand what's happened, and how to survive it and learn from it.

Short and radical, 30 Aug 2008
Robert Shiller has written some very interesting things over the years. In my opinion Irrational Exuberance is still one of the best books to read about stockmarkets, and in the New Financial Order he set out some new ideas for democratising finance so that it better serves the public. This short book (the previous reviewer is right to say it's more of a pamphlet) draws a bit on the ideas mapped out in the New Financial Order as a way out of the current mess.

To massively over-simplify, Shiller says we need a mix of short-term sticking plasters and longer-term reforms. In respect of the former camp he says we have to accept bailouts as a necessary evil, even though it goes against the moral hazard arguments. he also suggests setting up a revamped Homeowners Loan Corporation which would take on mortgages as collateral for loans to mortgage lenders in return for influencing the form future mortgages take (in order that they offer a better deal to homeowners).

Turning to the longer term Shiller sets out 6 key policies - comprehensive financial advice (based on fees rather than commssions), the establishment of a consumer finance watchdog, the creation of more default financial options (not just pensions, mortgage arrangements could also be included), improved financial disclosure, to improve accountability, the creation of better financial databases which would help provide consumers with better advice and more tailored products, and finally and most radically the creation of new units of economic measurement, based on what things actually cost.

There are big plus points about this book. First, Shiller is willing to think big. he's effectively arguing for more financial innovation, not less, but also that the process should be carried out in a way that meets the needs of the public. Secondly he warns against scapegoating the financial sector. In the epilogue he argues that we should be focusing on the systems that went wrong, rather than seeking to punish the industry as a whole. As tempting as it might be to try to stick the boot into the super-rich in the City, that isn't really going to take us very far. Shiller instead is setting out some challenging ideas for how we might stop this kind of crisis arising again.

an essential handbook for bubble spotters, 05 Aug 2008
Shiller's is a concise attempt to elaborate in just seven chapters the genesis of the housing bubble (a psychological carry-over from the dotcom bubble), explode its myths ("prices always go up"), explore its scale and the dangers of its deepening impact (it's bad), assert the need to maintain confidence in our economic and financial institutions by aggressive action (comparing the US and European responses to the Great Depression), and then explore longer-term, more fundamental reforms and innovations that will create a population much more attuned to economic risk.

Shiller says his inspiration was John Maynard Keynes 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace', which I take to mean that getting the subprime solution wrong could have devastating consequences.

At less than 200 pages of wide-margined type, lightly annotated and with no bibliography, there is something of the emergency pamphlet about this book. And Shiller is advocating a much speedier and more deep-rooted response to the crisis, which, as of a few weeks ago, he felt was still not being taken seriously enough.

There are many recommendations, but if the scale of the problem is as suggested, I'd argue that it's a book that everyone who lives in a house (and who is of reading age) should own; just don't buy ten and try to rent them out.

The Knackered Hack

Excellent and informative - the best place to start, 18 Sep 2008
This is simply the best introduction to the Buy-to-Let market available. The fundamental strength of the book is that David Lawrenson is (1) not trying to sell you one of his portfolios or convince you to invest in Romanina; (2) someone who has been there and done it. So the advice in the book is balanced, realistic and of immense practical use. Highly recommended.

Invaluable advice - helps avoid all the pitfalls and mantraps, 02 May 2008
For those looking to embark on a letting project or expand on a a small property portfolio, this concise tome is an essential companion. The book contains lots of step by step guidelines to ensure the reader is aware of factors they may otherwise overlook and help avoid potentially expensive and worrysome situations. Very detailed with being fussy.

Successful Property Letting: Review, 08 Feb 2008
Being a Chartered Surveyor and having worked in the rented property sector myself 20 years ago, I thought that I knew enough to be enter the buy-to-let world without the need for help. Reading David's book made me realize how wrong I was !! This book is essential for both new starters and for old hands in the buy-to-let world, and gives practical advice on all aspects of residential property letting in an easy-to-read format. Great value for money.

Excellent book! The best I've read on the subject, 10 Aug 2007
This book is really good. It's very readable, in easy to find sections and he goes into a great deal of detail without lots of unnecessary waffle. He gives a lot of common sense advice and covers all aspects of property investing, not just the merits of doing it, but everything else, from finding property to becoming a landlord and the legal side of that. A very good read, highly recommended.

Very useful source of information, 20 Jun 2007
Last year I started looking at buy-to-let opportunities and needed to gather loads of information. So I decided to purchase some books covering the issues. David Lawrenson's book in particular was the most useful one of those I read (5 in total). What I like about it is the practical and hands-on focus throughout the chapters. Also the list of websites/references has been extremely useful. Definitely a book to have if you're serious about buy-to-let!

Financial Democracy, 08 Nov 2008
For Prof. R.J. Shiller, the root of the subprime mortgage crisis in the US is a myth, the belief that real estate prices must strongly trend upward for demographic reasons.
He proves that the price of real estate, to the contrary, is trending lower. What went up are the quality and the dimension of the average individual houses. But what about `land'? Didn't Mark Twain recommend strongly: `Go for land. They've stopped producing it.'? R.J. Shiller remarks cleverly that only 2,6 % of US land is used for urbanization.
Another factor of the bubble was psychological: the human herd instinct. There was a social contagion of boom thinking.
A third, more specific, factor was the deliberate governmental policy to promote home-ownership as much as possible. This should be good for the Party.

When the real estate bubble burst, it disrupted immediately the credit markets. Aggressive mortgage lenders never worried about repayment risks. They repackaged the mortgages, got top ratings from the rating agencies and sold their packages to third parties all over the world.
But even more importantly, the crisis damaged the `social fabric', the way of life of millions of families and also human relationships (through aggressive creditors). It created an atmosphere of distrust, of hoarding, with runs on banks; in one word, it gave rise to a psychological environment that could lead to a severe and long depression, which would hurt every citizen. Therefore, the subprime crisis must be solved.

Prof. R.J. Shiller makes a distinction between the short term and the long term solution.
In the short term, there should be a massive bail-out in order to prevent an escalation of the crisis and of the economic downturn.
In the long term, the US government should create a basic social contract and protect every citizen against major misfortune. It should impose financial democracy through standardized full disclosure documents so that everybody should get better information about all the risks involved. Without affecting individual privacy, indicators should be created about the real value of real estate. Those should lead to a more efficient pricing of houses and to a stabilization of the market. Prof. R.J. Shiller did not only recommend these policies, but created an indicator himself.

With an open and clear-sighted mind, Prof. Shiller wrote a small, but essential, book about a dramatic worldwide crisis, without losing the `human touch'. It is an essential read for all those interested in the future of mankind.


Thoughtful, straightforward diagnosis and prescription, 18 Sep 2008
Robert Shiller, the prescient author of the book Irrational Exuberance, offers an insightful examination of the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis, and suggests a list of potential measures for the future. He lays the blame for the subprime crisis on the same oblivious fiscal attitudes that led to the technology bubble of the 1990s and the real estate bubble of the 2000s. Both bubbles involved excessive lending and resulted in severe losses for capital providers. His prescription for dealing with the crisis involves a range of policy measures. In the short term, he calls for bailouts for low-income borrowers who got drawn into subprime scams that they did not understand. For the long term, he proposes a new framework for financial institutions, more transparent information, simpler contracts, improved risk-management markets, equity insurance and home loans linked to income, among other measures. Both his diagnosis and his prescription will be controversial, no doubt, but getAbstract thinks his book is a necessary text for anyone who wants to understand what's happened, and how to survive it and learn from it.

Short and radical, 30 Aug 2008
Robert Shiller has written some very interesting things over the years. In my opinion Irrational Exuberance is still one of the best books to read about stockmarkets, and in the New Financial Order he set out some new ideas for democratising finance so that it better serves the public. This short book (the previous reviewer is right to say it's more of a pamphlet) draws a bit on the ideas mapped out in the New Financial Order as a way out of the current mess.

To massively over-simplify, Shiller says we need a mix of short-term sticking plasters and longer-term reforms. In respect of the former camp he says we have to accept bailouts as a necessary evil, even though it goes against the moral hazard arguments. he also suggests setting up a revamped Homeowners Loan Corporation which would take on mortgages as collateral for loans to mortgage lenders in return for influencing the form future mortgages take (in order that they offer a better deal to homeowners).

Turning to the longer term Shiller sets out 6 key policies - comprehensive financial advice (based on fees rather than commssions), the establishment of a consumer finance watchdog, the creation of more default financial options (not just pensions, mortgage arrangements could also be included), improved financial disclosure, to improve accountability, the creation of better financial databases which would help provide consumers with better advice and more tailored products, and finally and most radically the creation of new units of economic measurement, based on what things actually cost.

There are big plus points about this book. First, Shiller is willing to think big. he's effectively arguing for more financial innovation, not less, but also that the process should be carried out in a way that meets the needs of the public. Secondly he warns against scapegoating the financial sector. In the epilogue he argues that we should be focusing on the systems that went wrong, rather than seeking to punish the industry as a whole. As tempting as it might be to try to stick the boot into the super-rich in the City, that isn't really going to take us very far. Shiller instead is setting out some challenging ideas for how we might stop this kind of crisis arising again.

an essential handbook for bubble spotters, 05 Aug 2008
Shiller's is a concise attempt to elaborate in just seven chapters the genesis of the housing bubble (a psychological carry-over from the dotcom bubble), explode its myths ("prices always go up"), explore its scale and the dangers of its deepening impact (it's bad), assert the need to maintain confidence in our economic and financial institutions by aggressive action (comparing the US and European responses to the Great Depression), and then explore longer-term, more fundamental reforms and innovations that will create a population much more attuned to economic risk.

Shiller says his inspiration was John Maynard Keynes 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace', which I take to mean that getting the subprime solution wrong could have devastating consequences.

At less than 200 pages of wide-margined type, lightly annotated and with no bibliography, there is something of the emergency pamphlet about this book. And Shiller is advocating a much speedier and more deep-rooted response to the crisis, which, as of a few weeks ago, he felt was still not being taken seriously enough.

There are many recommendations, but if the scale of the problem is as suggested, I'd argue that it's a book that everyone who lives in a house (and who is of reading age) should own; just don't buy ten and try to rent them out.

The Knackered Hack

Excellent and informative - the best place to start, 18 Sep 2008
This is simply the best introduction to the Buy-to-Let market available. The fundamental strength of the book is that David Lawrenson is (1) not trying to sell you one of his portfolios or convince you to invest in Romanina; (2) someone who has been there and done it. So the advice in the book is balanced, realistic and of immense practical use. Highly recommended.

Invaluable advice - helps avoid all the pitfalls and mantraps, 02 May 2008
For those looking to embark on a letting project or expand on a a small property portfolio, this concise tome is an essential companion. The book contains lots of step by step guidelines to ensure the reader is aware of factors they may otherwise overlook and help avoid potentially expensive and worrysome situations. Very detailed with being fussy.

Successful Property Letting: Review, 08 Feb 2008
Being a Chartered Surveyor and having worked in the rented property sector myself 20 years ago, I thought that I knew enough to be enter the buy-to-let world without the need for help. Reading David's book made me realize how wrong I was !! This book is essential for both new starters and for old hands in the buy-to-let world, and gives practical advice on all aspects of residential property letting in an easy-to-read format. Great value for money.

Excellent book! The best I've read on the subject, 10 Aug 2007
This book is really good. It's very readable, in easy to find sections and he goes into a great deal of detail without lots of unnecessary waffle. He gives a lot of common sense advice and covers all aspects of property investing, not just the merits of doing it, but everything else, from finding property to becoming a landlord and the legal side of that. A very good read, highly recommended.

Very useful source of information, 20 Jun 2007
Last year I started looking at buy-to-let opportunities and needed to gather loads of information. So I decided to purchase some books covering the issues. David Lawrenson's book in particular was the most useful one of those I read (5 in total). What I like about it is the practical and hands-on focus throughout the chapters. Also the list of websites/references has been extremely useful. Definitely a book to have if you're serious about buy-to-let!

fred's being proved right, 01 Sep 2008
With UK house prices now crashing and many experts now foreseeing falls of up to 40% it looks like Fred Harrison is spot on with his predictions so far. He seems to be one of the few who have got the timing of the bubble bursting just right.

High on opinions, Low on substance - buy something else, 09 Mar 2008
hmmm. not an impressive read. The Author alleges to build a case to 'prove' his 18 year economic cycle theory. The 'proof' offered is poor and not convincing. I had hoped for much more than the repeated Mantra of the 18 year cycle, I get the feeling that if he states it enough as fact, then it must be true. Having recently read "The Black Swan" by Taleb, then 2010 was a real disappointment.

I suppose I should have submitted this review after reselling my copy on Amazon. oops.

My Very Own Crystal Ball, 26 Dec 2007
A very interesting read. I purchased this book in mid 2006 and so far everything that was predicted has come true. According to Harrison we are in for two tough years in the property market. 2008 and 2009 will see a downturn, however, come 2010 the market will once again turn. Currently I would love to move into a larger house but believe you me until January 2010 I'm staying put.

Scarily accurate so far, 17 Oct 2007
I read this book 6 months ago, and in the past few months have started to see signs that suggest the author is correct in his suppositions. An essential read for anyone considering buying a property in 2007-2008.

The coming depression - how low will he go ?, 21 Aug 2006
As a prominent proponent of the Land Value Tax it is intriguing to find that Fred Harrison comes down on the side of both private ownership and economic growth. For him the value of the land is essentially as a material resource and this distinction forms the basis of his thorough analysis of the housing market in the context of a modern capitalist economy. Alan Greenspan and Gordon Brown are criticised for their failure to acknowledge the effect of land speculation on modern predicitve methods. For all his detailed analysis of the cyclical trends of boom and bust he nevertheless maintains that economics is not an exact science.

CNBC, day trading, The Motley Fool, Silicon Investor. Not since the 1920s has there been such an intense fascination with the US stock market. For an increasing number of people, logging onto Yahoo finance is a habit more precious than that morning cup of coffee (as thousands of SBUX and YHOO shareholders know too well). Yet while the market continues to go higher, most of us can't get Alan Greenspan's famous line out of our heads. In Irrational Exuberance, Yale economics professor Robert Shiller examines this public fascination with stocks and sees a combination of factors that have driven stocks higher, including the rise of the Internet, increased coverage by the popular media of financial news, overly optimistic cheerleading by analysts and other pundits, the decline of inflation, and the rise of the mutual fund industry. He writes, "Perceived long-term risk is down ... Emotions and heightened attention to the market create a desire to get into the game. Such is irrational exuberance today in the United States."

By history's yardstick, Shiller believes this market is grossly overvalued and the factors that have conspired to create and amplify this unique millennium event--the baby boom effect, the public infatuation with the Internet, news media interest--will most certainly abate. He fears that too many individuals and institutions have come to view stocks as their only investment vehicle, and that investors should consider looking beyond stocks as a way to diversify and hedge against the inevitable downturn. This is a serious and well-researched book that should read like a Stephen King novel to anyone who has staked their future well-being to the market's continued success. --Harry C. Edwards, Amazon.com

Financial Democracy, 08 Nov 2008
For Prof. R.J. Shiller, the root of the subprime mortgage crisis in the US is a myth, the belief that real estate prices must strongly trend upward for demographic reasons.
He proves that the price of real estate, to the contrary, is trending lower. What went up are the quality and the dimension of the average individual houses. But what about `land'? Didn't Mark Twain recommend strongly: `Go for land. They've stopped producing it.'? R.J. Shiller remarks cleverly that only 2,6 % of US land is used for urbanization.
Another factor of the bubble was psychological: the human herd instinct. There was a social contagion of boom thinking.
A third, more specific, factor was the deliberate governmental policy to promote home-ownership as much as possible. This should be good for the Party.

When the real estate bubble burst, it disrupted immediately the credit markets. Aggressive mortgage lenders never worried about repayment risks. They repackaged the mortgages, got top ratings from the rating agencies and sold their packages to third parties all over the world.
But even more importantly, the crisis damaged the `social fabric', the way of life of millions of families and also human relationships (through aggressive creditors). It created an atmosphere of distrust, of hoarding, with runs on banks; in one word, it gave rise to a psychological environment that could lead to a severe and long depression, which would hurt every citizen. Therefore, the subprime crisis must be solved.

Prof. R.J. Shiller makes a distinction between the short term and the long term solution.
In the short term, there should be a massive bail-out in order to prevent an escalation of the crisis and of the economic downturn.
In the long term, the US government should create a basic social contract and protect every citizen against major misfortune. It should impose financial democracy through standardized full disclosure documents so that everybody should get better information about all the risks involved. Without affecting individual privacy, indicators should be created about the real value of real estate. Those should lead to a more efficient pricing of houses and to a stabilization of the market. Prof. R.J. Shiller did not only recommend these policies, but created an indicator himself.

With an open and clear-sighted mind, Prof. Shiller wrote a small, but essential, book about a dramatic worldwide crisis, without losing the `human touch'. It is an essential read for all those interested in the future of mankind.


Thoughtful, straightforward diagnosis and prescription, 18 Sep 2008
Robert Shiller, the prescient author of the book Irrational Exuberance, offers an insightful examination of the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis, and suggests a list of potential measures for the future. He lays the blame for the subprime crisis on the same oblivious fiscal attitudes that led to the technology bubble of the 1990s and the real estate bubble of the 2000s. Both bubbles involved excessive lending and resulted in severe losses for capital providers. His prescription for dealing with the crisis involves a range of policy measures. In the short term, he calls for bailouts for low-income borrowers who got drawn into subprime scams that they did not understand. For the long term, he proposes a new framework for financial institutions, more transparent information, simpler contracts, improved risk-management markets, equity insurance and home loans linked to income, among other measures. Both his diagnosis and his prescription will be controversial, no doubt, but getAbstract thinks his book is a necessary text for anyone who wants to understand what's happened, and how to survive it and learn from it.

Short and radical, 30 Aug 2008
Robert Shiller has written some very interesting things over the years. In my opinion Irrational Exuberance is still one of the best books to read about stockmarkets, and in the New Financial Order he set out some new ideas for democratising finance so that it better serves the public. This short book (the previous reviewer is right to say it's more of a pamphlet) draws a bit on the ideas mapped out in the New Financial Order as a way out of the current mess.

To massively over-simplify, Shiller says we need a mix of short-term sticking plasters and longer-term reforms. In respect of the former camp he says we have to accept bailouts as a necessary evil, even though it goes against the moral hazard arguments. he also suggests setting up a revamped Homeowners Loan Corporation which would take on mortgages as collateral for loans to mortgage lenders in return for influencing the form future mortgages take (in order that they offer a better deal to homeowners).

Turning to the longer term Shiller sets out 6 key policies - comprehensive financial advice (based on fees rather than commssions), the establishment of a consumer finance watchdog, the creation of more default financial options (not just pensions, mortgage arrangements could also be included), improved financial disclosure, to improve accountability, the creation of better financial databases which would help provide consumers with better advice and more tailored products, and finally and most radically the creation of new units of economic measurement, based on what things actually cost.

There are big plus points about this book. First, Shiller is willing to think big. he's effectively arguing for more financial innovation, not less, but also that the process should be carried out in a way that meets the needs of the public. Secondly he warns against scapegoating the financial sector. In the epilogue he argues that we should be focusing on the systems that went wrong, rather than seeking to punish the industry as a whole. As tempting as it might be to try to stick the boot into the super-rich in the City, that isn't really going to take us very far. Shiller instead is setting out some challenging ideas for how we might stop this kind of crisis arising again.

an essential handbook for bubble spotters, 05 Aug 2008
Shiller's is a concise attempt to elaborate in just seven chapters the genesis of the housing bubble (a psychological carry-over from the dotcom bubble), explode its myths ("prices always go up"), explore its scale and the dangers of its deepening impact (it's bad), assert the need to maintain confidence in our economic and financial institutions by aggressive action (comparing the US and European responses to the Great Depression), and then explore longer-term, more fundamental reforms and innovations that will create a population much more attuned to economic risk.

Shiller says his inspiration was John Maynard Keynes 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace', which I take to mean that getting the subprime solution wrong could have devastating consequences.

At less than 200 pages of wide-margined type, lightly annotated and with no bibliography, there is something of the emergency pamphlet about this book. And Shiller is advocating a much speedier and more deep-rooted response to the crisis, which, as of a few weeks ago, he felt was still not being taken seriously enough.

There are many recommendations, but if the scale of the problem is as suggested, I'd argue that it's a book that everyone who lives in a house (and who is of reading age) should own; just don't buy ten and try to rent them out.

The Knackered Hack

Excellent and informative - the best place to start, 18 Sep 2008
This is simply the best introduction to the Buy-to-Let market available. The fundamental strength of the book is that David Lawrenson is (1) not trying to sell you one of his portfolios or convince you to invest in Romanina; (2) someone who has been there and done it. So the advice in the book is balanced, realistic and of immense practical use. Highly recommended.

Invaluable advice - helps avoid all the pitfalls and mantraps, 02 May 2008
For those looking to embark on a letting project or expand on a a small property portfolio, this concise tome is an essential companion. The book contains lots of step by step guidelines to ensure the reader is aware of factors they may otherwise overlook and help avoid potentially expensive and worrysome situations. Very detailed with being fussy.

Successful Property Letting: Review, 08 Feb 2008
Being a Chartered Surveyor and having worked in the rented property sector myself 20 years ago, I thought that I knew enough to be enter the buy-to-let world without the need for help. Reading David's book made me realize how wrong I was !! This book is essential for both new starters and for old hands in the buy-to-let world, and gives practical advice on all aspects of residential property letting in an easy-to-read format. Great value for money.

Excellent book! The best I've read on the subject, 10 Aug 2007
This book is really good. It's very readable, in easy to find sections and he goes into a great deal of detail without lots of unnecessary waffle. He gives a lot of common sense advice and covers all aspects of property investing, not just the merits of doing it, but everything else, from finding property to becoming a landlord and the legal side of that. A very good read, highly recommended.

Very useful source of information, 20 Jun 2007
Last year I started looking at buy-to-let opportunities and needed to gather loads of information. So I decided to purchase some books covering the issues. David Lawrenson's book in particular was the most useful one of those I read (5 in total). What I like about it is the practical and hands-on focus throughout the chapters. Also the list of websites/references has been extremely useful. Definitely a book to have if you're serious about buy-to-let!

fred's being proved right, 01 Sep 2008
With UK house prices now crashing and many experts now foreseeing falls of up to 40% it looks like Fred Harrison is spot on with his predictions so far. He seems to be one of the few who have got the timing of the bubble bursting just right.

High on opinions, Low on substance - buy something else, 09 Mar 2008
hmmm. not an impressive read. The Author alleges to build a case to 'prove' his 18 year economic cycle theory. The 'proof' offered is poor and not convincing. I had hoped for much more than the repeated Mantra of the 18 year cycle, I get the feeling that if he states it enough as fact, then it must be true. Having recently read "The Black Swan" by Taleb, then 2010 was a real disappointment.

I suppose I should have submitted this review after reselling my copy on Amazon. oops.

My Very Own Crystal Ball, 26 Dec 2007
A very interesting read. I purchased this book in mid 2006 and so far everything that was predicted has come true. According to Harrison we are in for two tough years in the property market. 2008 and 2009 will see a downturn, however, come 2010 the market will once again turn. Currently I would love to move into a larger house but believe you me until January 2010 I'm staying put.

Scarily accurate so far, 17 Oct 2007
I read this book 6 months ago, and in the past few months have started to see signs that suggest the author is correct in his suppositions. An essential read for anyone considering buying a property in 2007-2008.

The coming depression - how low will he go ?, 21 Aug 2006
As a prominent proponent of the Land Value Tax it is intriguing to find that Fred Harrison comes down on the side of both private ownership and economic growth. For him the value of the land is essentially as a material resource and this distinction forms the basis of his thorough analysis of the housing market in the context of a modern capitalist economy. Alan Greenspan and Gordon Brown are criticised for their failure to acknowledge the effect of land speculation on modern predicitve methods. For all his detailed analysis of the cyclical trends of boom and bust he nevertheless maintains that economics is not an exact science.

Packed with Knowledge!, 07 Sep 2005
Shortly after a 1996 briefing by author Robert J. Shiller, Alan Greenspan, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, warned the country about the mood of "irrational exuberance" that was pushing up stock prices. In hindsight, it's clear that the bull was just beginning. Anyone who heeded that warning would have missed nearly unprecedented gains. But Shiller proved prophetic when the market peaked and crashed in 2000, the year he published this book's first edition. Shiller isn't teaching market timing; he's debunking cherished investing axioms, such as the belief that stocks or real estate are necessarily great long-term investments. He discredits financial reporting, notes the psychological and emotional factors that make investors behave irrationally, and sounds a note of caution as timely now as it was at the turn of the millennium. This book vaccinates you against the virus of credulity. We suggest a copy for every investor - dog-eared from frequent rereading. It's a wise investment.

bubble bubble, 26 Aug 2003
Shiller stands as one of the few people to come out of the experience of the recent bubble with his reputation enhanced. His book came out at pretty much the peak since when the market had dropped an incredible amount.

I can see why people didn't like hearing what he was saying at the time but in retrospect it is hard to challenge much of what he says. P/E ratios were wildly out of line with historical precedent with no clear reason why (seemingly sometimes just because the companies had websites!). I never really bought the US productivity miracle story anyhow but it seems increasingly clear that the reason for higher productivity in US firms is predominantly that employees work significantly more hours than European equivalents, not because of a techological revolution.

It makes interesting reading that there was very similar talk of "new eras" during previous bubbles, and of small investors only just realising that equities were a better investment over the long-run (how many times will this one be trotted out I wonder). Also having spoken to quite a few people who made and then lost a few grand in TMT stocks I find it very hard to dismiss the central idea that in such cases bubbles are really just naturally-forming pyramid schemes.

finally personally I'm gob-smacked that anyone actually bothers to seriously listen to fund managers anymore. They were no better at avoiding the collapse of the bubble than the day-traders as our staff pension fund has learnt to its cost. The only big investor to arguably call it right was Tony Dye at PDFM but he was two years or so too early.

I'm only giving it four stars because a) it's now of historical interest and not that practical for the future and b) because I found it too easy to understand. I'm not an investment expert and I'm wary of simplistic explanations in areas I don't know very well.

Having said that I do think there is a great deal of sense in what he says, and it is well worth a read if only to puncture any lingering illusions you may have about efficient markets.

An elegantly simple book on why markets ignore fundamenals, 11 Feb 2001
Not so long ago, the rise of the NASDAQ to a a peak of over 5,000 was seen as a clear sign that we had entered a new economic era. Economic cycles were a thing of the past, new technology and the belief that the all-powerful US Fed would ride to our rescue encouraged investors to bid up share prices to levels that now in hindsight looked certainly unrealistic. Academic studies on stock markets teach us that prices of stocks eventually return to their long-trend line. However, as Shiller in this elegantly simple book demonstrates, financial markets periodically detach themselves from economic fundamentals. The trending or herd influence of investors pulls markets to over-optimistic and over-pestimistic levels. Stock market psychology as Shiller shows is simply the use of rules of thumb by investors that distorts the efficient market over the short term. What Shiller unfortunately does not investigate is how style factors could become even more confusing as more and more investors (primarily institutional fund managers) become more conscious of the potential of style investing. However, the insight that the herd is probably made up of a bunch of headless chickens (who use feeling and not disciplined analysis) can be enjoyed by both active and disillusioned investors.

A worthwhile addition to the literature on the subject, 02 Jan 2001
It was on 5 December 1996 that Alan Greenspan described the behaviour of investors who had driven the value of shares on the New York Stock Exchange to record levels as "Irrational Exuberance". Robert J. Shiller has used this remark as the title of his book and the starting point for an examination of stock market and investor behaviour which is both accessible to the general reader and adds to the existing stock of serious work on the subject.

Robert Shiller begins his look at irrational exuberance in financial markets by outlining the evidence, which he finds convincing, that the current level of stock markets (even allowing for the poor performance during the year 2000) is far above that which is reasonable or rational.

He argues that this behaviour can be explained by 12 factors which are examined in the subsequent chapters. These are a mixture of common perceptions which drive markets higher than the underlying facts justify (role of internet, baby boom, expansion of defined contribution pension schemes, decline of economic rivals, cultural change favouring business, Republican congress, growth of mutual funds), cultural and psychological factors which have affected investor behaviour (expanded media reporting, optimistic forecasts of analysts, rise of gambling opportunities) and feedback mechanisms. The detailed analysis which follows explains convincingly how bubbles emerge through feedback effects (feeding upon themselves driving markets upwards or down). It also discusses the role of the media (which ultimatley Shiller regards as having at best a short-term influence on market behaviour), the psychology of the investor (for me the least convincing part of the book) and an interesting chapter discussing the arguments of efficient market theorists and their attempts to justify current stock market levels with reference to dividend values (since they are so clearly at variance with price earnings ratios).

Finally Shiller concludes with his recommendations to overcome the irrationality of markets. Paradoxically, these mean an expansion of the role of the market through the commodification of more risks and the action of investors to spread their risks beyond the stock market.

Robert J. Shiller's book is a great introduction for those interested in the history and causes of financial exuberance. While you may not agree with his conculsions and proposals, the preceding examination of the various causes seems comprehensive and is lucidly explained. Of particular interest are the chapters discussing feedback mechanisms and how financial bubbles are inflated What this section lacks, perhaps because no one has found the answer, is a description of what causes the feedback loop to breakdown and the bubble to deflate. In summary I consider this to be a worthwhile addition to the literature on financial markets and how they can go wrong.

An analysis all the more chilling for its rigour, 13 Jun 2000
Schiller's case rests on a rich mix of quantitative and qualitative research and analysis. (By qualitative, I include his surveys of fund managers with small sample sizes). He challenges a great many points of conventional wisdom, showing them to be neither conventional nor wise. One thing he fails to do, however, is systematically refute the hypothesis that high valuations (especially for tech stocks) are justified. Real option pricing, for instance, does demand an approach completely different to that of traditional discounted cash flows: if an investor wishes to take on the risk of an unproven business model, with its attendant uncertainty but large potential upside, that is not necessarily irrational.

Schiller's answer is that the P/E ratios are so far off the historical norms that it's not worth discussing further. And the option pricing view can't hold for the whole market.

The challenges to efficient market theory, and to Jeremy Siegel's (of the Wharton School at U Penn) views in "Stocks for the long run" are similarly one step short of complete.

That said, this book serves the invaluable function of challenging the complacency that pervades popular opinion and the media. My own favourite manifestation of this is the Economist's observation that when stocks rise, newspapers describe them as "strong"; when they fall, they are "volatile". What's in a name? Market sentiment, which drives prices to unsustainable levels.

This book was written because the author cares. Both as an academic and as an observer of public policy, he rightly fears the effects of a collapse in the markets. He deserves to be read.

Financial Democracy, 08 Nov 2008
For Prof. R.J. Shiller, the root of the subprime mortgage crisis in the US is a myth, the belief that real estate prices must strongly trend upward for demographic reasons.
He proves that the price of real estate, to the contrary, is trending lower. What went up are the quality and the dimension of the average individual houses. But what about `land'? Didn't Mark Twain recommend strongly: `Go for land. They've stopped producing it.'? R.J. Shiller remarks cleverly that only 2,6 % of US land is used for urbanization.
Another factor of the bubble was psychological: the human herd instinct. There was a social contagion of boom thinking.
A third, more specific, factor was the deliberate governmental policy to promote home-ownership as much as possible. This should be good for the Party.

When the real estate bubble burst, it disrupted immediately the credit markets. Aggressive mortgage lenders never worried about repayment risks. They repackaged the mortgages, got top ratings from the rating agencies and sold their packages to third parties all over the world.
But even more importantly, the crisis damaged the `social fabric', the way of life of millions of families and also human relationships (through aggressive creditors). It created an atmosphere of distrust, of hoarding, with runs on banks; in one word, it gave rise to a psychological environment that could lead to a severe and long depression, which would hurt every citizen. Therefore, the subprime crisis must be solved.

Prof. R.J. Shiller makes a distinction between the short term and the long term solution.
In the short term, there should be a massive bail-out in order to prevent an escalation of the crisis and of the economic downturn.
In the long term, the US government should create a basic social contract and protect every citizen against major misfortune. It should impose financial democracy through standardized full disclosure documents so that everybody should get better information about all the risks involved. Without affecting individual privacy, indicators should be created about the real value of real estate. Those should lead to a more efficient pricing of houses and to a stabilization of the market. Prof. R.J. Shiller did not only recommend these policies, but created an indicator himself.

With an open and clear-sighted mind, Prof. Shiller wrote a small, but essential, book about a dramatic worldwide crisis, without losing the `human touch'. It is an essential read for all those interested in the future of mankind.


Thoughtful, straightforward diagnosis and prescription, 18 Sep 2008
Robert Shiller, the prescient author of the book Irrational Exuberance, offers an insightful examination of the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis, and suggests a list of potential measures for the future. He lays the blame for the subprime crisis on the same oblivious fiscal attitudes that led to the technology bubble of the 1990s and the real estate bubble of the 2000s. Both bubbles involved excessive lending and resulted in severe losses for capital providers. His prescription for dealing with the crisis involves a range of policy measures. In the short term, he calls for bailouts for low-income borrowers who got drawn into subprime scams that they did not understand. For the long term, he proposes a new framework for financial institutions, more transparent information, simpler contracts, improved risk-management markets, equity insurance and home loans linked to income, among other measures. Both his diagnosis and his prescription will be controversial, no doubt, but getAbstract thinks his book is a necessary text for anyone who wants to understand what's happened, and how to survive it and learn from it.

Short and radical, 30 Aug 2008
Robert Shiller has written some very interesting things over the years. In my opinion Irrational Exuberance is still one of the best books to read about stockmarkets, and in the New Financial Order he set out some new ideas for democratising finance so that it better serves the public. This short book (the previous reviewer is right to say it's more of a pamphlet) draws a bit on the ideas mapped out in the New Financial Order as a way out of the current mess.

To massively over-simplify, Shiller says we need a mix of short-term sticking plasters and longer-term reforms. In respect of the former camp he says we have to accept bailouts as a necessary evil, even though it goes against the moral hazard arguments. he also suggests setting up a revamped Homeowners Loan Corporation which would take on mortgages as collateral for loans to mortgage lenders in return for influencing the form future mortgages take (in order that they offer a better deal to homeowners).

Turning to the longer term Shiller sets out 6 key policies - comprehensive financial advice (based on fees rather than commssions), the establishment of a consumer finance watchdog, the creation of more default financial options (not just pensions, mortgage arrangements could also be included), improved financial disclosure, to improve accountability, the creation of better financial databases which would help provide consumers with better advice and more tailored products, and finally and most radically the creation of new units of economic measurement, based on what things actually cost.

There are big plus points about this book. First, Shiller is willing to think big. he's effectively arguing for more financial innovation, not less, but also that the process should be carried out in a way that meets the needs of the public. Secondly he warns against scapegoating the financial sector. In the epilogue he argues that we should be focusing on the systems that went wrong, rather than seeking to punish the industry as a whole. As tempting as it might be to try to stick the boot into the super-rich in the City, that isn't really going to take us very far. Shiller instead is setting out some challenging ideas for how we might stop this kind of crisis arising again.

an essential handbook for bubble spotters, 05 Aug 2008
Shiller's is a concise attempt to elaborate in just seven chapters the genesis of the housing bubble (a psychological carry-over from the dotcom bubble), explode its myths ("prices always go up"), explore its scale and the dangers of its deepening impact (it's bad), assert the need to maintain confidence in our economic and financial institutions by aggressive action (comparing the US and European responses to the Great Depression), and then explore longer-term, more fundamental reforms and innovations that will create a population much more attuned to economic risk.

Shiller says his inspiration was John Maynard Keynes 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace', which I take to mean that getting the subprime solution wrong could have devastating consequences.

At less than 200 pages of wide-margined type, lightly annotated and with no bibliography, there is something of the emergency pamphlet about this book. And Shiller is advocating a much speedier and more deep-rooted response to the crisis, which, as of a few weeks ago, he felt was still not being taken seriously enough.

There are many recommendations, but if the scale of the problem is as suggested, I'd argue that it's a book that everyone who lives in a house (and who is of reading age) should own; just don't buy ten and try to rent them out.

The Knackered Hack

Excellent and informative - the best place to start, 18 Sep 2008
This is simply the best introduction to the Buy-to-Let market available. The fundamental strength of the book is that David Lawrenson is (1) not trying to sell you one of his portfolios or convince you to invest in Romanina; (2) someone who has been there and done it. So the advice in the book is balanced, realistic and of immense practical use. Highly recommended.

Invaluable advice - helps avoid all the pitfalls and mantraps, 02 May 2008
For those looking to embark on a letting project or expand on a a small property portfolio, this concise tome is an essential companion. The book contains lots of step by step guidelines to ensure the reader is aware of factors they may otherwise overlook and help avoid potentially expensive and worrysome situations. Very detailed with being fussy.

Successful Property Letting: Review, 08 Feb 2008
Being a Chartered Surveyor and having worked in the rented property sector myself 20 years ago, I thought that I knew enough to be enter the buy-to-let world without the need for help. Reading David's book made me realize how wrong I was !! This book is essential for both new starters and for old hands in the buy-to-let world, and gives practical advice on all aspects of residential property letting in an easy-to-read format. Great value for money.

Excellent book! The best I've read on the subject, 10 Aug 2007
This book is really good. It's very readable, in easy to find sections and he goes into a great deal of detail without lots of unnecessary waffle. He gives a lot of common sense advice and covers all aspects of property investing, not just the merits of doing it, but everything else, from finding property to becoming a landlord and the legal side of that. A very good read, highly recommended.

Very useful source of information, 20 Jun 2007
Last year I started looking at buy-to-let opportunities and needed to gather loads of information. So I decided to purchase some books covering the issues. David Lawrenson's book in particular was the most useful one of those I read (5 in total). What I like about it is the practical and hands-on focus throughout the chapters. Also the list of websites/references has been extremely useful. Definitely a book to have if you're serious about buy-to-let!

fred's being proved right, 01 Sep 2008
With UK house prices now crashing and many experts now foreseeing falls of up to 40% it looks like Fred Harrison is spot on with his predictions so far. He seems to be one of the few who have got the timing of the bubble bursting just right.

High on opinions, Low on substance - buy something else, 09 Mar 2008
hmmm. not an impressive read. The Author alleges to build a case to 'prove' his 18 year economic cycle theory. The 'proof' offered is poor and not convincing. I had hoped for much more than the repeated Mantra of the 18 year cycle, I get the feeling that if he states it enough as fact, then it must be true. Having recently read "The Black Swan" by Taleb, then 2010 was a real disappointment.

I suppose I should have submitted this review after reselling my copy on Amazon. oops.

My Very Own Crystal Ball, 26 Dec 2007
A very interesting read. I purchased this book in mid 2006 and so far everything that was predicted has come true. According to Harrison we are in for two tough years in the property market. 2008 and 2009 will see a downturn, however, come 2010 the market will once again turn. Currently I would love to move into a larger house but believe you me until January 2010 I'm staying put.

Scarily accurate so far, 17 Oct 2007
I read this book 6 months ago, and in the past few months have started to see signs that suggest the author is correct in his suppositions. An essential read for anyone considering buying a property in 2007-2008.

The coming depression - how low will he go ?, 21 Aug 2006
As a prominent proponent of the Land Value Tax it is intriguing to find that Fred Harrison comes down on the side of both private ownership and economic growth. For him the value of the land is essentially as a material resource and this distinction forms the basis of his thorough analysis of the housing market in the context of a modern capitalist economy. Alan Greenspan and Gordon Brown are criticised for their failure to acknowledge the effect of land speculation on modern predicitve methods. For all his detailed analysis of the cyclical trends of boom and bust he nevertheless maintains that economics is not an exact science.

Packed with Knowledge!, 07 Sep 2005
Shortly after a 1996 briefing by author Robert J. Shiller, Alan Greenspan, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, warned the country about the mood of "irrational exuberance" that was pushing up stock prices. In hindsight, it's clear that the bull was just beginning. Anyone who heeded that warning would have missed nearly unprecedented gains. But Shiller proved prophetic when the market peaked and crashed in 2000, the year he published this book's first edition. Shiller isn't teaching market timing; he's debunking cherished investing axioms, such as the belief that stocks or real estate are necessarily great long-term investments. He discredits financial reporting, notes the psychological and emotional factors that make investors behave irrationally, and sounds a note of caution as timely now as it was at the turn of the millennium. This book vaccinates you against the virus of credulity. We suggest a copy for every investor - dog-eared from frequent rereading. It's a wise investment.

bubble bubble, 26 Aug 2003
Shiller stands as one of the few people to come out of the experience of the recent bubble with his reputation enhanced. His book came out at pretty much the peak since when the market had dropped an incredible amount.

I can see why people didn't like hearing what he was saying at the time but in retrospect it is hard to challenge much of what he says. P/E ratios were wildly out of line with historical precedent with no clear reason why (seemingly sometimes just because the companies had websites!). I never really bought the US productivity miracle story anyhow but it seems increasingly clear that the reason for higher productivity in US firms is predominantly that employees work significantly more hours than European equivalents, not because of a techological revolution.

It makes interesting reading that there was very similar talk of "new eras" during previous bubbles, and of small investors only just realising that equities were a better investment over the long-run (how many times will this one be trotted out I wonder). Also having spoken to quite a few people who made and then lost a few grand in TMT stocks I find it very hard to dismiss the central idea that in such cases bubbles are really just naturally-forming pyramid schemes.

finally personally I'm gob-smacked that anyone actually bothers to seriously listen to fund managers anymore. They were no better at avoiding the collapse of the bubble than the day-traders as our staff pension fund has learnt to its cost. The only big investor to arguably call it right was Tony Dye at PDFM but he was two years or so too early.

I'm only giving it four stars because a) it's now of historical interest and not that practical for the future and b) because I found it too easy to understand. I'm not an investment expert and I'm wary of simplistic explanations in areas I don't know very well.

Having said that I do think there is a great deal of sense in what he says, and it is well worth a read if only to puncture any lingering illusions you may have about efficient markets.

An elegantly simple book on why markets ignore fundamenals, 11 Feb 2001
Not so long ago, the rise of the NASDAQ to a a peak of over 5,000 was seen as a clear sign that we had entered a new economic era. Economic cycles were a thing of the past, new technology and the belief that the all-powerful US Fed would ride to our rescue encouraged investors to bid up share prices to levels that now in hindsight looked certainly unrealistic. Academic studies on stock markets teach us that prices of stocks eventually return to their long-trend line. However, as Shiller in this elegantly simple book demonstrates, financial markets periodically detach themselves from economic fundamentals. The trending or herd influence of investors pulls markets to over-optimistic and over-pestimistic levels. Stock market psychology as Shiller shows is simply the use of rules of thumb by investors that distorts the efficient market over the short term. What Shiller unfortunately does not investigate is how style factors could become even more confusing as more and more investors (primarily institutional fund managers) become more conscious of the potential of style investing. However, the insight that the herd is probably made up of a bunch of headless chickens (who use feeling and not disciplined analysis) can be enjoyed by both active and disillusioned investors.

A worthwhile addition to the literature on the subject, 02 Jan 2001
It was on 5 December 1996 that Alan Greenspan described the behaviour of investors who had driven the value of shares on the New York Stock Exchange to record levels as "Irrational Exuberance". Robert J. Shiller has used this remark as the title of his book and the starting point for an examination of stock market and investor behaviour which is both accessible to the general reader and adds to the existing stock of serious work on the subject.

Robert Shiller begins his look at irrational exuberance in financial markets by outlining the evidence, which he finds convincing, that the current level of stock markets (even allowing for the poor performance during the year 2000) is far above that which is reasonable or rational.

He argues that this behaviour can be explained by 12 factors which are examined in the subsequent chapters. These are a mixture of common perceptions which drive markets higher than the underlying facts justify (role of internet, baby boom, expansion of defined contribution pension schemes, decline of economic rivals, cultural change favouring business, Republican congress, growth of mutual funds), cultural and psychological factors which have affected investor behaviour (expanded media reporting, optimistic forecasts of analysts, rise of gambling opportunities) and feedback mechanisms. The detailed analysis which follows explains convincingly how bubbles emerge through feedback effects (feeding upon themselves driving markets upwards or down). It also discusses the role of the media (which ultimatley Shiller regards as having at best a short-term influence on market behaviour), the psychology of the investor (for me the least convincing part of the book) and an interesting chapter discussing the arguments of efficient market theorists and their attempts to justify current stock market levels with reference to dividend values (since they are so clearly at variance with price earnings ratios).

Finally Shiller concludes with his recommendations to overcome the irrationality of markets. Paradoxically, these mean an expansion of the role of the market through the commodification of more risks and the action of investors to spread their risks beyond the stock market.

Robert J. Shiller's book is a great introduction for those interested in the history and causes of financial exuberance. While you may not agree with his conculsions and proposals, the preceding examination of the various causes seems comprehensive and is lucidly explained. Of particular interest are the chapters discussing feedback mechanisms and how financial bubbles are inflated What this section lacks, perhaps because no one has found the answer, is a description of what causes the feedback loop to breakdown and the bubble to deflate. In summary I consider this to be a worthwhile addition to the literature on financial markets and how they can go wrong.

An analysis all the more chilling for its rigour, 13 Jun 2000
Schiller's case rests on a rich mix of quantitative and qualitative research and analysis. (By qualitative, I include his surveys of fund managers with small sample sizes). He challenges a great many points of conventional wisdom, showing them to be neither conventional nor wise. One thing he fails to do, however, is systematically refute the hypothesis that high valuations (especially for tech stocks) are justified. Real option pricing, for instance, does demand an approach completely different to that of traditional discounted cash flows: if an investor wishes to take on the risk of an unproven business model, with its attendant uncertainty but large potential upside, that is not necessarily irrational.

Schiller's answer is that the P/E ratios are so far off the historical norms that it's not worth discussing further. And the option pricing view can't hold for the whole market.

The challenges to efficient market theory, and to Jeremy Siegel's (of the Wharton School at U Penn) views in "Stocks for the long run" are similarly one step short of complete.

That said, this book serves the invaluable function of challenging the complacency that pervades popular opinion and the media. My own favourite manifestation of this is the Economist's observation that when stocks rise, newspapers describe them as "strong"; when they fall, they are "volatile". What's in a name? Market sentiment, which drives prices to unsustainable levels.

This book was written because the author cares. Both as an academic and as an observer of public policy, he rightly fears the effects of a collapse in the markets. He deserves to be read.

A Godsend...., 07 Nov 2007
I am new to investing in property and found the that book answered many of the questions that I had in relation to investing in the property market.
It is written in a clear and intelligent way with many helpful tips.

Financial Democracy, 08 Nov 2008
For Prof. R.J. Shiller, the root of the subprime mortgage crisis in the US is a myth, the belief that real estate prices must strongly trend upward for demographic reasons.
He proves that the price of real estate, to the contrary, is trending lower. What went up are the quality and the dimension of the average individual houses. But what about `land'? Didn't Mark Twain recommend strongly: `Go for land. They've stopped producing it.'? R.J. Shiller remarks cleverly that only 2,6 % of US land is used for urbanization.
Another factor of the bubble was psychological: the human herd instinct. There was a social contagion of boom thinking.
A third, more specific, factor was the deliberate governmental policy to promote home-ownership as much as possible. This should be good for the Party.

When the real estate bubble burst, it disrupted immediately the credit markets. Aggressive mortgage lenders never worried about repayment risks. They repackaged the mortgages, got top ratings from the rating agencies and sold their packages to third parties all over the world.
But even more importantly, the crisis damaged the `social fabric', the way of life of millions of families and also human relationships (through aggressive creditors). It created an atmosphere of distrust, of hoarding, with runs on banks; in one word, it gave rise to a psychological environment that could lead to a severe and long depression, which would hurt every citizen. Therefore, the subprime crisis must be solved.

Prof. R.J. Shiller makes a distinction between the short term and the long term solution.
In the short term, there should be a massive bail-out in order to prevent an escalation of the crisis and of the economic downturn.
In the long term, the US government should create a basic social contract and protect every citizen against major misfortune. It should impose financial democracy through standardized full disclosure documents so that everybody should get better information about all the risks involved. Without affecting individual privacy, indicators should be created about the real value of real estate. Those should lead to a more efficient pricing of houses and to a stabilization of the market. Prof. R.J. Shiller did not only recommend these policies, but created an indicator himself.

With an open and clear-sighted mind, Prof. Shiller wrote a small, but essential, book about a dramatic worldwide crisis, without losing the `human touch'. It is an essential read for all those interested in the future of mankind.


Thoughtful, straightforward diagnosis and prescription, 18 Sep 2008
Robert Shiller, the prescient author of the book Irrational Exuberance, offers an insightful examination of the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis, and suggests a list of potential measures for the future. He lays the blame for the subprime crisis on the same oblivious fiscal attitudes that led to the technology bubble of the 1990s and the real estate bubble of the 2000s. Both bubbles involved excessive lending and resulted in severe losses for capital providers. His prescription for dealing with the crisis involves a range of policy measures. In the short term, he calls for bailouts for low-income borrowers who got drawn into subprime scams that they did not understand. For the long term, he proposes a new framework for financial institutions, more transparent information, simpler contracts, improved risk-management markets, equity insurance and home loans linked to income, among other measures. Both his diagnosis and his prescription will be controversial, no doubt, but getAbstract thinks his book is a necessary text for anyone who wants to understand what's happened, and how to survive it and learn from it.

Short and radical, 30 Aug 2008
Robert Shiller has written some very interesting things over the years. In my opinion Irrational Exuberance is still one of the best books to read about stockmarkets, and in the New Financial Order he set out some new ideas for democratising finance so that it better serves the public. This short book (the previous reviewer is right to say it's more of a pamphlet) draws a bit on the ideas mapped out in the New Financial Order as a way out of the current mess.

To massively over-simplify, Shiller says we need a mix of short-term sticking plasters and longer-term reforms. In respect of the former camp he says we have to accept bailouts as a necessary evil, even though it goes against the moral hazard arguments. he also suggests setting up a revamped Homeowners Loan Corporation which would take on mortgages as collateral for loans to mortgage lenders in return for influencing the form future mortgages take (in order that they offer a better deal to homeowners).

Turning to the longer term Shiller sets out 6 key policies - comprehensive financial advice (based on fees rather than commssions), the establishment of a consumer finance watchdog, the creation of more default financial options (not just pensions, mortgage arrangements could also be included), improved financial disclosure, to improve accountability, the creation of better financial databases which would help provide consumers with better advice and more tailored products, and finally and most radically the creation of new units of economic measurement, based on what things actually cost.

There are big plus points about this book. First, Shiller is willing to think big. he's effectively arguing for more financial innovation, not less, but also that the process should be carried out in a way that meets the needs of the public. Secondly he warns against scapegoating the financial sector. In the epilogue he argues that we should be focusing on the systems that went wrong, rather than seeking to punish the industry as a whole. As tempting as it might be to try to stick the boot into the super-rich in the City, that isn't really going to take us very far. Shiller instead is setting out some challenging ideas for how we might stop this kind of crisis arising again.

an essential handbook for bubble spotters, 05 Aug 2008
Shiller's is a concise attempt to elaborate in just seven chapters the genesis of the housing bubble (a psychological carry-over from the dotcom bubble), explode its myths ("prices always go up"), explore its scale and the dangers of its deepening impact (it's bad), assert the need to maintain confidence in our economic and financial institutions by aggressive action (comparing the US and European responses to the Great Depression), and then explore longer-term, more fundamental reforms and innovations that will create a population much more attuned to economic risk.

Shiller says his inspiration was John Maynard Keynes 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace', which I take to mean that getting the subprime solution wrong could have devastating consequences.

At less than 200 pages of wide-margined type, lightly annotated and with no bibliography, there is something of the emergency pamphlet about this book. And Shiller is advocating a much speedier and more deep-rooted response to the crisis, which, as of a few weeks ago, he felt was still not being taken seriously enough.

There are many recommendations, but if the scale of the problem is as suggested, I'd argue that it's a book that everyone who lives in a house (and who is of reading age) should own; just don't buy ten and try to rent them out.

The Knackered Hack

Excellent and informative - the best place to start, 18 Sep 2008
This is simply the best introduction to the Buy-to-Let market available. The fundamental strength of the book is that David Lawrenson is (1) not trying to sell you one of his portfolios or convince you to invest in Romanina; (2) someone who has been there and done it. So the advice in the book is balanced, realistic and of immense practical use. Highly recommended.

Invaluable advice - helps avoid all the pitfalls and mantraps, 02 May 2008
For those looking to embark on a letting project or expand on a a small property portfolio, this concise tome is an essential companion. The book contains lots of step by step guidelines to ensure the reader is aware of factors they may otherwise overlook and help avoid potentially expensive and worrysome situations. Very detailed with being fussy.

Successful Property Letting: Review, 08 Feb 2008
Being a Chartered Surveyor and having worked in the rented property sector myself 20 years ago, I thought that I knew enough to be enter the buy-to-let world without the need for help. Reading David's book made me realize how wrong I was !! This book is essential for both new starters and for old hands in the buy-to-let world, and gives practical advice on all aspects of residential property letting in an easy-to-read format. Great value for money.

Excellent book! The best I've read on the subject, 10 Aug 2007
This book is really good. It's very readable, in easy to find sections and he goes into a great deal of detail without lots of unnecessary waffle. He gives a lot of common sense advice and covers all aspects of property investing, not just the merits of doing it, but everything else, from finding property to becoming a landlord and the legal side of that. A very good read, highly recommended.

Very useful source of information, 20 Jun 2007
Last year I started looking at buy-to-let opportunities and needed to gather loads of information. So I decided to purchase some books covering the issues. David Lawrenson's book in particular was the most useful one of those I read (5 in total). What I like about it is the practical and hands-on focus throughout the chapters. Also the list of websites/references has been extremely useful. Definitely a book to have if you're serious about buy-to-let!

fred's being proved right, 01 Sep 2008
With UK house prices now crashing and many experts now foreseeing falls of up to 40% it looks like Fred Harrison is spot on with his predictions so far. He seems to be one of the few who have got the timing of the bubble bursting just right.

High on opinions, Low on substance - buy something else, 09 Mar 2008
hmmm. not an impressive read. The Author alleges to build a case to 'prove' his 18 year economic cycle theory. The 'proof' offered is poor and not convincing. I had hoped for much more than the repeated Mantra of the 18 year cycle, I get the feeling that if he states it enough as fact, then it must be true. Having recently read "The Black Swan" by Taleb, then 2010 was a real disappointment.

I suppose I should have submitted this review after reselling my copy on Amazon. oops.

My Very Own Crystal Ball, 26 Dec 2007
A very interesting read. I purchased this book in mid 2006 and so far everything that was predicted has come true. According to Harrison we are in for two tough years in the property market. 2008 and 2009 will see a downturn, however, come 2010 the market will once again turn. Currently I would love to move into a larger house but believe you me until January 2010 I'm staying put.

Scarily accurate so far, 17 Oct 2007
I read this book 6 months ago, and in the past few months have started to see signs that suggest the author is correct in his suppositions. An essential read for anyone considering buying a property in 2007-2008.

The coming depression - how low will he go ?, 21 Aug 2006
As a prominent proponent of the Land Value Tax it is intriguing to find that Fred Harrison comes down on the side of both private ownership and economic growth. For him the value of the land is essentially as a material resource and this distinction forms the basis of his thorough analysis of the housing market in the context of a modern capitalist economy. Alan Greenspan and Gordon Brown are criticised for their failure to acknowledge the effect of land speculation on modern predicitve methods. For all his detailed analysis of the cyclical trends of boom and bust he nevertheless maintains that economics is not an exact science.

Packed with Knowledge!, 07 Sep 2005
Shortly after a 1996 briefing by author Robert J. Shiller, Alan Greenspan, chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, warned the country about the mood of "irrational exuberance" that was pushing up stock prices. In hindsight, it's clear that the bull was just beginning. Anyone who heeded that warning would have missed nearly unprecedented gains. But Shiller proved prophetic when the market peaked and crashed in 2000, the year he published this book's first edition. Shiller isn't teaching market timing; he's debunking cherished investing axioms, such as the belief that stocks or real estate are necessarily great long-term investments. He discredits financial reporting, notes the psychological and emotional factors that make investors behave irrationally, and sounds a note of caution as timely now as it was at the turn of the millennium. This book vaccinates you against the virus of credulity. We suggest a copy for every investor - dog-eared from frequent rereading. It's a wise investment.

bubble bubble, 26 Aug 2003
Shiller stands as one of the few people to come out of the experience of the recent bubble with his reputation enhanced. His book came out at pretty much the peak since when the market had dropped an incredible amount.

I can see why people didn't like hearing what he was saying at the time but in retrospect it is hard to challenge much of what he says. P/E ratios were wildly out of line with historical precedent with no clear reason why (seemingly sometimes just because the companies had websites!). I never really bought the US productivity miracle story anyhow but it seems increasingly clear that the reason for higher productivity in US firms is predominantly that employees work significantly more hours than European equivalents, not because of a techological revolution.

It makes interesting reading that there was very similar talk of "new eras" during previous bubbles, and of small investors only just realising that equities were a better investment over the long-run (how many times will this one be trotted out I wonder). Also having spoken to quite a few people who made and then lost a few grand in TMT stocks I find it very hard to dismiss the central idea that in such cases bubbles are really just naturally-forming pyramid schemes.

finally personally I'm gob-smacked that anyone actually bothers to seriously listen to fund managers anymore. They were no better at avoiding the collapse of the bubble than the day-traders as our staff pension fund has learnt to its cost. The only big investor to arguably call it right was Tony Dye at PDFM but he was two years or so too early.

I'm only giving it four stars because a) it's now of historical interest and not that practical for the future and b) because I found it too easy to understand. I'm not an investment expert and I'm wary of simplistic explanations in areas I don't know very well.

Having said that I do think there is a great deal of sense in what he says, and it is well worth a read if only to puncture any lingering illusions you may have about efficient markets.

An elegantly simple book on why markets ignore fundamenals, 11 Feb 2001
Not so long ago, the rise of the NASDAQ to a a peak of over 5,000 was seen as a clear sign that we had entered a new economic era. Economic cycles were a thing of the past, new technology and the belief that the all-powerful US Fed would ride to our rescue encouraged investors to bid up share prices to levels that now in hindsight looked certainly unrealistic. Academic studies on stock markets teach us that prices of stocks eventually return to their long-trend line. However, as Shiller in this elegantly simple book demonstrates, financial markets periodically detach themselves from economic fundamentals. The trending or herd influence of investors pulls markets to over-optimistic and over-pestimistic levels. Stock market psychology as Shiller shows is simply the use of rules of thumb by investors that distorts the efficient market over the short term. What Shiller unfortunately does not investigate is how style factors could become even more confusing as more and more investors (primarily institutional fund managers) become more conscious of the potential of style investing. However, the insight that the herd is probably made up of a bunch of headless chickens (who use feeling and not disciplined analysis) can be enjoyed by both active and disillusioned investors.

A worthwhile addition to the literature on the subject, 02 Jan 2001
It was on 5 December 1996 that Alan Greenspan described the behaviour of investors who had driven the value of shares on the New York Stock Exchange to record levels as "Irrational Exuberance". Robert J. Shiller has used this remark as the title of his book and the starting point for an examination of stock market and investor behaviour which is both accessible to the general reader and adds to the existing stock of serious work on the subject.

Robert Shiller begins his look at irrational exuberance in financial markets by outlining the evidence, which he finds convincing, that the current level of stock markets (even allowing for the poor performance during the year 2000) is far above that which is reasonable or rational.

He argues that this behaviour can be explained by 12 factors which are examined in the subsequent chapters. These are a mixture of common perceptions which drive markets higher than the underlying facts justify (role of internet, baby boom, expansion of defined contribution pension schemes, decline of economic rivals, cultural change favouring business, Republican congress, growth of mutual funds), cultural and psychological factors which have affected investor behaviour (expanded media reporting, optimistic forecasts of analysts, rise of gambling opportunities) and feedback mechanisms. The detailed analysis which follows explains convincingly how bubbles emerge through feedback effects (feeding upon themselves driving markets upwards or down). It also discusses the role of the media (which ultimatley Shiller regards as having at best a short-term influence on market behaviour), the psychology of the investor (for me the least convincing part of the book) and an interesting chapter discussing the arguments of efficient market theorists and their attempts to justify current stock market levels with reference to dividend values (since they are so clearly at variance with price earnings ratios).

Finally Shiller concludes with his recommendations to overcome the irrationality of markets. Paradoxically, these mean an expansion of the role of the market through the commodification of more risks and the action of investors to spread their risks beyond the stock market.

Robert J. Shiller's book is a great introduction for those interested in the history and causes of financial exuberance. While you may not agree with his conculsions and proposals, the preceding examination of the various causes seems comprehensive and is lucidly explained. Of particular interest are the chapters discussing feedback mechanisms and how financial bubbles are inflated What this section lacks, perhaps because no one has found the answer, is a description of what causes the feedback loop to breakdown and the bubble to deflate. In summary I consider this to be a worthwhile addition to the literature on financial markets and how they can go wrong.

An analysis all the more chilling for its rigour, 13 Jun 2000
Schiller's case rests on a rich mix of quantitative and qualitative research and analysis. (By qualitative, I include his surveys of fund managers with small sample sizes). He challenges a great many points of conventional wisdom, showing them to be neither conventional nor wise. One thing he fails to do, however, is systematically refute the hypothesis that high valuations (especially for tech stocks) are justified. Real option pricing, for instance, does demand an approach completely different to that of traditional discounted cash flows: if an investor wishes to take on the risk of an unproven business model, with its attendant uncertainty but large potential upside, that is not necessarily irrational.

Schiller's answer is that the P/E ratios are so far off the historical norms that it's not worth discussing further. And the option pricing view can't hold for the whole market.

The challenges to efficient market theory, and to Jeremy Siegel's (of the Wharton School at U Penn) views in "Stocks for the long run" are similarly one step short of complete.

That said, this book serves the invaluable function of challenging the complacency that pervades popular opinion and the media. My own favourite manifestation of this is the Economist's observation that when stocks rise, newspapers describe them as "strong"; when they fall, they are "volatile". What's in a name? Market sentiment, which drives prices to unsustainable levels.

This book was written because the author cares. Both as an academic and as an observer of public policy, he rightly fears the effects of a collapse in the markets. He deserves to be read.

A Godsend...., 07 Nov 2007
I am new to investing in property and found the that book answered many of the questions that I had in relation to investing in the property market.
It is written in a clear and intelligent way with many helpful tips.

Essential for Valuers and Students in real estate, 12 Mar 2002
Quick reference to numerous rates of return for valuers of real estate.

invaluable, 02 Mar 2002
without this book it is not possible to get a degree in estate management, or understand any of the valuation modules.

Excellent and Helpful, 29 Jun 2001
One of the most helpful books dealing with valuation and conversion. Anyone who is studying or working in valuation, this book will be a life saver for you.

It helps to solve problems and teach you to understand about yields, conversions and everything you need to know!

Very Helpful, 27 Jun 2001
This book is a god send for anyone who is studying valuation. It helps you to grasp and understand what you are doing as well as provide you with all the right answers. It is a life saver.