Excellent Contribution to COIN Literature, 06 Jan 2009
A well written contribution to the rapidly expanding stockpile of Counter-Insurgency literature available today. The focus on the organisational learning and behaviour remains particularly insightful and highly relevant in addressing the core focus. Nagl's experience as not only a COIN thinker but a COIN practitioner no doubt contributed to the quality of this study. 'Learning to eat Soup with a Knife' is a must read for military personnel, academics and anyone with a strong interest in field of Counter-Insurgent Policy.

On a final note to the general reader, the depth and style of analyse in this work is likely to go beyond the needs for everyday conversational knowledge and would not be largely useful for historical overview of either conflict. Nevertheless at a time where COIN is at the forefront of Policy, Nagl's work highlights timeless principles that remain relevant today and have the potential to provide useful insight in many modern conflicts.



Counterinsurgency, a reference guide., 09 Dec 2008
I was lucky enough to meet Col Nagle earlier in the year and following on from conversations i had with him i was keen to read this work.

This is an imformative and intuitive look at the subject drawing lessons from both campaigns but moreover takingextensive extracts from numerous other litterary publications on the subject.

As a compendium of reference material, "Learning to eat soup with a knife" offers clear direction to the reader on further reading and asscociated text. I would reccomend his work to anyone studdying counter insurgency principals, or to any British reader who wants to hear an American expert wax lyrical about how our armed forces are historically better than his own in these environments.

A Must for those Heading to the Sand Pit, 20 Mar 2008
John Nagl's book is simply a must for those heading to the sand pit and includes a great deal of insights into the workings of the British and American army's.

John Nagl incliudes his own aspect of Argyris and Schon's double loop learning system based on Ashby's previous work and fits the learning cycle into the military system in order to discover what is a successful learning organisation.

It is interesting to review the American surge with the failure of Britain's army to secure Basra after reading this book and learning more about organisational learning.

Importantly, it is also easy and interesting to read!!

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), 24 Dec 2007
Colonel Nagl's book is an excellent study though inevitably is bears traces of its original existence as a Oxford University doctoral study.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.

Not What I Expected, 20 Jul 2007
This book has received a number of 'must read' reviews in a number of publications - several of them military in-house magazines. I think some of those reviews are overstated now that I have had the benefit of reading the book. In particular the subtitle 'Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam' is misleading.

Once I opened the book and understood that the main thrust was a study of organisational behaviour then it became clear to me that the author had researched the subject well and presented his arguments effectively and most impressively, as a serving US Army officer, made some critical statements regarding his employer.

For anybody seeking an in-depth analysis of the Malayan Emergency or the Vietnam War, or even a primer on counter-insurgency, this is not the book for you. If, however, you have slightly more than a passing knowledge of both the British and US Armies and the two conflicts, then this book offers well-argued and courageous insights and I recommend it on this basis.

Excellent Contribution to COIN Literature, 06 Jan 2009
A well written contribution to the rapidly expanding stockpile of Counter-Insurgency literature available today. The focus on the organisational learning and behaviour remains particularly insightful and highly relevant in addressing the core focus. Nagl's experience as not only a COIN thinker but a COIN practitioner no doubt contributed to the quality of this study. 'Learning to eat Soup with a Knife' is a must read for military personnel, academics and anyone with a strong interest in field of Counter-Insurgent Policy.

On a final note to the general reader, the depth and style of analyse in this work is likely to go beyond the needs for everyday conversational knowledge and would not be largely useful for historical overview of either conflict. Nevertheless at a time where COIN is at the forefront of Policy, Nagl's work highlights timeless principles that remain relevant today and have the potential to provide useful insight in many modern conflicts.



Counterinsurgency, a reference guide., 09 Dec 2008
I was lucky enough to meet Col Nagle earlier in the year and following on from conversations i had with him i was keen to read this work.

This is an imformative and intuitive look at the subject drawing lessons from both campaigns but moreover takingextensive extracts from numerous other litterary publications on the subject.

As a compendium of reference material, "Learning to eat soup with a knife" offers clear direction to the reader on further reading and asscociated text. I would reccomend his work to anyone studdying counter insurgency principals, or to any British reader who wants to hear an American expert wax lyrical about how our armed forces are historically better than his own in these environments.

A Must for those Heading to the Sand Pit, 20 Mar 2008
John Nagl's book is simply a must for those heading to the sand pit and includes a great deal of insights into the workings of the British and American army's.

John Nagl incliudes his own aspect of Argyris and Schon's double loop learning system based on Ashby's previous work and fits the learning cycle into the military system in order to discover what is a successful learning organisation.

It is interesting to review the American surge with the failure of Britain's army to secure Basra after reading this book and learning more about organisational learning.

Importantly, it is also easy and interesting to read!!

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), 24 Dec 2007
Colonel Nagl's book is an excellent study though inevitably is bears traces of its original existence as a Oxford University doctoral study.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.

Not What I Expected, 20 Jul 2007
This book has received a number of 'must read' reviews in a number of publications - several of them military in-house magazines. I think some of those reviews are overstated now that I have had the benefit of reading the book. In particular the subtitle 'Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam' is misleading.

Once I opened the book and understood that the main thrust was a study of organisational behaviour then it became clear to me that the author had researched the subject well and presented his arguments effectively and most impressively, as a serving US Army officer, made some critical statements regarding his employer.

For anybody seeking an in-depth analysis of the Malayan Emergency or the Vietnam War, or even a primer on counter-insurgency, this is not the book for you. If, however, you have slightly more than a passing knowledge of both the British and US Armies and the two conflicts, then this book offers well-argued and courageous insights and I recommend it on this basis.



Sampans, Banyans and Rambutans: A Childhood in Singapore and Malaya, 07 Jun 2007
This is a delightful book and will appeal to anybody interested in what it was like to grow up in Singapore or Malaya in the 1960s or early 1970s in a Royal Naval family. Many thousands of British forces service personnel were stationed at or passing through Singapore with their families during this time (along with Australians and New Zealanders as well). If you recall HMS Terror and Banyans you will want to read this book!

Derek Tait's book is full of evocative photos and anecdotes which I am sure will trigger memories of idyliic and happy times for anybody who went through a similar experience. I was in Singapore 1969-71, my dad being based at HMS Terror, and Derek's story is my story too.

I understand Derek is writing a second book based on other people's memories. I for one can't wait to read it.

Excellent Contribution to COIN Literature, 06 Jan 2009
A well written contribution to the rapidly expanding stockpile of Counter-Insurgency literature available today. The focus on the organisational learning and behaviour remains particularly insightful and highly relevant in addressing the core focus. Nagl's experience as not only a COIN thinker but a COIN practitioner no doubt contributed to the quality of this study. 'Learning to eat Soup with a Knife' is a must read for military personnel, academics and anyone with a strong interest in field of Counter-Insurgent Policy.

On a final note to the general reader, the depth and style of analyse in this work is likely to go beyond the needs for everyday conversational knowledge and would not be largely useful for historical overview of either conflict. Nevertheless at a time where COIN is at the forefront of Policy, Nagl's work highlights timeless principles that remain relevant today and have the potential to provide useful insight in many modern conflicts.



Counterinsurgency, a reference guide., 09 Dec 2008
I was lucky enough to meet Col Nagle earlier in the year and following on from conversations i had with him i was keen to read this work.

This is an imformative and intuitive look at the subject drawing lessons from both campaigns but moreover takingextensive extracts from numerous other litterary publications on the subject.

As a compendium of reference material, "Learning to eat soup with a knife" offers clear direction to the reader on further reading and asscociated text. I would reccomend his work to anyone studdying counter insurgency principals, or to any British reader who wants to hear an American expert wax lyrical about how our armed forces are historically better than his own in these environments.

A Must for those Heading to the Sand Pit, 20 Mar 2008
John Nagl's book is simply a must for those heading to the sand pit and includes a great deal of insights into the workings of the British and American army's.

John Nagl incliudes his own aspect of Argyris and Schon's double loop learning system based on Ashby's previous work and fits the learning cycle into the military system in order to discover what is a successful learning organisation.

It is interesting to review the American surge with the failure of Britain's army to secure Basra after reading this book and learning more about organisational learning.

Importantly, it is also easy and interesting to read!!

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), 24 Dec 2007
Colonel Nagl's book is an excellent study though inevitably is bears traces of its original existence as a Oxford University doctoral study.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.

Not What I Expected, 20 Jul 2007
This book has received a number of 'must read' reviews in a number of publications - several of them military in-house magazines. I think some of those reviews are overstated now that I have had the benefit of reading the book. In particular the subtitle 'Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam' is misleading.

Once I opened the book and understood that the main thrust was a study of organisational behaviour then it became clear to me that the author had researched the subject well and presented his arguments effectively and most impressively, as a serving US Army officer, made some critical statements regarding his employer.

For anybody seeking an in-depth analysis of the Malayan Emergency or the Vietnam War, or even a primer on counter-insurgency, this is not the book for you. If, however, you have slightly more than a passing knowledge of both the British and US Armies and the two conflicts, then this book offers well-argued and courageous insights and I recommend it on this basis.



Sampans, Banyans and Rambutans: A Childhood in Singapore and Malaya, 07 Jun 2007
This is a delightful book and will appeal to anybody interested in what it was like to grow up in Singapore or Malaya in the 1960s or early 1970s in a Royal Naval family. Many thousands of British forces service personnel were stationed at or passing through Singapore with their families during this time (along with Australians and New Zealanders as well). If you recall HMS Terror and Banyans you will want to read this book!

Derek Tait's book is full of evocative photos and anecdotes which I am sure will trigger memories of idyliic and happy times for anybody who went through a similar experience. I was in Singapore 1969-71, my dad being based at HMS Terror, and Derek's story is my story too.

I understand Derek is writing a second book based on other people's memories. I for one can't wait to read it.


Patchy, 26 Jun 2008
The early part of this book is really absorbing, as the author relates how he raised merry hell behind the lines of the Japanese advance down the Malayan peninsula. He blew up trains, he blew up railway lines, he blew up bridges and he also learnt to stuff bamboo stems full of explosive and leave them innocently lying in the road, where he blew them up remotely when a suitably-laden Japanese truck drove over them. He would then mow down a few of the survivors and disappear into the jungle.

After not very long, however, and of course after the fall of Singapore, his access to sabotage weaponry disappeared. At that point, at liberty in occupied Malaya, he was able to do very little and he spent the next three years essentially living rough in the jungle and trying to train the locals in the techniques of guerilla warfare.

The pace of the book slackens off badly at this stage because very little really happens. Reading between the lines, this must have been an absolutely desperate time in the author's life. He was separated from his friends and allies, had no sources of supply or even escape, and was reliant for shelter from the Japanese on local Chinese and aborigines.

In fact, he spend much of the next three years trudging from one jungle camp to another and trying to keep body (and one assumes mind) together. The book powerfully makes the point that the jungle is just about the most hostile place you could choose to live. The health of those who tried to do so was every bit as bad as that of those imprisoned in Japanese PoW camps. He also makes some interesting points about the importance of face saving in the local community, to the extent that Chinese guerilla leaders would refuse to attend lectures on jungle fighting tactics in case it looked to their men like they didn't know what they were doing.

Eventually, as the tide turns, the author starts to get a bit more involved again. His was certainly a remarkable feat of survival but it speaks volumes about what a tough struggle the Far Eastern campaigns were that it took this man pretty well all his efforts for three years just to survive - and that just barely.

Classic, 25 Nov 2006
A must read for anyone interested in Malayan military history, particularly the Japanese occupation and the Malayan Emergency. Also relevant to anyone that will be operating in the jungle at some point.

Excellent Contribution to COIN Literature, 06 Jan 2009
A well written contribution to the rapidly expanding stockpile of Counter-Insurgency literature available today. The focus on the organisational learning and behaviour remains particularly insightful and highly relevant in addressing the core focus. Nagl's experience as not only a COIN thinker but a COIN practitioner no doubt contributed to the quality of this study. 'Learning to eat Soup with a Knife' is a must read for military personnel, academics and anyone with a strong interest in field of Counter-Insurgent Policy.

On a final note to the general reader, the depth and style of analyse in this work is likely to go beyond the needs for everyday conversational knowledge and would not be largely useful for historical overview of either conflict. Nevertheless at a time where COIN is at the forefront of Policy, Nagl's work highlights timeless principles that remain relevant today and have the potential to provide useful insight in many modern conflicts.



Counterinsurgency, a reference guide., 09 Dec 2008
I was lucky enough to meet Col Nagle earlier in the year and following on from conversations i had with him i was keen to read this work.

This is an imformative and intuitive look at the subject drawing lessons from both campaigns but moreover takingextensive extracts from numerous other litterary publications on the subject.

As a compendium of reference material, "Learning to eat soup with a knife" offers clear direction to the reader on further reading and asscociated text. I would reccomend his work to anyone studdying counter insurgency principals, or to any British reader who wants to hear an American expert wax lyrical about how our armed forces are historically better than his own in these environments.

A Must for those Heading to the Sand Pit, 20 Mar 2008
John Nagl's book is simply a must for those heading to the sand pit and includes a great deal of insights into the workings of the British and American army's.

John Nagl incliudes his own aspect of Argyris and Schon's double loop learning system based on Ashby's previous work and fits the learning cycle into the military system in order to discover what is a successful learning organisation.

It is interesting to review the American surge with the failure of Britain's army to secure Basra after reading this book and learning more about organisational learning.

Importantly, it is also easy and interesting to read!!

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), 24 Dec 2007
Colonel Nagl's book is an excellent study though inevitably is bears traces of its original existence as a Oxford University doctoral study.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.

Not What I Expected, 20 Jul 2007
This book has received a number of 'must read' reviews in a number of publications - several of them military in-house magazines. I think some of those reviews are overstated now that I have had the benefit of reading the book. In particular the subtitle 'Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam' is misleading.

Once I opened the book and understood that the main thrust was a study of organisational behaviour then it became clear to me that the author had researched the subject well and presented his arguments effectively and most impressively, as a serving US Army officer, made some critical statements regarding his employer.

For anybody seeking an in-depth analysis of the Malayan Emergency or the Vietnam War, or even a primer on counter-insurgency, this is not the book for you. If, however, you have slightly more than a passing knowledge of both the British and US Armies and the two conflicts, then this book offers well-argued and courageous insights and I recommend it on this basis.



Sampans, Banyans and Rambutans: A Childhood in Singapore and Malaya, 07 Jun 2007
This is a delightful book and will appeal to anybody interested in what it was like to grow up in Singapore or Malaya in the 1960s or early 1970s in a Royal Naval family. Many thousands of British forces service personnel were stationed at or passing through Singapore with their families during this time (along with Australians and New Zealanders as well). If you recall HMS Terror and Banyans you will want to read this book!

Derek Tait's book is full of evocative photos and anecdotes which I am sure will trigger memories of idyliic and happy times for anybody who went through a similar experience. I was in Singapore 1969-71, my dad being based at HMS Terror, and Derek's story is my story too.

I understand Derek is writing a second book based on other people's memories. I for one can't wait to read it.


Patchy, 26 Jun 2008
The early part of this book is really absorbing, as the author relates how he raised merry hell behind the lines of the Japanese advance down the Malayan peninsula. He blew up trains, he blew up railway lines, he blew up bridges and he also learnt to stuff bamboo stems full of explosive and leave them innocently lying in the road, where he blew them up remotely when a suitably-laden Japanese truck drove over them. He would then mow down a few of the survivors and disappear into the jungle.

After not very long, however, and of course after the fall of Singapore, his access to sabotage weaponry disappeared. At that point, at liberty in occupied Malaya, he was able to do very little and he spent the next three years essentially living rough in the jungle and trying to train the locals in the techniques of guerilla warfare.

The pace of the book slackens off badly at this stage because very little really happens. Reading between the lines, this must have been an absolutely desperate time in the author's life. He was separated from his friends and allies, had no sources of supply or even escape, and was reliant for shelter from the Japanese on local Chinese and aborigines.

In fact, he spend much of the next three years trudging from one jungle camp to another and trying to keep body (and one assumes mind) together. The book powerfully makes the point that the jungle is just about the most hostile place you could choose to live. The health of those who tried to do so was every bit as bad as that of those imprisoned in Japanese PoW camps. He also makes some interesting points about the importance of face saving in the local community, to the extent that Chinese guerilla leaders would refuse to attend lectures on jungle fighting tactics in case it looked to their men like they didn't know what they were doing.

Eventually, as the tide turns, the author starts to get a bit more involved again. His was certainly a remarkable feat of survival but it speaks volumes about what a tough struggle the Far Eastern campaigns were that it took this man pretty well all his efforts for three years just to survive - and that just barely.

Classic, 25 Nov 2006
A must read for anyone interested in Malayan military history, particularly the Japanese occupation and the Malayan Emergency. Also relevant to anyone that will be operating in the jungle at some point.

Magnificent, 05 Mar 2007

There has been major motion pictures created on less daring fiction than the heroism described within this book, a fact which has forced me to remind myself that the events which are vividly described are actually true!

The amount of research that has obviously gone into the creation of this novel is amazing and the justified anger in which the authors describe the treatment of those concerned leaves an aftertaste that is hard to forget.

In short, a must-read that I found hard to put down and even harder to forget.

Dave J.

Excellent Contribution to COIN Literature, 06 Jan 2009
A well written contribution to the rapidly expanding stockpile of Counter-Insurgency literature available today. The focus on the organisational learning and behaviour remains particularly insightful and highly relevant in addressing the core focus. Nagl's experience as not only a COIN thinker but a COIN practitioner no doubt contributed to the quality of this study. 'Learning to eat Soup with a Knife' is a must read for military personnel, academics and anyone with a strong interest in field of Counter-Insurgent Policy.

On a final note to the general reader, the depth and style of analyse in this work is likely to go beyond the needs for everyday conversational knowledge and would not be largely useful for historical overview of either conflict. Nevertheless at a time where COIN is at the forefront of Policy, Nagl's work highlights timeless principles that remain relevant today and have the potential to provide useful insight in many modern conflicts.



Counterinsurgency, a reference guide., 09 Dec 2008
I was lucky enough to meet Col Nagle earlier in the year and following on from conversations i had with him i was keen to read this work.

This is an imformative and intuitive look at the subject drawing lessons from both campaigns but moreover takingextensive extracts from numerous other litterary publications on the subject.

As a compendium of reference material, "Learning to eat soup with a knife" offers clear direction to the reader on further reading and asscociated text. I would reccomend his work to anyone studdying counter insurgency principals, or to any British reader who wants to hear an American expert wax lyrical about how our armed forces are historically better than his own in these environments.

A Must for those Heading to the Sand Pit, 20 Mar 2008
John Nagl's book is simply a must for those heading to the sand pit and includes a great deal of insights into the workings of the British and American army's.

John Nagl incliudes his own aspect of Argyris and Schon's double loop learning system based on Ashby's previous work and fits the learning cycle into the military system in order to discover what is a successful learning organisation.

It is interesting to review the American surge with the failure of Britain's army to secure Basra after reading this book and learning more about organisational learning.

Importantly, it is also easy and interesting to read!!

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), 24 Dec 2007
Colonel Nagl's book is an excellent study though inevitably is bears traces of its original existence as a Oxford University doctoral study.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.

Not What I Expected, 20 Jul 2007
This book has received a number of 'must read' reviews in a number of publications - several of them military in-house magazines. I think some of those reviews are overstated now that I have had the benefit of reading the book. In particular the subtitle 'Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam' is misleading.

Once I opened the book and understood that the main thrust was a study of organisational behaviour then it became clear to me that the author had researched the subject well and presented his arguments effectively and most impressively, as a serving US Army officer, made some critical statements regarding his employer.

For anybody seeking an in-depth analysis of the Malayan Emergency or the Vietnam War, or even a primer on counter-insurgency, this is not the book for you. If, however, you have slightly more than a passing knowledge of both the British and US Armies and the two conflicts, then this book offers well-argued and courageous insights and I recommend it on this basis.



Sampans, Banyans and Rambutans: A Childhood in Singapore and Malaya, 07 Jun 2007
This is a delightful book and will appeal to anybody interested in what it was like to grow up in Singapore or Malaya in the 1960s or early 1970s in a Royal Naval family. Many thousands of British forces service personnel were stationed at or passing through Singapore with their families during this time (along with Australians and New Zealanders as well). If you recall HMS Terror and Banyans you will want to read this book!

Derek Tait's book is full of evocative photos and anecdotes which I am sure will trigger memories of idyliic and happy times for anybody who went through a similar experience. I was in Singapore 1969-71, my dad being based at HMS Terror, and Derek's story is my story too.

I understand Derek is writing a second book based on other people's memories. I for one can't wait to read it.


Patchy, 26 Jun 2008
The early part of this book is really absorbing, as the author relates how he raised merry hell behind the lines of the Japanese advance down the Malayan peninsula. He blew up trains, he blew up railway lines, he blew up bridges and he also learnt to stuff bamboo stems full of explosive and leave them innocently lying in the road, where he blew them up remotely when a suitably-laden Japanese truck drove over them. He would then mow down a few of the survivors and disappear into the jungle.

After not very long, however, and of course after the fall of Singapore, his access to sabotage weaponry disappeared. At that point, at liberty in occupied Malaya, he was able to do very little and he spent the next three years essentially living rough in the jungle and trying to train the locals in the techniques of guerilla warfare.

The pace of the book slackens off badly at this stage because very little really happens. Reading between the lines, this must have been an absolutely desperate time in the author's life. He was separated from his friends and allies, had no sources of supply or even escape, and was reliant for shelter from the Japanese on local Chinese and aborigines.

In fact, he spend much of the next three years trudging from one jungle camp to another and trying to keep body (and one assumes mind) together. The book powerfully makes the point that the jungle is just about the most hostile place you could choose to live. The health of those who tried to do so was every bit as bad as that of those imprisoned in Japanese PoW camps. He also makes some interesting points about the importance of face saving in the local community, to the extent that Chinese guerilla leaders would refuse to attend lectures on jungle fighting tactics in case it looked to their men like they didn't know what they were doing.

Eventually, as the tide turns, the author starts to get a bit more involved again. His was certainly a remarkable feat of survival but it speaks volumes about what a tough struggle the Far Eastern campaigns were that it took this man pretty well all his efforts for three years just to survive - and that just barely.

Classic, 25 Nov 2006
A must read for anyone interested in Malayan military history, particularly the Japanese occupation and the Malayan Emergency. Also relevant to anyone that will be operating in the jungle at some point.

Magnificent, 05 Mar 2007

There has been major motion pictures created on less daring fiction than the heroism described within this book, a fact which has forced me to remind myself that the events which are vividly described are actually true!

The amount of research that has obviously gone into the creation of this novel is amazing and the justified anger in which the authors describe the treatment of those concerned leaves an aftertaste that is hard to forget.

In short, a must-read that I found hard to put down and even harder to forget.

Dave J.

The Third Domino, 05 Jan 2009
Chin Peng and the Third Domino

At the end of the Second World War, the Japanese surrender left a political vacuum in South East Asia. In Indo-China and Malaya, the local communist parties had provided powerful support for the Allied cause after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. None of these communist parties wanted the return of their colonial masters and a rash of independence movements developed in Indonesia, Malaya, Indo-China, and in the sub-continent, also. After the fall of China to Mao's forces and the French loss at Dien Bien Phu, the untidy nil-all draw in Korea, Malaya appeared to be the third domino to fall.
There have been many British analyses of the so-called "Emergency" but Chin Peng's "My Side of History" provides an interesting and much needed balance. Chin Peng (Ong Boon Hua) had been born in Malaya in 1924 of Nanyang Chinese parents. At an early age, he developed nationalist and communist beliefs, becoming a probationary member of the Communist Party of Malaya in 1940 as a 16 year old.
Japan's entry to the war and the defeat of the Commonwealth forces in Singapore increased the CPM's importance, and the British SOE established guerrilla teams in Malaya with CPM assistance. The war facilitated Chin Peng's rise in the Communist Party and the traitorous General Secretary Lai Te, collaborating with the Japanese betrayed other challenging high-ranking key members. When the war ended Lai Te (a Vietnamese) then returned to working under the control of British Special Branch. Chin Peng was awarded two medals by the returning British for his help in defeating the Japanese. However, there was a growing mood in Malaya for independence and little appetite for the return of the pompous British, as colonial masters.
Soon the CPM realised that interregnum was not going to give Malaya, or their party what they sought and so they retreated into state based sanctuaries. Communications were a major problem for the CPM and Central Committee meetings were difficult to organise and dangerous. Chin Peng was lucky and in his jungle redoubts, he avoided the betrayals and ambushes during the Emergency.
Of interest, from a military viewpoint, is that the CPM did not develop the same degree of control or organisation that the communists had developed in Vietnam. Generally, they had to rely on couriers who were constantly endangered. Secondly the British devised the Briggs Plan of "new villages" to cut off the CPM from its food and support sources. This proved to be very effective and Chin Peng confirms its affect on party members in the jungle. The Briggs Plan later appeared in South Vietnam as "Strategic Hamlets", which were not successful in that environment. The effectiveness of the Commonwealth troops' patrolling and failure to win popular support forced Chin Peng's permanent relocation across the border into southern Thailand.
The threat of the SAS forced a relocation of the CPM upper echelons into China in 1960 and this demonstrated the control infrastructure that the communists had in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, even at that time.
Chin Peng's "My Side of History" adds the missing dimension to the conflict in Malaya, but I felt that a lot of detail and intensity had been lost with the passage of time.


good autobiography by author who checked his facts, 08 Aug 2005
This is Chin Peng's autobiography. He has been the Public Record Office in England and checked facts.

The book is very useful. It explains the linkage between the conventional and guerilla campaigns against the Japanese in Malaya in World War II, and the subsequent guerrilla campaigns against the British and the Malaysian government.

As described by Chin Peng, the Malayan Communist Party were a murderous lot, and killed quite a lot of their own people for security reasons. Chin Peng admits that some of those killed were loyal, and did not deserve their fate.

Chin Peng also admits that in the communist world, not everyone thought well of his leadership.

The book was written with assistance. It is difficult to know how much of it is really the work of Chin Peng.

Excellent Contribution to COIN Literature, 06 Jan 2009
A well written contribution to the rapidly expanding stockpile of Counter-Insurgency literature available today. The focus on the organisational learning and behaviour remains particularly insightful and highly relevant in addressing the core focus. Nagl's experience as not only a COIN thinker but a COIN practitioner no doubt contributed to the quality of this study. 'Learning to eat Soup with a Knife' is a must read for military personnel, academics and anyone with a strong interest in field of Counter-Insurgent Policy.

On a final note to the general reader, the depth and style of analyse in this work is likely to go beyond the needs for everyday conversational knowledge and would not be largely useful for historical overview of either conflict. Nevertheless at a time where COIN is at the forefront of Policy, Nagl's work highlights timeless principles that remain relevant today and have the potential to provide useful insight in many modern conflicts.



Counterinsurgency, a reference guide., 09 Dec 2008
I was lucky enough to meet Col Nagle earlier in the year and following on from conversations i had with him i was keen to read this work.

This is an imformative and intuitive look at the subject drawing lessons from both campaigns but moreover takingextensive extracts from numerous other litterary publications on the subject.

As a compendium of reference material, "Learning to eat soup with a knife" offers clear direction to the reader on further reading and asscociated text. I would reccomend his work to anyone studdying counter insurgency principals, or to any British reader who wants to hear an American expert wax lyrical about how our armed forces are historically better than his own in these environments.

A Must for those Heading to the Sand Pit, 20 Mar 2008
John Nagl's book is simply a must for those heading to the sand pit and includes a great deal of insights into the workings of the British and American army's.

John Nagl incliudes his own aspect of Argyris and Schon's double loop learning system based on Ashby's previous work and fits the learning cycle into the military system in order to discover what is a successful learning organisation.

It is interesting to review the American surge with the failure of Britain's army to secure Basra after reading this book and learning more about organisational learning.

Importantly, it is also easy and interesting to read!!

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), 24 Dec 2007
Colonel Nagl's book is an excellent study though inevitably is bears traces of its original existence as a Oxford University doctoral study.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.

Not What I Expected, 20 Jul 2007
This book has received a number of 'must read' reviews in a number of publications - several of them military in-house magazines. I think some of those reviews are overstated now that I have had the benefit of reading the book. In particular the subtitle 'Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam' is misleading.

Once I opened the book and understood that the main thrust was a study of organisational behaviour then it became clear to me that the author had researched the subject well and presented his arguments effectively and most impressively, as a serving US Army officer, made some critical statements regarding his employer.

For anybody seeking an in-depth analysis of the Malayan Emergency or the Vietnam War, or even a primer on counter-insurgency, this is not the book for you. If, however, you have slightly more than a passing knowledge of both the British and US Armies and the two conflicts, then this book offers well-argued and courageous insights and I recommend it on this basis.



Sampans, Banyans and Rambutans: A Childhood in Singapore and Malaya, 07 Jun 2007
This is a delightful book and will appeal to anybody interested in what it was like to grow up in Singapore or Malaya in the 1960s or early 1970s in a Royal Naval family. Many thousands of British forces service personnel were stationed at or passing through Singapore with their families during this time (along with Australians and New Zealanders as well). If you recall HMS Terror and Banyans you will want to read this book!

Derek Tait's book is full of evocative photos and anecdotes which I am sure will trigger memories of idyliic and happy times for anybody who went through a similar experience. I was in Singapore 1969-71, my dad being based at HMS Terror, and Derek's story is my story too.

I understand Derek is writing a second book based on other people's memories. I for one can't wait to read it.


Patchy, 26 Jun 2008
The early part of this book is really absorbing, as the author relates how he raised merry hell behind the lines of the Japanese advance down the Malayan peninsula. He blew up trains, he blew up railway lines, he blew up bridges and he also learnt to stuff bamboo stems full of explosive and leave them innocently lying in the road, where he blew them up remotely when a suitably-laden Japanese truck drove over them. He would then mow down a few of the survivors and disappear into the jungle.

After not very long, however, and of course after the fall of Singapore, his access to sabotage weaponry disappeared. At that point, at liberty in occupied Malaya, he was able to do very little and he spent the next three years essentially living rough in the jungle and trying to train the locals in the techniques of guerilla warfare.

The pace of the book slackens off badly at this stage because very little really happens. Reading between the lines, this must have been an absolutely desperate time in the author's life. He was separated from his friends and allies, had no sources of supply or even escape, and was reliant for shelter from the Japanese on local Chinese and aborigines.

In fact, he spend much of the next three years trudging from one jungle camp to another and trying to keep body (and one assumes mind) together. The book powerfully makes the point that the jungle is just about the most hostile place you could choose to live. The health of those who tried to do so was every bit as bad as that of those imprisoned in Japanese PoW camps. He also makes some interesting points about the importance of face saving in the local community, to the extent that Chinese guerilla leaders would refuse to attend lectures on jungle fighting tactics in case it looked to their men like they didn't know what they were doing.

Eventually, as the tide turns, the author starts to get a bit more involved again. His was certainly a remarkable feat of survival but it speaks volumes about what a tough struggle the Far Eastern campaigns were that it took this man pretty well all his efforts for three years just to survive - and that just barely.

Classic, 25 Nov 2006
A must read for anyone interested in Malayan military history, particularly the Japanese occupation and the Malayan Emergency. Also relevant to anyone that will be operating in the jungle at some point.

Magnificent, 05 Mar 2007

There has been major motion pictures created on less daring fiction than the heroism described within this book, a fact which has forced me to remind myself that the events which are vividly described are actually true!

The amount of research that has obviously gone into the creation of this novel is amazing and the justified anger in which the authors describe the treatment of those concerned leaves an aftertaste that is hard to forget.

In short, a must-read that I found hard to put down and even harder to forget.

Dave J.

The Third Domino, 05 Jan 2009
Chin Peng and the Third Domino

At the end of the Second World War, the Japanese surrender left a political vacuum in South East Asia. In Indo-China and Malaya, the local communist parties had provided powerful support for the Allied cause after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. None of these communist parties wanted the return of their colonial masters and a rash of independence movements developed in Indonesia, Malaya, Indo-China, and in the sub-continent, also. After the fall of China to Mao's forces and the French loss at Dien Bien Phu, the untidy nil-all draw in Korea, Malaya appeared to be the third domino to fall.
There have been many British analyses of the so-called "Emergency" but Chin Peng's "My Side of History" provides an interesting and much needed balance. Chin Peng (Ong Boon Hua) had been born in Malaya in 1924 of Nanyang Chinese parents. At an early age, he developed nationalist and communist beliefs, becoming a probationary member of the Communist Party of Malaya in 1940 as a 16 year old.
Japan's entry to the war and the defeat of the Commonwealth forces in Singapore increased the CPM's importance, and the British SOE established guerrilla teams in Malaya with CPM assistance. The war facilitated Chin Peng's rise in the Communist Party and the traitorous General Secretary Lai Te, collaborating with the Japanese betrayed other challenging high-ranking key members. When the war ended Lai Te (a Vietnamese) then returned to working under the control of British Special Branch. Chin Peng was awarded two medals by the returning British for his help in defeating the Japanese. However, there was a growing mood in Malaya for independence and little appetite for the return of the pompous British, as colonial masters.
Soon the CPM realised that interregnum was not going to give Malaya, or their party what they sought and so they retreated into state based sanctuaries. Communications were a major problem for the CPM and Central Committee meetings were difficult to organise and dangerous. Chin Peng was lucky and in his jungle redoubts, he avoided the betrayals and ambushes during the Emergency.
Of interest, from a military viewpoint, is that the CPM did not develop the same degree of control or organisation that the communists had developed in Vietnam. Generally, they had to rely on couriers who were constantly endangered. Secondly the British devised the Briggs Plan of "new villages" to cut off the CPM from its food and support sources. This proved to be very effective and Chin Peng confirms its affect on party members in the jungle. The Briggs Plan later appeared in South Vietnam as "Strategic Hamlets", which were not successful in that environment. The effectiveness of the Commonwealth troops' patrolling and failure to win popular support forced Chin Peng's permanent relocation across the border into southern Thailand.
The threat of the SAS forced a relocation of the CPM upper echelons into China in 1960 and this demonstrated the control infrastructure that the communists had in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, even at that time.
Chin Peng's "My Side of History" adds the missing dimension to the conflict in Malaya, but I felt that a lot of detail and intensity had been lost with the passage of time.


good autobiography by author who checked his facts, 08 Aug 2005
This is Chin Peng's autobiography. He has been the Public Record Office in England and checked facts.

The book is very useful. It explains the linkage between the conventional and guerilla campaigns against the Japanese in Malaya in World War II, and the subsequent guerrilla campaigns against the British and the Malaysian government.

As described by Chin Peng, the Malayan Communist Party were a murderous lot, and killed quite a lot of their own people for security reasons. Chin Peng admits that some of those killed were loyal, and did not deserve their fate.

Chin Peng also admits that in the communist world, not everyone thought well of his leadership.

The book was written with assistance. It is difficult to know how much of it is really the work of Chin Peng.

A very approachable book, 31 Jul 2004
This is a well-written mix of science (the lemurs) the people of this area of south Madagascar (the Lords)and some history, developmental politics,etc. The author has been visiting the country for decades and writes an engaging personal story travelling through the years, the issues and the history.I was particularly impressed with her forthright views on local politics, unusually bold by the standards of travel writers. However she is more than an observant traveller. Well worth reading.

Excellent Contribution to COIN Literature, 06 Jan 2009
A well written contribution to the rapidly expanding stockpile of Counter-Insurgency literature available today. The focus on the organisational learning and behaviour remains particularly insightful and highly relevant in addressing the core focus. Nagl's experience as not only a COIN thinker but a COIN practitioner no doubt contributed to the quality of this study. 'Learning to eat Soup with a Knife' is a must read for military personnel, academics and anyone with a strong interest in field of Counter-Insurgent Policy.

On a final note to the general reader, the depth and style of analyse in this work is likely to go beyond the needs for everyday conversational knowledge and would not be largely useful for historical overview of either conflict. Nevertheless at a time where COIN is at the forefront of Policy, Nagl's work highlights timeless principles that remain relevant today and have the potential to provide useful insight in many modern conflicts.



Counterinsurgency, a reference guide., 09 Dec 2008
I was lucky enough to meet Col Nagle earlier in the year and following on from conversations i had with him i was keen to read this work.

This is an imformative and intuitive look at the subject drawing lessons from both campaigns but moreover takingextensive extracts from numerous other litterary publications on the subject.

As a compendium of reference material, "Learning to eat soup with a knife" offers clear direction to the reader on further reading and asscociated text. I would reccomend his work to anyone studdying counter insurgency principals, or to any British reader who wants to hear an American expert wax lyrical about how our armed forces are historically better than his own in these environments.

A Must for those Heading to the Sand Pit, 20 Mar 2008
John Nagl's book is simply a must for those heading to the sand pit and includes a great deal of insights into the workings of the British and American army's.

John Nagl incliudes his own aspect of Argyris and Schon's double loop learning system based on Ashby's previous work and fits the learning cycle into the military system in order to discover what is a successful learning organisation.

It is interesting to review the American surge with the failure of Britain's army to secure Basra after reading this book and learning more about organisational learning.

Importantly, it is also easy and interesting to read!!

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), 24 Dec 2007
Colonel Nagl's book is an excellent study though inevitably is bears traces of its original existence as a Oxford University doctoral study.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.

Not What I Expected, 20 Jul 2007
This book has received a number of 'must read' reviews in a number of publications - several of them military in-house magazines. I think some of those reviews are overstated now that I have had the benefit of reading the book. In particular the subtitle 'Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam' is misleading.

Once I opened the book and understood that the main thrust was a study of organisational behaviour then it became clear to me that the author had researched the subject well and presented his arguments effectively and most impressively, as a serving US Army officer, made some critical statements regarding his employer.

For anybody seeking an in-depth analysis of the Malayan Emergency or the Vietnam War, or even a primer on counter-insurgency, this is not the book for you. If, however, you have slightly more than a passing knowledge of both the British and US Armies and the two conflicts, then this book offers well-argued and courageous insights and I recommend it on this basis.



Sampans, Banyans and Rambutans: A Childhood in Singapore and Malaya, 07 Jun 2007
This is a delightful book and will appeal to anybody interested in what it was like to grow up in Singapore or Malaya in the 1960s or early 1970s in a Royal Naval family. Many thousands of British forces service personnel were stationed at or passing through Singapore with their families during this time (along with Australians and New Zealanders as well). If you recall HMS Terror and Banyans you will want to read this book!

Derek Tait's book is full of evocative photos and anecdotes which I am sure will trigger memories of idyliic and happy times for anybody who went through a similar experience. I was in Singapore 1969-71, my dad being based at HMS Terror, and Derek's story is my story too.

I understand Derek is writing a second book based on other people's memories. I for one can't wait to read it.


Patchy, 26 Jun 2008
The early part of this book is really absorbing, as the author relates how he raised merry hell behind the lines of the Japanese advance down the Malayan peninsula. He blew up trains, he blew up railway lines, he blew up bridges and he also learnt to stuff bamboo stems full of explosive and leave them innocently lying in the road, where he blew them up remotely when a suitably-laden Japanese truck drove over them. He would then mow down a few of the survivors and disappear into the jungle.

After not very long, however, and of course after the fall of Singapore, his access to sabotage weaponry disappeared. At that point, at liberty in occupied Malaya, he was able to do very little and he spent the next three years essentially living rough in the jungle and trying to train the locals in the techniques of guerilla warfare.

The pace of the book slackens off badly at this stage because very little really happens. Reading between the lines, this must have been an absolutely desperate time in the author's life. He was separated from his friends and allies, had no sources of supply or even escape, and was reliant for shelter from the Japanese on local Chinese and aborigines.

In fact, he spend much of the next three years trudging from one jungle camp to another and trying to keep body (and one assumes mind) together. The book powerfully makes the point that the jungle is just about the most hostile place you could choose to live. The health of those who tried to do so was every bit as bad as that of those imprisoned in Japanese PoW camps. He also makes some interesting points about the importance of face saving in the local community, to the extent that Chinese guerilla leaders would refuse to attend lectures on jungle fighting tactics in case it looked to their men like they didn't know what they were doing.

Eventually, as the tide turns, the author starts to get a bit more involved again. His was certainly a remarkable feat of survival but it speaks volumes about what a tough struggle the Far Eastern campaigns were that it took this man pretty well all his efforts for three years just to survive - and that just barely.

Classic, 25 Nov 2006
A must read for anyone interested in Malayan military history, particularly the Japanese occupation and the Malayan Emergency. Also relevant to anyone that will be operating in the jungle at some point.

Magnificent, 05 Mar 2007

There has been major motion pictures created on less daring fiction than the heroism described within this book, a fact which has forced me to remind myself that the events which are vividly described are actually true!

The amount of research that has obviously gone into the creation of this novel is amazing and the justified anger in which the authors describe the treatment of those concerned leaves an aftertaste that is hard to forget.

In short, a must-read that I found hard to put down and even harder to forget.

Dave J.

The Third Domino, 05 Jan 2009
Chin Peng and the Third Domino

At the end of the Second World War, the Japanese surrender left a political vacuum in South East Asia. In Indo-China and Malaya, the local communist parties had provided powerful support for the Allied cause after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. None of these communist parties wanted the return of their colonial masters and a rash of independence movements developed in Indonesia, Malaya, Indo-China, and in the sub-continent, also. After the fall of China to Mao's forces and the French loss at Dien Bien Phu, the untidy nil-all draw in Korea, Malaya appeared to be the third domino to fall.
There have been many British analyses of the so-called "Emergency" but Chin Peng's "My Side of History" provides an interesting and much needed balance. Chin Peng (Ong Boon Hua) had been born in Malaya in 1924 of Nanyang Chinese parents. At an early age, he developed nationalist and communist beliefs, becoming a probationary member of the Communist Party of Malaya in 1940 as a 16 year old.
Japan's entry to the war and the defeat of the Commonwealth forces in Singapore increased the CPM's importance, and the British SOE established guerrilla teams in Malaya with CPM assistance. The war facilitated Chin Peng's rise in the Communist Party and the traitorous General Secretary Lai Te, collaborating with the Japanese betrayed other challenging high-ranking key members. When the war ended Lai Te (a Vietnamese) then returned to working under the control of British Special Branch. Chin Peng was awarded two medals by the returning British for his help in defeating the Japanese. However, there was a growing mood in Malaya for independence and little appetite for the return of the pompous British, as colonial masters.
Soon the CPM realised that interregnum was not going to give Malaya, or their party what they sought and so they retreated into state based sanctuaries. Communications were a major problem for the CPM and Central Committee meetings were difficult to organise and dangerous. Chin Peng was lucky and in his jungle redoubts, he avoided the betrayals and ambushes during the Emergency.
Of interest, from a military viewpoint, is that the CPM did not develop the same degree of control or organisation that the communists had developed in Vietnam. Generally, they had to rely on couriers who were constantly endangered. Secondly the British devised the Briggs Plan of "new villages" to cut off the CPM from its food and support sources. This proved to be very effective and Chin Peng confirms its affect on party members in the jungle. The Briggs Plan later appeared in South Vietnam as "Strategic Hamlets", which were not successful in that environment. The effectiveness of the Commonwealth troops' patrolling and failure to win popular support forced Chin Peng's permanent relocation across the border into southern Thailand.
The threat of the SAS forced a relocation of the CPM upper echelons into China in 1960 and this demonstrated the control infrastructure that the communists had in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, even at that time.
Chin Peng's "My Side of History" adds the missing dimension to the conflict in Malaya, but I felt that a lot of detail and intensity had been lost with the passage of time.


good autobiography by author who checked his facts, 08 Aug 2005
This is Chin Peng's autobiography. He has been the Public Record Office in England and checked facts.

The book is very useful. It explains the linkage between the conventional and guerilla campaigns against the Japanese in Malaya in World War II, and the subsequent guerrilla campaigns against the British and the Malaysian government.

As described by Chin Peng, the Malayan Communist Party were a murderous lot, and killed quite a lot of their own people for security reasons. Chin Peng admits that some of those killed were loyal, and did not deserve their fate.

Chin Peng also admits that in the communist world, not everyone thought well of his leadership.

The book was written with assistance. It is difficult to know how much of it is really the work of Chin Peng.

A very approachable book, 31 Jul 2004
This is a well-written mix of science (the lemurs) the people of this area of south Madagascar (the Lords)and some history, developmental politics,etc. The author has been visiting the country for decades and writes an engaging personal story travelling through the years, the issues and the history.I was particularly impressed with her forthright views on local politics, unusually bold by the standards of travel writers. However she is more than an observant traveller. Well worth reading.

Excellent!, 09 Jan 2005
This book not only covers the major, popular birdwatching sites of both Peninsular Malaysia and Malaysian Borneo, but lots of wonderfully obscure, little-known areas as well.
Descriptions of all sites are accompanied by a sketch map, details on access and facilities, and long lists of birds to be seen there - grouped according to how easy/hard they are to see.
A must have for all birdwatchers going to Malaysia, and indeed very useful for anyone interested in nature reserves of the country.

Excellent Contribution to COIN Literature, 06 Jan 2009
A well written contribution to the rapidly expanding stockpile of Counter-Insurgency literature available today. The focus on the organisational learning and behaviour remains particularly insightful and highly relevant in addressing the core focus. Nagl's experience as not only a COIN thinker but a COIN practitioner no doubt contributed to the quality of this study. 'Learning to eat Soup with a Knife' is a must read for military personnel, academics and anyone with a strong interest in field of Counter-Insurgent Policy.

On a final note to the general reader, the depth and style of analyse in this work is likely to go beyond the needs for everyday conversational knowledge and would not be largely useful for historical overview of either conflict. Nevertheless at a time where COIN is at the forefront of Policy, Nagl's work highlights timeless principles that remain relevant today and have the potential to provide useful insight in many modern conflicts.



Counterinsurgency, a reference guide., 09 Dec 2008
I was lucky enough to meet Col Nagle earlier in the year and following on from conversations i had with him i was keen to read this work.

This is an imformative and intuitive look at the subject drawing lessons from both campaigns but moreover takingextensive extracts from numerous other litterary publications on the subject.

As a compendium of reference material, "Learning to eat soup with a knife" offers clear direction to the reader on further reading and asscociated text. I would reccomend his work to anyone studdying counter insurgency principals, or to any British reader who wants to hear an American expert wax lyrical about how our armed forces are historically better than his own in these environments.

A Must for those Heading to the Sand Pit, 20 Mar 2008
John Nagl's book is simply a must for those heading to the sand pit and includes a great deal of insights into the workings of the British and American army's.

John Nagl incliudes his own aspect of Argyris and Schon's double loop learning system based on Ashby's previous work and fits the learning cycle into the military system in order to discover what is a successful learning organisation.

It is interesting to review the American surge with the failure of Britain's army to secure Basra after reading this book and learning more about organisational learning.

Importantly, it is also easy and interesting to read!!

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), 24 Dec 2007
Colonel Nagl's book is an excellent study though inevitably is bears traces of its original existence as a Oxford University doctoral study.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.

Not What I Expected, 20 Jul 2007
This book has received a number of 'must read' reviews in a number of publications - several of them military in-house magazines. I think some of those reviews are overstated now that I have had the benefit of reading the book. In particular the subtitle 'Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam' is misleading.

Once I opened the book and understood that the main thrust was a study of organisational behaviour then it became clear to me that the author had researched the subject well and presented his arguments effectively and most impressively, as a serving US Army officer, made some critical statements regarding his employer.

For anybody seeking an in-depth analysis of the Malayan Emergency or the Vietnam War, or even a primer on counter-insurgency, this is not the book for you. If, however, you have slightly more than a passing knowledge of both the British and US Armies and the two conflicts, then this book offers well-argued and courageous insights and I recommend it on this basis.



Sampans, Banyans and Rambutans: A Childhood in Singapore and Malaya, 07 Jun 2007
This is a delightful book and will appeal to anybody interested in what it was like to grow up in Singapore or Malaya in the 1960s or early 1970s in a Royal Naval family. Many thousands of British forces service personnel were stationed at or passing through Singapore with their families during this time (along with Australians and New Zealanders as well). If you recall HMS Terror and Banyans you will want to read this book!

Derek Tait's book is full of evocative photos and anecdotes which I am sure will trigger memories of idyliic and happy times for anybody who went through a similar experience. I was in Singapore 1969-71, my dad being based at HMS Terror, and Derek's story is my story too.

I understand Derek is writing a second book based on other people's memories. I for one can't wait to read it.


Patchy, 26 Jun 2008
The early part of this book is really absorbing, as the author relates how he raised merry hell behind the lines of the Japanese advance down the Malayan peninsula. He blew up trains, he blew up railway lines, he blew up bridges and he also learnt to stuff bamboo stems full of explosive and leave them innocently lying in the road, where he blew them up remotely when a suitably-laden Japanese truck drove over them. He would then mow down a few of the survivors and disappear into the jungle.

After not very long, however, and of course after the fall of Singapore, his access to sabotage weaponry disappeared. At that point, at liberty in occupied Malaya, he was able to do very little and he spent the next three years essentially living rough in the jungle and trying to train the locals in the techniques of guerilla warfare.

The pace of the book slackens off badly at this stage because very little really happens. Reading between the lines, this must have been an absolutely desperate time in the author's life. He was separated from his friends and allies, had no sources of supply or even escape, and was reliant for shelter from the Japanese on local Chinese and aborigines.

In fact, he spend much of the next three years trudging from one jungle camp to another and trying to keep body (and one assumes mind) together. The book powerfully makes the point that the jungle is just about the most hostile place you could choose to live. The health of those who tried to do so was every bit as bad as that of those imprisoned in Japanese PoW camps. He also makes some interesting points about the importance of face saving in the local community, to the extent that Chinese guerilla leaders would refuse to attend lectures on jungle fighting tactics in case it looked to their men like they didn't know what they were doing.

Eventually, as the tide turns, the author starts to get a bit more involved again. His was certainly a remarkable feat of survival but it speaks volumes about what a tough struggle the Far Eastern campaigns were that it took this man pretty well all his efforts for three years just to survive - and that just barely.

Classic, 25 Nov 2006
A must read for anyone interested in Malayan military history, particularly the Japanese occupation and the Malayan Emergency. Also relevant to anyone that will be operating in the jungle at some point.

Magnificent, 05 Mar 2007

There has been major motion pictures created on less daring fiction than the heroism described within this book, a fact which has forced me to remind myself that the events which are vividly described are actually true!

The amount of research that has obviously gone into the creation of this novel is amazing and the justified anger in which the authors describe the treatment of those concerned leaves an aftertaste that is hard to forget.

In short, a must-read that I found hard to put down and even harder to forget.

Dave J.

The Third Domino, 05 Jan 2009
Chin Peng and the Third Domino

At the end of the Second World War, the Japanese surrender left a political vacuum in South East Asia. In Indo-China and Malaya, the local communist parties had provided powerful support for the Allied cause after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. None of these communist parties wanted the return of their colonial masters and a rash of independence movements developed in Indonesia, Malaya, Indo-China, and in the sub-continent, also. After the fall of China to Mao's forces and the French loss at Dien Bien Phu, the untidy nil-all draw in Korea, Malaya appeared to be the third domino to fall.
There have been many British analyses of the so-called "Emergency" but Chin Peng's "My Side of History" provides an interesting and much needed balance. Chin Peng (Ong Boon Hua) had been born in Malaya in 1924 of Nanyang Chinese parents. At an early age, he developed nationalist and communist beliefs, becoming a probationary member of the Communist Party of Malaya in 1940 as a 16 year old.
Japan's entry to the war and the defeat of the Commonwealth forces in Singapore increased the CPM's importance, and the British SOE established guerrilla teams in Malaya with CPM assistance. The war facilitated Chin Peng's rise in the Communist Party and the traitorous General Secretary Lai Te, collaborating with the Japanese betrayed other challenging high-ranking key members. When the war ended Lai Te (a Vietnamese) then returned to working under the control of British Special Branch. Chin Peng was awarded two medals by the returning British for his help in defeating the Japanese. However, there was a growing mood in Malaya for independence and little appetite for the return of the pompous British, as colonial masters.
Soon the CPM realised that interregnum was not going to give Malaya, or their party what they sought and so they retreated into state based sanctuaries. Communications were a major problem for the CPM and Central Committee meetings were difficult to organise and dangerous. Chin Peng was lucky and in his jungle redoubts, he avoided the betrayals and ambushes during the Emergency.
Of interest, from a military viewpoint, is that the CPM did not develop the same degree of control or organisation that the communists had developed in Vietnam. Generally, they had to rely on couriers who were constantly endangered. Secondly the British devised the Briggs Plan of "new villages" to cut off the CPM from its food and support sources. This proved to be very effective and Chin Peng confirms its affect on party members in the jungle. The Briggs Plan later appeared in South Vietnam as "Strategic Hamlets", which were not successful in that environment. The effectiveness of the Commonwealth troops' patrolling and failure to win popular support forced Chin Peng's permanent relocation across the border into southern Thailand.
The threat of the SAS forced a relocation of the CPM upper echelons into China in 1960 and this demonstrated the control infrastructure that the communists had in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, even at that time.
Chin Peng's "My Side of History" adds the missing dimension to the conflict in Malaya, but I felt that a lot of detail and intensity had been lost with the passage of time.


good autobiography by author who checked his facts, 08 Aug 2005
This is Chin Peng's autobiography. He has been the Public Record Office in England and checked facts.

The book is very useful. It explains the linkage between the conventional and guerilla campaigns against the Japanese in Malaya in World War II, and the subsequent guerrilla campaigns against the British and the Malaysian government.

As described by Chin Peng, the Malayan Communist Party were a murderous lot, and killed quite a lot of their own people for security reasons. Chin Peng admits that some of those killed were loyal, and did not deserve their fate.

Chin Peng also admits that in the communist world, not everyone thought well of his leadership.

The book was written with assistance. It is difficult to know how much of it is really the work of Chin Peng.

A very approachable book, 31 Jul 2004
This is a well-written mix of science (the lemurs) the people of this area of south Madagascar (the Lords)and some history, developmental politics,etc. The author has been visiting the country for decades and writes an engaging personal story travelling through the years, the issues and the history.I was particularly impressed with her forthright views on local politics, unusually bold by the standards of travel writers. However she is more than an observant traveller. Well worth reading.

Excellent!, 09 Jan 2005
This book not only covers the major, popular birdwatching sites of both Peninsular Malaysia and Malaysian Borneo, but lots of wo