EXPLOSIVE READING, 30 Sep 2008
This literary masterpiece from Pulitzer prize winning author Steve Coll will blow your mind.The apparent relentless and exhaustive research that made this book shows Colls dedication to bringing the full story to the reader.Beginning with the US support of the Afghan fighters during the Soviet invasion and finishing just days before the attacks on 9/11 Coll will take you on a mind boggling journey encompassing delicate matters such as:the US support of the taliban,the CIA attempts to buy back Stinger missiles it had given to the Mujaheddin for $150,000 apiece!! hare brained and expensive attempts to remove Osama Bin Laden and constant policy changes and in-fighting within the CIA.Throw in the main characters:an impeached president,a president with no clue on foriegn policy,tribal leaders more concerned with personal enrichment than the liberation of their people and radical jihadists like Osama the world hide and seek champion!!Add to this mix the ineptitude of the CIA and you have an extremely interesting plot.Read this book for the story and you will become more informed on the origins of al-Qaeda,the history of Afghanistan and the entanglement of the US government.Study this book and you will see layer upon layer of CIA incompetence,could 9/11 have been prevented?

Whats Missing, 29 Jun 2008
Well after reading this book, iam think did Steve Coll write the 9/11 Commision Report. As the 9/11 Report blames nobody in the CIA, FBI, NSA for 9/11. Coll fails even to mention the Bin Ladens being flown out of the USA on 9/12/01, when nobody was flying. The book fails to menion the the guy who knew the most about Osama, AL"CIADA" John Oneil . Oneil was the lead FBI investigator of the Cole bombing, resigned from the FBI becuase the Bush administration told him to "back off the Bin Laddens". John Oneil took over secuirty in the Twin Towers on 9/11 , he never made it out . Also mising was this,The first instance is the electronic memo of July 10, 2001 from Kenneth Williams, an FBI agent in Phoenix, Arizona, noting the number of students with ties to radical Islamic fundamentalists enrolled at local aviation training schools, and suggesting that a nationwide canvass of these schools be carried out to determine if there was a pattern. The guy who sat on this memo David Fracsa , was promoted. Now there is some good information in the book, but its been editited t by Bush White House. . The Books says the CIA NEVER HAD ANY CONTACT WITH BIN LADDEN EVER. I wont be buying his new book The Bin Laddens. The paper back was published after the 9/11 commision report was put out.

Incredible, 05 Nov 2007
This has become my favourite book of all time. Each page is packed with information, the whole book is extensively referenced too. It also puts to bed many misconceptions and myths (a common one is that the CIA funded bin Laden, which is not true).
Coll also describes the feelings of those who worked in the CIA and State Dept. and he shows their many conflicts and competing ideologies. The split feelings and decisions within the U.S. policy makers with respect to Massoud, bin Laden and the Taliban are very well told.
Recommended.

You could not want for a better history, 31 Oct 2007
This is by far the clearest and most complete account I have yet read about the roots of al-Qaeda. The style of writing is exemplary: this is a big book on a tricky subject and could have turned out very dull and difficult indeed in the hands of a poorer writer, but Steve Coll deserves all the prizes and acolades that he has received for his work.

The book clearly traces the foundations of radical islam from the years before the Soviet invasion of Afgaistan, through the rise of the Taliban and up to the eve of 11th September 2001.

A must-read for anyone struggling to understand where why the world has got to today.


Brilliant, 08 Mar 2007
A brilliantly written book which goes into a great deal of detail. I found it interesting that the writing style almost perfectly matched that of Daniel Yergin's, who was also a recepient of a pulitzer prize

EXPLOSIVE READING, 30 Sep 2008
This literary masterpiece from Pulitzer prize winning author Steve Coll will blow your mind.The apparent relentless and exhaustive research that made this book shows Colls dedication to bringing the full story to the reader.Beginning with the US support of the Afghan fighters during the Soviet invasion and finishing just days before the attacks on 9/11 Coll will take you on a mind boggling journey encompassing delicate matters such as:the US support of the taliban,the CIA attempts to buy back Stinger missiles it had given to the Mujaheddin for $150,000 apiece!! hare brained and expensive attempts to remove Osama Bin Laden and constant policy changes and in-fighting within the CIA.Throw in the main characters:an impeached president,a president with no clue on foriegn policy,tribal leaders more concerned with personal enrichment than the liberation of their people and radical jihadists like Osama the world hide and seek champion!!Add to this mix the ineptitude of the CIA and you have an extremely interesting plot.Read this book for the story and you will become more informed on the origins of al-Qaeda,the history of Afghanistan and the entanglement of the US government.Study this book and you will see layer upon layer of CIA incompetence,could 9/11 have been prevented?

Whats Missing, 29 Jun 2008
Well after reading this book, iam think did Steve Coll write the 9/11 Commision Report. As the 9/11 Report blames nobody in the CIA, FBI, NSA for 9/11. Coll fails even to mention the Bin Ladens being flown out of the USA on 9/12/01, when nobody was flying. The book fails to menion the the guy who knew the most about Osama, AL"CIADA" John Oneil . Oneil was the lead FBI investigator of the Cole bombing, resigned from the FBI becuase the Bush administration told him to "back off the Bin Laddens". John Oneil took over secuirty in the Twin Towers on 9/11 , he never made it out . Also mising was this,The first instance is the electronic memo of July 10, 2001 from Kenneth Williams, an FBI agent in Phoenix, Arizona, noting the number of students with ties to radical Islamic fundamentalists enrolled at local aviation training schools, and suggesting that a nationwide canvass of these schools be carried out to determine if there was a pattern. The guy who sat on this memo David Fracsa , was promoted. Now there is some good information in the book, but its been editited t by Bush White House. . The Books says the CIA NEVER HAD ANY CONTACT WITH BIN LADDEN EVER. I wont be buying his new book The Bin Laddens. The paper back was published after the 9/11 commision report was put out.

Incredible, 05 Nov 2007
This has become my favourite book of all time. Each page is packed with information, the whole book is extensively referenced too. It also puts to bed many misconceptions and myths (a common one is that the CIA funded bin Laden, which is not true).
Coll also describes the feelings of those who worked in the CIA and State Dept. and he shows their many conflicts and competing ideologies. The split feelings and decisions within the U.S. policy makers with respect to Massoud, bin Laden and the Taliban are very well told.
Recommended.

You could not want for a better history, 31 Oct 2007
This is by far the clearest and most complete account I have yet read about the roots of al-Qaeda. The style of writing is exemplary: this is a big book on a tricky subject and could have turned out very dull and difficult indeed in the hands of a poorer writer, but Steve Coll deserves all the prizes and acolades that he has received for his work.

The book clearly traces the foundations of radical islam from the years before the Soviet invasion of Afgaistan, through the rise of the Taliban and up to the eve of 11th September 2001.

A must-read for anyone struggling to understand where why the world has got to today.


Brilliant, 08 Mar 2007
A brilliantly written book which goes into a great deal of detail. I found it interesting that the writing style almost perfectly matched that of Daniel Yergin's, who was also a recepient of a pulitzer prize

A Great Key to Understanding Our Time, 05 Sep 2008
While many people in the West have become familiar with words like outsourcing, offshoring and globalisation, some questions remain: what exactly do these words mean? When did globalisation as we know it begin? What are the forces that drive globalisation and what will the future of a globalised world look like? Thomas Friedman, the three-time Pulitzer prize winner, addresses these questions in an honest, informed way by arguing that the world has become flatter in the last 20 years.

The author begins by outlining the forces that led to globalisation or a flattening of the world: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; development of the internet and web browsers; offshoring; outsourcing; uploading (read Blogging, Youtube and the MySpace phenomenon) and improved supply chain management. He convincingly argues that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the development of the computers and the internet have led to an increase in the global (skilled) labour force and vast improvements in labour productivity. By using cogent examples from India, Thomas Friedman explained that the development of the internet and the presence of a skilled labour force in India enabled that country to jettison fifty years of Socialism in favour of a free market economy. This has in turn led to astronomical growth rates on the subcontinent.

The author then sets his sights on America's place in the flattening flat. He stresses that while the US has the best universities in the world, it (the US) cannot take it for granted that it will be the leader in science and technology in the new flat world. He presents interesting statistics, which indicate that, the number of US maths and science graduates is falling rapidly, a situation he calls a quiet crisis. Furthermore, Mr Friedman bemoans the failure of the US political class to see the looming crisis ahead. Instead, the politicians in Washington seem to be too busy fighting over petty issues such as drugs in sports and whether or not to teach intelligent design in America's schools.

Mr Friedman then examines the so-called Unflat World i.e. the Developing World (as if we needed another word to describe the poor). He states the inhabitants of the Unflat World (rural India, Africa, rural China) are either too sick or their local governments too broken to participate in the Flat World platform. Though his analysis is a tad too simplistic for me, it does have a ring of truth to it. Yes, bad governments can be a barrier to their people's economic progress. This is all the more regrettable in a world where the barriers to participation in the global economy are being constantly reduced.

The flattening of the world has enabled educated, savvy Indians and Chinese to access hitherto closed markets in the West. Furthermore, their increased prosperity has enabled them to buy more Western goods and services. In a flattening world, both rich and poor countries gain from trade and exchange. However, the book argues that there are also real losers in the flattening process chief among who are people who lose their jobs to oursourcing or offshoring. Friedman argues for more elaborate safety nets to help those who lose out in the globalisation game.

The book is quite US-centric but it does not detract from its main theme. The key message that I took from the book is on page 343. Mr Freidman: "Wealth in an age of flatness will increasingly gravitate to those countries that get three things right: the infrastructure to connect as efficiently and speedily as possible with the flat world platform, the right education programmes and knowledge skills to empower more of their people to innovate and do value-added work on that platform, and finally the right governance - that is, the right tax policies, the right investment and trade laws, and, most of all, the right inspirational leadership - to enhance and manage the flow with the flat world." It is a message that I, as a Nigerian, have taken to heart. I highly recommend The World is Flat to anyone interested in understanding the forces that drive globalisation and how they will affect him/her in the nest 20-30 years.


Disappointing, 10 Aug 2008
Friedman's latest book is just plain disappointing. We all know that the world is growing more connected -- the internet, cell phones, global trade, etc. are all growing quickly. The world is changing fast. We all know that.

Friedman's book does not add much. He is not an expert in any of the topics he discusses, and he does not do the kind of in-depth research or thinking needed to come up with an interesting prediction or observation. Rather, he just picked a "hot topic," did a few random interviews, and wrote a book.

Freidman oversimplifies an incredibly complex process, and he does not tell you anything you do not already know. He also repeats his catch phrase -- "the world is flat" -- over and over, as if trying to make you remember the name of his book.

I really enjoyed Beruit to Jerusalem when it came out, and I was very disappointed to read this one.

too simplistic though very good fairytale, 22 Dec 2007
Thomas Friedman charms the readers with his grand story of a fast changing world in a borderless life of business, wealth, competition and entrepreneurship. Interesting read, but his vision and messages are too narrow and even too simplistic. What is more, his knowledge about China and India and other parts of the world is less than profound. More serious readers should also read 2 other new books: 1. China's global reach; 2. China and the new world order, both by Chinese journalist/consultant George Zhibin Gu, which offers more dynamic and realistic insights on emerging China and India in relation to the established West.

Not too exciting..., 31 Oct 2007
I thought the idea was good, but like so many of these books, not enough to fill a few hundred pages. I think we know that the "world is getting flatter" (even the metaphor is a bit naff - the world is shrinking) and that this is changing business.

Don't bother.

In America or around the world., 19 Sep 2007
From the first few pages when Friedman leaps from level playing fields to a flat world, it is almost easy to understand why the cover shows ships falling off the edge of an un-flat world [NOTE: The current dust cover, changed since this review was written, no longer depicts ships falling off a 'flat' earth. You can draw your own conclusions as to the motives behind that decision.]. Something is missing here. "Level" is not "flat". And ships don't fall off a flat surface. Is he trying to be ironic? If so, Friedman ought to leave that to Tino Georgiou. If he thinks a "brief history" of the past five years is a funny concept, again I refer you to Tino Georgiou--"The Fates" for more robust and pointed humor.
As a journalist, with seemingly unlimited resources and the once-gilded New York Times brand name behind him, Friedman has leveraged his basic skills into best-sellerdom, all the while seemingly in shock and awe of all the things his rich travel budget allows him to take in. Yet I have to ask, where's the beef?

Yes, the world has shifted from networks based on mythology and monarchies, through manufacturing and Marxism, to today's global marketing, but services aren't a new phenomenon; they've always been with us. And although wireless communication has made the world faster and more competitive, life is no more ruthless, violent or uncertain now than when plagues, expansive military conquest, disease, poor hygiene, inbred monarchies, and wealth-by-acquisition ruled the world as they have for most of human existence. Sure, technology has increased the pace, but each generation seems to think that the last generation had it slow and easy, and that has never been the case. The poor villager who wandered too far away from his hut 1,500 years ago experienced no less a shock than today's global traveler stepping off a plane in Mumbai.

And this outsourcing 'problem' is not new and it is not based simply on information technology. For as long as man has tried to better his life and to leverage his advantages, he has hired someone else to produce the things he needs, be it food, cooking, child care, or production. Like services, outsourcing is not new. That villager from 1,500 years ago thought that outsourcing crop production to the next village over was no less daunting or distant than Americans importing oranges from Israel or roses from Brazil. And you can bet the other villagers were mad as hell at him for taking away 'their' work.

For more than fifty years, columnists, pundits, journalists, armchair analysts, and bad economists have been intrigued by each new emerging economic superpower, from the Soviet Union, to the European Union, to Japan, to China, and now India, and each time all that wonderment and starry-eyed predictions have come to nothing. Like Ayn Rand said, what separates America from the rest of the world is that we were the first to think of making money, not just taking money. And America still does that very well. I still have my doubts about the sustainability of growth in China and India. Sooner or later they are going to hit a consumer-oriented economy and demands for many things their people don't demand today. Besides, their growth has been exaggerated by the fact that they started basically at zero. Bad analysts like straight-line extrapolations. Not only do these growth lines sometimes flatten out, they can nose dive. And what's bigger and more dramatic, 3% growth in a $11 trillion economy or 7% in a $200 million economy?

Maybe the world has become more homogenous with technology and communications. But anyone who thinks that there is some huge melting pot, in America or around the world, would be better served by recognizing the world as a salad bowl, not a melting pot. And neither the pot or bowl are flat. Unless you must have this book, skip and get yourself a copy of Tino Georgiou--"The Fates"

EXPLOSIVE READING, 30 Sep 2008
This literary masterpiece from Pulitzer prize winning author Steve Coll will blow your mind.The apparent relentless and exhaustive research that made this book shows Colls dedication to bringing the full story to the reader.Beginning with the US support of the Afghan fighters during the Soviet invasion and finishing just days before the attacks on 9/11 Coll will take you on a mind boggling journey encompassing delicate matters such as:the US support of the taliban,the CIA attempts to buy back Stinger missiles it had given to the Mujaheddin for $150,000 apiece!! hare brained and expensive attempts to remove Osama Bin Laden and constant policy changes and in-fighting within the CIA.Throw in the main characters:an impeached president,a president with no clue on foriegn policy,tribal leaders more concerned with personal enrichment than the liberation of their people and radical jihadists like Osama the world hide and seek champion!!Add to this mix the ineptitude of the CIA and you have an extremely interesting plot.Read this book for the story and you will become more informed on the origins of al-Qaeda,the history of Afghanistan and the entanglement of the US government.Study this book and you will see layer upon layer of CIA incompetence,could 9/11 have been prevented?

Whats Missing, 29 Jun 2008
Well after reading this book, iam think did Steve Coll write the 9/11 Commision Report. As the 9/11 Report blames nobody in the CIA, FBI, NSA for 9/11. Coll fails even to mention the Bin Ladens being flown out of the USA on 9/12/01, when nobody was flying. The book fails to menion the the guy who knew the most about Osama, AL"CIADA" John Oneil . Oneil was the lead FBI investigator of the Cole bombing, resigned from the FBI becuase the Bush administration told him to "back off the Bin Laddens". John Oneil took over secuirty in the Twin Towers on 9/11 , he never made it out . Also mising was this,The first instance is the electronic memo of July 10, 2001 from Kenneth Williams, an FBI agent in Phoenix, Arizona, noting the number of students with ties to radical Islamic fundamentalists enrolled at local aviation training schools, and suggesting that a nationwide canvass of these schools be carried out to determine if there was a pattern. The guy who sat on this memo David Fracsa , was promoted. Now there is some good information in the book, but its been editited t by Bush White House. . The Books says the CIA NEVER HAD ANY CONTACT WITH BIN LADDEN EVER. I wont be buying his new book The Bin Laddens. The paper back was published after the 9/11 commision report was put out.

Incredible, 05 Nov 2007
This has become my favourite book of all time. Each page is packed with information, the whole book is extensively referenced too. It also puts to bed many misconceptions and myths (a common one is that the CIA funded bin Laden, which is not true).
Coll also describes the feelings of those who worked in the CIA and State Dept. and he shows their many conflicts and competing ideologies. The split feelings and decisions within the U.S. policy makers with respect to Massoud, bin Laden and the Taliban are very well told.
Recommended.

You could not want for a better history, 31 Oct 2007
This is by far the clearest and most complete account I have yet read about the roots of al-Qaeda. The style of writing is exemplary: this is a big book on a tricky subject and could have turned out very dull and difficult indeed in the hands of a poorer writer, but Steve Coll deserves all the prizes and acolades that he has received for his work.

The book clearly traces the foundations of radical islam from the years before the Soviet invasion of Afgaistan, through the rise of the Taliban and up to the eve of 11th September 2001.

A must-read for anyone struggling to understand where why the world has got to today.


Brilliant, 08 Mar 2007
A brilliantly written book which goes into a great deal of detail. I found it interesting that the writing style almost perfectly matched that of Daniel Yergin's, who was also a recepient of a pulitzer prize

A Great Key to Understanding Our Time, 05 Sep 2008
While many people in the West have become familiar with words like outsourcing, offshoring and globalisation, some questions remain: what exactly do these words mean? When did globalisation as we know it begin? What are the forces that drive globalisation and what will the future of a globalised world look like? Thomas Friedman, the three-time Pulitzer prize winner, addresses these questions in an honest, informed way by arguing that the world has become flatter in the last 20 years.

The author begins by outlining the forces that led to globalisation or a flattening of the world: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; development of the internet and web browsers; offshoring; outsourcing; uploading (read Blogging, Youtube and the MySpace phenomenon) and improved supply chain management. He convincingly argues that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the development of the computers and the internet have led to an increase in the global (skilled) labour force and vast improvements in labour productivity. By using cogent examples from India, Thomas Friedman explained that the development of the internet and the presence of a skilled labour force in India enabled that country to jettison fifty years of Socialism in favour of a free market economy. This has in turn led to astronomical growth rates on the subcontinent.

The author then sets his sights on America's place in the flattening flat. He stresses that while the US has the best universities in the world, it (the US) cannot take it for granted that it will be the leader in science and technology in the new flat world. He presents interesting statistics, which indicate that, the number of US maths and science graduates is falling rapidly, a situation he calls a quiet crisis. Furthermore, Mr Friedman bemoans the failure of the US political class to see the looming crisis ahead. Instead, the politicians in Washington seem to be too busy fighting over petty issues such as drugs in sports and whether or not to teach intelligent design in America's schools.

Mr Friedman then examines the so-called Unflat World i.e. the Developing World (as if we needed another word to describe the poor). He states the inhabitants of the Unflat World (rural India, Africa, rural China) are either too sick or their local governments too broken to participate in the Flat World platform. Though his analysis is a tad too simplistic for me, it does have a ring of truth to it. Yes, bad governments can be a barrier to their people's economic progress. This is all the more regrettable in a world where the barriers to participation in the global economy are being constantly reduced.

The flattening of the world has enabled educated, savvy Indians and Chinese to access hitherto closed markets in the West. Furthermore, their increased prosperity has enabled them to buy more Western goods and services. In a flattening world, both rich and poor countries gain from trade and exchange. However, the book argues that there are also real losers in the flattening process chief among who are people who lose their jobs to oursourcing or offshoring. Friedman argues for more elaborate safety nets to help those who lose out in the globalisation game.

The book is quite US-centric but it does not detract from its main theme. The key message that I took from the book is on page 343. Mr Freidman: "Wealth in an age of flatness will increasingly gravitate to those countries that get three things right: the infrastructure to connect as efficiently and speedily as possible with the flat world platform, the right education programmes and knowledge skills to empower more of their people to innovate and do value-added work on that platform, and finally the right governance - that is, the right tax policies, the right investment and trade laws, and, most of all, the right inspirational leadership - to enhance and manage the flow with the flat world." It is a message that I, as a Nigerian, have taken to heart. I highly recommend The World is Flat to anyone interested in understanding the forces that drive globalisation and how they will affect him/her in the nest 20-30 years.


Disappointing, 10 Aug 2008
Friedman's latest book is just plain disappointing. We all know that the world is growing more connected -- the internet, cell phones, global trade, etc. are all growing quickly. The world is changing fast. We all know that.

Friedman's book does not add much. He is not an expert in any of the topics he discusses, and he does not do the kind of in-depth research or thinking needed to come up with an interesting prediction or observation. Rather, he just picked a "hot topic," did a few random interviews, and wrote a book.

Freidman oversimplifies an incredibly complex process, and he does not tell you anything you do not already know. He also repeats his catch phrase -- "the world is flat" -- over and over, as if trying to make you remember the name of his book.

I really enjoyed Beruit to Jerusalem when it came out, and I was very disappointed to read this one.

too simplistic though very good fairytale, 22 Dec 2007
Thomas Friedman charms the readers with his grand story of a fast changing world in a borderless life of business, wealth, competition and entrepreneurship. Interesting read, but his vision and messages are too narrow and even too simplistic. What is more, his knowledge about China and India and other parts of the world is less than profound. More serious readers should also read 2 other new books: 1. China's global reach; 2. China and the new world order, both by Chinese journalist/consultant George Zhibin Gu, which offers more dynamic and realistic insights on emerging China and India in relation to the established West.

Not too exciting..., 31 Oct 2007
I thought the idea was good, but like so many of these books, not enough to fill a few hundred pages. I think we know that the "world is getting flatter" (even the metaphor is a bit naff - the world is shrinking) and that this is changing business.

Don't bother.

In America or around the world., 19 Sep 2007
From the first few pages when Friedman leaps from level playing fields to a flat world, it is almost easy to understand why the cover shows ships falling off the edge of an un-flat world [NOTE: The current dust cover, changed since this review was written, no longer depicts ships falling off a 'flat' earth. You can draw your own conclusions as to the motives behind that decision.]. Something is missing here. "Level" is not "flat". And ships don't fall off a flat surface. Is he trying to be ironic? If so, Friedman ought to leave that to Tino Georgiou. If he thinks a "brief history" of the past five years is a funny concept, again I refer you to Tino Georgiou--"The Fates" for more robust and pointed humor.
As a journalist, with seemingly unlimited resources and the once-gilded New York Times brand name behind him, Friedman has leveraged his basic skills into best-sellerdom, all the while seemingly in shock and awe of all the things his rich travel budget allows him to take in. Yet I have to ask, where's the beef?

Yes, the world has shifted from networks based on mythology and monarchies, through manufacturing and Marxism, to today's global marketing, but services aren't a new phenomenon; they've always been with us. And although wireless communication has made the world faster and more competitive, life is no more ruthless, violent or uncertain now than when plagues, expansive military conquest, disease, poor hygiene, inbred monarchies, and wealth-by-acquisition ruled the world as they have for most of human existence. Sure, technology has increased the pace, but each generation seems to think that the last generation had it slow and easy, and that has never been the case. The poor villager who wandered too far away from his hut 1,500 years ago experienced no less a shock than today's global traveler stepping off a plane in Mumbai.

And this outsourcing 'problem' is not new and it is not based simply on information technology. For as long as man has tried to better his life and to leverage his advantages, he has hired someone else to produce the things he needs, be it food, cooking, child care, or production. Like services, outsourcing is not new. That villager from 1,500 years ago thought that outsourcing crop production to the next village over was no less daunting or distant than Americans importing oranges from Israel or roses from Brazil. And you can bet the other villagers were mad as hell at him for taking away 'their' work.

For more than fifty years, columnists, pundits, journalists, armchair analysts, and bad economists have been intrigued by each new emerging economic superpower, from the Soviet Union, to the European Union, to Japan, to China, and now India, and each time all that wonderment and starry-eyed predictions have come to nothing. Like Ayn Rand said, what separates America from the rest of the world is that we were the first to think of making money, not just taking money. And America still does that very well. I still have my doubts about the sustainability of growth in China and India. Sooner or later they are going to hit a consumer-oriented economy and demands for many things their people don't demand today. Besides, their growth has been exaggerated by the fact that they started basically at zero. Bad analysts like straight-line extrapolations. Not only do these growth lines sometimes flatten out, they can nose dive. And what's bigger and more dramatic, 3% growth in a $11 trillion economy or 7% in a $200 million economy?

Maybe the world has become more homogenous with technology and communications. But anyone who thinks that there is some huge melting pot, in America or around the world, would be better served by recognizing the world as a salad bowl, not a melting pot. And neither the pot or bowl are flat. Unless you must have this book, skip and get yourself a copy of Tino Georgiou--"The Fates"


A key essay, which provides for a new interpretation of the conflicts under way, 12 Nov 2008
The Descent into Chaos by Ahmed Rashid is going to alter the common view about what happened in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia after 9/11. It should be considered as a seminal work, for sure, because it challenges the current official version about the guidelines followed in the international reconstruction effort under way in Afghanistan. The most troubling assumption of the essay relates to the support accorded by the US to the warlords, which alienated, in Rashid's view, the Afghan people and opened a window of opportunity for the Taliban to come back. In Rashid opinion, since the very beginnig of his endeavour Karzai lacked adequate support by the US, because the Pentagon disregarded nation building, and wanted to avoid a larger military involvement on the field. The official story still mantains right the opposite. The Descent is telling troubling truths also about Pakistan and the real committment showed by former President Musharraf to the Global War on Terror, exposing all the setbacks suffered by the regional US policy. Rashid is very critical as well on the Bush administration stance about human rights, which in the end proved to be highly counterproductive for the US long term interests in Central Asia. Guantanamo and the renditions are strongly criticized. Finally, the book is rich in first hand infos. It is clearly a must read, also because Rashid has been called to give the US Strategic Review of the Afghan Strategy his own advice.

An excellent overview of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan., 27 Sep 2008
I've really enjoyed this wide ranging and very readable book. It is an excellent introduction to the complexities of Western involvement in Afghanistan, to the failures of policy in Pakistan and to the tactics employed by the CIA under the "war on terror" umbrella. This is an indispensable book for anyone interested in current day politics, because decisions and events which are played out in this region have a tremendous influence on Western governance. It deserves to be on the bookshelf of every NATO officer and NATO government MP.

Insane warmongering, 25 Sep 2008


Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid is a friend and supporter of Afghanistan's president Hamid Karzai. Rashid warns that Afghanistan is facing state collapse, Pakistan is in meltdown, and the five Central Asian states are dictatorships. He claims that the most important thing in the world is to rebuild these nations.

He shows that President Karzai's regime depends on warlords and drug barons, who are backed by the CIA. Britain's forces there are supposed to be helping to cut opium production, but their policy of paying farmers to destroy their opium crops has been `disastrous'. Opium production soared from 4,000 tons in 2005 to 8,200 in 2007. Half of this was grown in British-occupied Helmand, where the rest of Afghanistan's opium was sold.

The USA is allied to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which are al-Qaeda's main sponsors. The USA has given more than $10 billion to Pakistan's President Musharraf. Bush backed him even after he tore up the constitution, sacked the judges, imprisoned more than 12,000 people and muzzled the media. This `created immense hatred for the U.S. Army and America'.

The USA's torture of POWs has further increased this hatred. As Rashid writes, "By following America's lead in promoting or condoning disappearances, torture, and secret jails, these countries found their path to democracy and their struggle against Islamic extremism set back by decades. Western-led nation building had little credibility if it denied justice to the very people it was supposed to help. It could well be argued that over time Islamic extremists were emboldened rather than subdued by the travesty of justice the United States perpetrated. The people learned to hate America. ... The deterioration of human rights in each country became linked to that government's proximity to the CIA."

So the USA's wars have increased the al-Qaeda threat, particularly in Pakistan. Rashid also notes that US interventions have failed in Yugoslavia and East Timor and made a hell-hole of Iraq.

And then - after all this - Rashid calls on the USA, not to get out of the region, but to get deeper in. More sanely, he also calls on the peoples of the region to take responsibility for moving their nations towards democracy.


A deeply troubling book, 11 Jul 2008
Ahmed Rashid has long been a leading expert on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Muslim states of Central Asia that were once part of the Soviet Union. In 2000, the year before 9/11, he published 'Taliban', a book which politicians rushed to read after the attack on the Twin Towers; and if Central Asia catches fire, they will doubtlessly rush to his following book, 'Jihad', first published in 2002, which is an equally authoritative account of the dangers lurking in that area.

After a brilliant introduction of 21 pages, the first three chapters of the present book give the story of American involvement in Afghanistan before 9/11. The characteristic unreliability of American policy is brought out: help given to the Islamic forces and to Pakistan while the Soviets were in Afghanistan; then a total lack of interest in the period after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, when Afghanistan was first torn apart by competing war-lords and was then overrun by the Taliban.

No longer in need of Pakistan, the USA then imposed sanctions on that country because it, like India, had carried out tests of nuclear weapons.

The next 15 chapters are essentially a sequel to the author's Taliban, and chronicles in great and sometimes in dense detail, right up to early 2008, the story of Afghanistan and Pakistan after the expulsion of the Taliban at the end of 2001 and the installation of Hamid Karzai as interim President. The victory had been not only been swift (it took two months), but had also been cheap for the Americans. They had fought the campaign from the air, leaving the land fighting to the war-lords of the Northern Alliance. The Americans lost just one man killed. Karzai was installed as interim president. This easy victory led the Americans to believe that it could be copied in Iraq, an attack on which the neo-cons had planned even before the Afghan war. Once the Iraq war began, the Americans concentrated on that and paid much less attention to Afghanistan, on which they wanted to spend as little money as possible. Rumsfeld was explicitly not interested in `nation building': helping Afghanistan to develop a healthy infrastructure.

From this all sorts of mistakes arose:

1. It seemed easier to use the armies of the war-lords than to build and train an Afghan National Army.

2. Karzai, a Pashtun, had no control over the Tajik and Uzbek war-lords. They refused to disarm or to let their men be integrated into a national army. Occasionally they fought each other; they collected tolls which they refused to hand over to the government; and they alienated the Pashtun majority. For a long time Karzai dared not confront them. When eventually he managed to form a new government without them in 2004, he proved indecisive in implementing a programme of reform.

3. He was unwilling to stamp out the cultivation of opium and the drug-lords, one of whom was his own brother. Drug dealing corrupted the entire administration and the police. The Allies did not provide money for planting alternative crops and would not allow their armies to interdict the drug trade for fear of alienating the tens of thousands of farmers who depended on it.

4. The worst problem is Pakistan. Osama bin Laden and the Al-Queda forces, as well as the fleeing Taliban found sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan. These were already home to what would become the Pakistani Taliban, who helped them to rebuild their forces and joined them in incursions back into Afghanistan.

For a long time the Americans were not interested in the Taliban and did not take it seriously; but they did want Al-Qaeda people handed over, and for this they needed Musharraf's help. Musharraf did this (if he could find them!), and in return sanctions on Pakistan were lifted. For a long time the Americans did not realize the close connections that had been built up between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. But Musharraf, the Pakistani Army and the ISI (the intelligence service) protected the Taliban and gave it much covert help and even direction. This was largely because they saw Karzai as a potential ally of India. Karzai pleaded with the Americans and the British to pressurize Pakistan to give up supporting the Taliban; but these found the alliance with Pakistan too important, and pretended to believe Musharraf's denials, aided, as these were, by the ISI very occasionally giving them information about the whereabouts of Taliban leaders.

But while this was just enough to appease the Allies, it was also enough to enrage the more extreme sections of the Taliban, who in any case were egged on by their al-Qaeda allies to attack Musharraf and his police as American lackeys. Musharraf emerges from this book as being as devious as he is foolish.

5. When the Americans focussed on Iraq, NATO took over as the Western instrument in Afghanistan. But each of the 37 countries which provided troops drew up its own rules about what these troops could - or more importantly: could not - do. Some confined them to reconstruction and humanitarian work; some were specifically prohibited for fighting the Taliban; some were not to interfere with poppy growing; those stationed in the more peaceful north were prevented from helping the hard-pressed - and always insufficiently numerous - troops in the south. Of the 45,000 troops stationed in Afghanistan in 2006, only 15,000 were available for fighting. In the absence of a unified command, it is not surprising that the Taliban began to reestablish itself in large areas of the East and South from 2003 onwards and have been gaining in strength ever since.

There is much more in this troubling book - for example a comparatively brief account of the danger of al-Qaeda and other Islamic organizations establishing themselves in the Uzbekistan and the other secular Central Asian republics, where tyrannical and corrupt governments are propped up by the Americans simply because these, too, suppress Islamic (along with all other) groups.






Excellent and very readable, 10 Jul 2008
This is a fascinating book. I read a proof copy which I found in a charity shop and will now buy the final edition.

The author is clearly very knowledgeable on all aspects of the recent history of Afghanistan. He writes extremely lucidly and engagingly without ever appearing condescending to the reader.

Complaints - few or none.

Maybe the only thing that could be said is that the author has moved from being an observer (compare e.g. his Taleban book) to being now a (minor) participant in his role as an advisor to the UN. There are now clearly a few axes to grind. This colours the book occasionally and should be born in mind.

EXPLOSIVE READING, 30 Sep 2008
This literary masterpiece from Pulitzer prize winning author Steve Coll will blow your mind.The apparent relentless and exhaustive research that made this book shows Colls dedication to bringing the full story to the reader.Beginning with the US support of the Afghan fighters during the Soviet invasion and finishing just days before the attacks on 9/11 Coll will take you on a mind boggling journey encompassing delicate matters such as:the US support of the taliban,the CIA attempts to buy back Stinger missiles it had given to the Mujaheddin for $150,000 apiece!! hare brained and expensive attempts to remove Osama Bin Laden and constant policy changes and in-fighting within the CIA.Throw in the main characters:an impeached president,a president with no clue on foriegn policy,tribal leaders more concerned with personal enrichment than the liberation of their people and radical jihadists like Osama the world hide and seek champion!!Add to this mix the ineptitude of the CIA and you have an extremely interesting plot.Read this book for the story and you will become more informed on the origins of al-Qaeda,the history of Afghanistan and the entanglement of the US government.Study this book and you will see layer upon layer of CIA incompetence,could 9/11 have been prevented?

Whats Missing, 29 Jun 2008
Well after reading this book, iam think did Steve Coll write the 9/11 Commision Report. As the 9/11 Report blames nobody in the CIA, FBI, NSA for 9/11. Coll fails even to mention the Bin Ladens being flown out of the USA on 9/12/01, when nobody was flying. The book fails to menion the the guy who knew the most about Osama, AL"CIADA" John Oneil . Oneil was the lead FBI investigator of the Cole bombing, resigned from the FBI becuase the Bush administration told him to "back off the Bin Laddens". John Oneil took over secuirty in the Twin Towers on 9/11 , he never made it out . Also mising was this,The first instance is the electronic memo of July 10, 2001 from Kenneth Williams, an FBI agent in Phoenix, Arizona, noting the number of students with ties to radical Islamic fundamentalists enrolled at local aviation training schools, and suggesting that a nationwide canvass of these schools be carried out to determine if there was a pattern. The guy who sat on this memo David Fracsa , was promoted. Now there is some good information in the book, but its been editited t by Bush White House. . The Books says the CIA NEVER HAD ANY CONTACT WITH BIN LADDEN EVER. I wont be buying his new book The Bin Laddens. The paper back was published after the 9/11 commision report was put out.

Incredible, 05 Nov 2007
This has become my favourite book of all time. Each page is packed with information, the whole book is extensively referenced too. It also puts to bed many misconceptions and myths (a common one is that the CIA funded bin Laden, which is not true).
Coll also describes the feelings of those who worked in the CIA and State Dept. and he shows their many conflicts and competing ideologies. The split feelings and decisions within the U.S. policy makers with respect to Massoud, bin Laden and the Taliban are very well told.
Recommended.

You could not want for a better history, 31 Oct 2007
This is by far the clearest and most complete account I have yet read about the roots of al-Qaeda. The style of writing is exemplary: this is a big book on a tricky subject and could have turned out very dull and difficult indeed in the hands of a poorer writer, but Steve Coll deserves all the prizes and acolades that he has received for his work.

The book clearly traces the foundations of radical islam from the years before the Soviet invasion of Afgaistan, through the rise of the Taliban and up to the eve of 11th September 2001.

A must-read for anyone struggling to understand where why the world has got to today.


Brilliant, 08 Mar 2007
A brilliantly written book which goes into a great deal of detail. I found it interesting that the writing style almost perfectly matched that of Daniel Yergin's, who was also a recepient of a pulitzer prize

A Great Key to Understanding Our Time, 05 Sep 2008
While many people in the West have become familiar with words like outsourcing, offshoring and globalisation, some questions remain: what exactly do these words mean? When did globalisation as we know it begin? What are the forces that drive globalisation and what will the future of a globalised world look like? Thomas Friedman, the three-time Pulitzer prize winner, addresses these questions in an honest, informed way by arguing that the world has become flatter in the last 20 years.

The author begins by outlining the forces that led to globalisation or a flattening of the world: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; development of the internet and web browsers; offshoring; outsourcing; uploading (read Blogging, Youtube and the MySpace phenomenon) and improved supply chain management. He convincingly argues that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the development of the computers and the internet have led to an increase in the global (skilled) labour force and vast improvements in labour productivity. By using cogent examples from India, Thomas Friedman explained that the development of the internet and the presence of a skilled labour force in India enabled that country to jettison fifty years of Socialism in favour of a free market economy. This has in turn led to astronomical growth rates on the subcontinent.

The author then sets his sights on America's place in the flattening flat. He stresses that while the US has the best universities in the world, it (the US) cannot take it for granted that it will be the leader in science and technology in the new flat world. He presents interesting statistics, which indicate that, the number of US maths and science graduates is falling rapidly, a situation he calls a quiet crisis. Furthermore, Mr Friedman bemoans the failure of the US political class to see the looming crisis ahead. Instead, the politicians in Washington seem to be too busy fighting over petty issues such as drugs in sports and whether or not to teach intelligent design in America's schools.

Mr Friedman then examines the so-called Unflat World i.e. the Developing World (as if we needed another word to describe the poor). He states the inhabitants of the Unflat World (rural India, Africa, rural China) are either too sick or their local governments too broken to participate in the Flat World platform. Though his analysis is a tad too simplistic for me, it does have a ring of truth to it. Yes, bad governments can be a barrier to their people's economic progress. This is all the more regrettable in a world where the barriers to participation in the global economy are being constantly reduced.

The flattening of the world has enabled educated, savvy Indians and Chinese to access hitherto closed markets in the West. Furthermore, their increased prosperity has enabled them to buy more Western goods and services. In a flattening world, both rich and poor countries gain from trade and exchange. However, the book argues that there are also real losers in the flattening process chief among who are people who lose their jobs to oursourcing or offshoring. Friedman argues for more elaborate safety nets to help those who lose out in the globalisation game.

The book is quite US-centric but it does not detract from its main theme. The key message that I took from the book is on page 343. Mr Freidman: "Wealth in an age of flatness will increasingly gravitate to those countries that get three things right: the infrastructure to connect as efficiently and speedily as possible with the flat world platform, the right education programmes and knowledge skills to empower more of their people to innovate and do value-added work on that platform, and finally the right governance - that is, the right tax policies, the right investment and trade laws, and, most of all, the right inspirational leadership - to enhance and manage the flow with the flat world." It is a message that I, as a Nigerian, have taken to heart. I highly recommend The World is Flat to anyone interested in understanding the forces that drive globalisation and how they will affect him/her in the nest 20-30 years.


Disappointing, 10 Aug 2008
Friedman's latest book is just plain disappointing. We all know that the world is growing more connected -- the internet, cell phones, global trade, etc. are all growing quickly. The world is changing fast. We all know that.

Friedman's book does not add much. He is not an expert in any of the topics he discusses, and he does not do the kind of in-depth research or thinking needed to come up with an interesting prediction or observation. Rather, he just picked a "hot topic," did a few random interviews, and wrote a book.

Freidman oversimplifies an incredibly complex process, and he does not tell you anything you do not already know. He also repeats his catch phrase -- "the world is flat" -- over and over, as if trying to make you remember the name of his book.

I really enjoyed Beruit to Jerusalem when it came out, and I was very disappointed to read this one.

too simplistic though very good fairytale, 22 Dec 2007
Thomas Friedman charms the readers with his grand story of a fast changing world in a borderless life of business, wealth, competition and entrepreneurship. Interesting read, but his vision and messages are too narrow and even too simplistic. What is more, his knowledge about China and India and other parts of the world is less than profound. More serious readers should also read 2 other new books: 1. China's global reach; 2. China and the new world order, both by Chinese journalist/consultant George Zhibin Gu, which offers more dynamic and realistic insights on emerging China and India in relation to the established West.

Not too exciting..., 31 Oct 2007
I thought the idea was good, but like so many of these books, not enough to fill a few hundred pages. I think we know that the "world is getting flatter" (even the metaphor is a bit naff - the world is shrinking) and that this is changing business.

Don't bother.

In America or around the world., 19 Sep 2007
From the first few pages when Friedman leaps from level playing fields to a flat world, it is almost easy to understand why the cover shows ships falling off the edge of an un-flat world [NOTE: The current dust cover, changed since this review was written, no longer depicts ships falling off a 'flat' earth. You can draw your own conclusions as to the motives behind that decision.]. Something is missing here. "Level" is not "flat". And ships don't fall off a flat surface. Is he trying to be ironic? If so, Friedman ought to leave that to Tino Georgiou. If he thinks a "brief history" of the past five years is a funny concept, again I refer you to Tino Georgiou--"The Fates" for more robust and pointed humor.
As a journalist, with seemingly unlimited resources and the once-gilded New York Times brand name behind him, Friedman has leveraged his basic skills into best-sellerdom, all the while seemingly in shock and awe of all the things his rich travel budget allows him to take in. Yet I have to ask, where's the beef?

Yes, the world has shifted from networks based on mythology and monarchies, through manufacturing and Marxism, to today's global marketing, but services aren't a new phenomenon; they've always been with us. And although wireless communication has made the world faster and more competitive, life is no more ruthless, violent or uncertain now than when plagues, expansive military conquest, disease, poor hygiene, inbred monarchies, and wealth-by-acquisition ruled the world as they have for most of human existence. Sure, technology has increased the pace, but each generation seems to think that the last generation had it slow and easy, and that has never been the case. The poor villager who wandered too far away from his hut 1,500 years ago experienced no less a shock than today's global traveler stepping off a plane in Mumbai.

And this outsourcing 'problem' is not new and it is not based simply on information technology. For as long as man has tried to better his life and to leverage his advantages, he has hired someone else to produce the things he needs, be it food, cooking, child care, or production. Like services, outsourcing is not new. That villager from 1,500 years ago thought that outsourcing crop production to the next village over was no less daunting or distant than Americans importing oranges from Israel or roses from Brazil. And you can bet the other villagers were mad as hell at him for taking away 'their' work.

For more than fifty years, columnists, pundits, journalists, armchair analysts, and bad economists have been intrigued by each new emerging economic superpower, from the Soviet Union, to the European Union, to Japan, to China, and now India, and each time all that wonderment and starry-eyed predictions have come to nothing. Like Ayn Rand said, what separates America from the rest of the world is that we were the first to think of making money, not just taking money. And America still does that very well. I still have my doubts about the sustainability of growth in China and India. Sooner or later they are going to hit a consumer-oriented economy and demands for many things their people don't demand today. Besides, their growth has been exaggerated by the fact that they started basically at zero. Bad analysts like straight-line extrapolations. Not only do these growth lines sometimes flatten out, they can nose dive. And what's bigger and more dramatic, 3% growth in a $11 trillion economy or 7% in a $200 million economy?

Maybe the world has become more homogenous with technology and communications. But anyone who thinks that there is some huge melting pot, in America or around the world, would be better served by recognizing the world as a salad bowl, not a melting pot. And neither the pot or bowl are flat. Unless you must have this book, skip and get yourself a copy of Tino Georgiou--"The Fates"


A key essay, which provides for a new interpretation of the conflicts under way, 12 Nov 2008
The Descent into Chaos by Ahmed Rashid is going to alter the common view about what happened in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia after 9/11. It should be considered as a seminal work, for sure, because it challenges the current official version about the guidelines followed in the international reconstruction effort under way in Afghanistan. The most troubling assumption of the essay relates to the support accorded by the US to the warlords, which alienated, in Rashid's view, the Afghan people and opened a window of opportunity for the Taliban to come back. In Rashid opinion, since the very beginnig of his endeavour Karzai lacked adequate support by the US, because the Pentagon disregarded nation building, and wanted to avoid a larger military involvement on the field. The official story still mantains right the opposite. The Descent is telling troubling truths also about Pakistan and the real committment showed by former President Musharraf to the Global War on Terror, exposing all the setbacks suffered by the regional US policy. Rashid is very critical as well on the Bush administration stance about human rights, which in the end proved to be highly counterproductive for the US long term interests in Central Asia. Guantanamo and the renditions are strongly criticized. Finally, the book is rich in first hand infos. It is clearly a must read, also because Rashid has been called to give the US Strategic Review of the Afghan Strategy his own advice.

An excellent overview of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan., 27 Sep 2008
I've really enjoyed this wide ranging and very readable book. It is an excellent introduction to the complexities of Western involvement in Afghanistan, to the failures of policy in Pakistan and to the tactics employed by the CIA under the "war on terror" umbrella. This is an indispensable book for anyone interested in current day politics, because decisions and events which are played out in this region have a tremendous influence on Western governance. It deserves to be on the bookshelf of every NATO officer and NATO government MP.

Insane warmongering, 25 Sep 2008


Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid is a friend and supporter of Afghanistan's president Hamid Karzai. Rashid warns that Afghanistan is facing state collapse, Pakistan is in meltdown, and the five Central Asian states are dictatorships. He claims that the most important thing in the world is to rebuild these nations.

He shows that President Karzai's regime depends on warlords and drug barons, who are backed by the CIA. Britain's forces there are supposed to be helping to cut opium production, but their policy of paying farmers to destroy their opium crops has been `disastrous'. Opium production soared from 4,000 tons in 2005 to 8,200 in 2007. Half of this was grown in British-occupied Helmand, where the rest of Afghanistan's opium was sold.

The USA is allied to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which are al-Qaeda's main sponsors. The USA has given more than $10 billion to Pakistan's President Musharraf. Bush backed him even after he tore up the constitution, sacked the judges, imprisoned more than 12,000 people and muzzled the media. This `created immense hatred for the U.S. Army and America'.

The USA's torture of POWs has further increased this hatred. As Rashid writes, "By following America's lead in promoting or condoning disappearances, torture, and secret jails, these countries found their path to democracy and their struggle against Islamic extremism set back by decades. Western-led nation building had little credibility if it denied justice to the very people it was supposed to help. It could well be argued that over time Islamic extremists were emboldened rather than subdued by the travesty of justice the United States perpetrated. The people learned to hate America. ... The deterioration of human rights in each country became linked to that government's proximity to the CIA."

So the USA's wars have increased the al-Qaeda threat, particularly in Pakistan. Rashid also notes that US interventions have failed in Yugoslavia and East Timor and made a hell-hole of Iraq.

And then - after all this - Rashid calls on the USA, not to get out of the region, but to get deeper in. More sanely, he also calls on the peoples of the region to take responsibility for moving their nations towards democracy.


A deeply troubling book, 11 Jul 2008
Ahmed Rashid has long been a leading expert on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Muslim states of Central Asia that were once part of the Soviet Union. In 2000, the year before 9/11, he published 'Taliban', a book which politicians rushed to read after the attack on the Twin Towers; and if Central Asia catches fire, they will doubtlessly rush to his following book, 'Jihad', first published in 2002, which is an equally authoritative account of the dangers lurking in that area.

After a brilliant introduction of 21 pages, the first three chapters of the present book give the story of American involvement in Afghanistan before 9/11. The characteristic unreliability of American policy is brought out: help given to the Islamic forces and to Pakistan while the Soviets were in Afghanistan; then a total lack of interest in the period after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, when Afghanistan was first torn apart by competing war-lords and was then overrun by the Taliban.

No longer in need of Pakistan, the USA then imposed sanctions on that country because it, like India, had carried out tests of nuclear weapons.

The next 15 chapters are essentially a sequel to the author's Taliban, and chronicles in great and sometimes in dense detail, right up to early 2008, the story of Afghanistan and Pakistan after the expulsion of the Taliban at the end of 2001 and the installation of Hamid Karzai as interim President. The victory had been not only been swift (it took two months), but had also been cheap for the Americans. They had fought the campaign from the air, leaving the land fighting to the war-lords of the Northern Alliance. The Americans lost just one man killed. Karzai was installed as interim president. This easy victory led the Americans to believe that it could be copied in Iraq, an attack on which the neo-cons had planned even before the Afghan war. Once the Iraq war began, the Americans concentrated on that and paid much less attention to Afghanistan, on which they wanted to spend as little money as possible. Rumsfeld was explicitly not interested in `nation building': helping Afghanistan to develop a healthy infrastructure.

From this all sorts of mistakes arose:

1. It seemed easier to use the armies of the war-lords than to build and train an Afghan National Army.

2. Karzai, a Pashtun, had no control over the Tajik and Uzbek war-lords. They refused to disarm or to let their men be integrated into a national army. Occasionally they fought each other; they collected tolls which they refused to hand over to the government; and they alienated the Pashtun majority. For a long time Karzai dared not confront them. When eventually he managed to form a new government without them in 2004, he proved indecisive in implementing a programme of reform.

3. He was unwilling to stamp out the cultivation of opium and the drug-lords, one of whom was his own brother. Drug dealing corrupted the entire administration and the police. The Allies did not provide money for planting alternative crops and would not allow their armies to interdict the drug trade for fear of alienating the tens of thousands of farmers who depended on it.

4. The worst problem is Pakistan. Osama bin Laden and the Al-Queda forces, as well as the fleeing Taliban found sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan. These were already home to what would become the Pakistani Taliban, who helped them to rebuild their forces and joined them in incursions back into Afghanistan.

For a long time the Americans were not interested in the Taliban and did not take it seriously; but they did want Al-Qaeda people handed over, and for this they needed Musharraf's help. Musharraf did this (if he could find them!), and in return sanctions on Pakistan were lifted. For a long time the Americans did not realize the close connections that had been built up between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. But Musharraf, the Pakistani Army and the ISI (the intelligence service) protected the Taliban and gave it much covert help and even direction. This was largely because they saw Karzai as a potential ally of India. Karzai pleaded with the Americans and the British to pressurize Pakistan to give up supporting the Taliban; but these found the alliance with Pakistan too important, and pretended to believe Musharraf's denials, aided, as these were, by the ISI very occasionally giving them information about the whereabouts of Taliban leaders.

But while this was just enough to appease the Allies, it was also enough to enrage the more extreme sections of the Taliban, who in any case were egged on by their al-Qaeda allies to attack Musharraf and his police as American lackeys. Musharraf emerges from this book as being as devious as he is foolish.

5. When the Americans focussed on Iraq, NATO took over as the Western instrument in Afghanistan. But each of the 37 countries which provided troops drew up its own rules about what these troops could - or more importantly: could not - do. Some confined them to reconstruction and humanitarian work; some were specifically prohibited for fighting the Taliban; some were not to interfere with poppy growing; those stationed in the more peaceful north were prevented from helping the hard-pressed - and always insufficiently numerous - troops in the south. Of the 45,000 troops stationed in Afghanistan in 2006, only 15,000 were available for fighting. In the absence of a unified command, it is not surprising that the Taliban began to reestablish itself in large areas of the East and South from 2003 onwards and have been gaining in strength ever since.

There is much more in this troubling book - for example a comparatively brief account of the danger of al-Qaeda and other Islamic organizations establishing themselves in the Uzbekistan and the other secular Central Asian republics, where tyrannical and corrupt governments are propped up by the Americans simply because these, too, suppress Islamic (along with all other) groups.






Excellent and very readable, 10 Jul 2008
This is a fascinating book. I read a proof copy which I found in a charity shop and will now buy the final edition.

The author is clearly very knowledgeable on all aspects of the recent history of Afghanistan. He writes extremely lucidly and engagingly without ever appearing condescending to the reader.

Complaints - few or none.

Maybe the only thing that could be said is that the author has moved from being an observer (compare e.g. his Taleban book) to being now a (minor) participant in his role as an advisor to the UN. There are now clearly a few axes to grind. This colours the book occasionally and should be born in mind.

Exhausting Details of Bush Grasping at New Straws to "Win" in Iraq, 29 Sep 2008
Unless this is your introduction to Bob Woodward's four books about how the United States got into Iraq and why it didn't turn out so well, you won't be surprised to learn that President George W. Bush knows of no price too high for the United States to pay in order to make him look good in his decision to invade Iraq in 2003. His approach to improving matters in Iraq is to wait for someone to propose spending more money and more lives, and then jump on the suggestion. Meanwhile, he and his true believers revel in the thought he will be ultimately considered as being another Abraham Lincoln for bringing democracy to the Middle East. That's the long and short of this book.

Most of the over 400 pages dwell on good-faith attempts to find ways to respond to the rising numbers of attacks by insurgents that began in 2004. The military felt that only by withdrawing could they reduce the temptation to attack.

Of course, the president didn't pay any attention to those except if they agreed with his determination to increase troop strength once again. If his people weren't getting the message, outside conservative political operatives would be brought in to prepare a new direction. You'll also learn how President Bush enjoys tutoring Prime Minister Maliki on how to create political consensus (talk about the blind leading the blind).

How did the surge turn out? So far, violence is down in Iraq. But apparently a lot of the credit goes to a change in leadership (General Petraeus) to bring more counterinsurgency techniques and a secret effort to assassinate the leaders of the insurgency. Also, al Qaeda was too violent for even the Iraqis and Sunnis began to sign up to fight them. In addition, we began to put the people who used to be in the Iraqi army back on our payroll. These methods could have been brought in during 2004.

We get a picture of a president aware that things are going downhill but totally deferential to what his military leaders on the ground propose while hinting that he would like to send them more troops . . . for years on end without looking for any ways to improve. This isn't a commander in chief . . . this is a part-time chairman of the board who happens to live in the White House.

The book is more eloquent for what it doesn't talk about, as President Bush presides over the destruction of the American economy by allowing even more looting through financial malfeasance than he permitted those contractors who were supposed to "rebuild" Iraq. Herbert Hoover starts to look better and better: At least he didn't preside over destroying the economy and a disastrous war through his bungling.

I do hope that Bob Woodward will expand his focus in future books to show the full range of the inattentiveness, incompetence, and arrogance of President George W. Bush . . . not just his mess in Iraq. Please pray for our president! He needs forgiveness.

Why did I grade the book at three stars? This book could have been summarized and made more interesting in about 150 pages. This book contains less relevant information than the others but he still wrote a long book.

Exhausting Details of Bush Grasping at New Straws to "Win" in Iraq, 29 Sep 2008

Unless this is your introduction to Bob Woodward's four books about how the United States got into Iraq and why it didn't turn out so well, you won't be surprised to learn that President George W. Bush knows of no price too high for the United States to pay in order to make him look good in his decision to invade Iraq in 2003. His approach to improving matters in Iraq is to wait for someone to propose spending more money and more lives, and then jump on the suggestion. Meanwhile, he and his true believers revel in the thought he will be ultimately considered as being another Abraham Lincoln for bringing democracy to the Middle East. That's the long and short of this book.

Most of the over 400 pages dwell on good-faith attempts to find ways to respond to the rising numbers of attacks by insurgents that began in 2004. The military felt that only by withdrawing could they reduce the temptation to attack.

Of course, the president didn't pay any attention to those except if they agreed with his determination to increase troop strength once again. If his people weren't getting the message, outside conservative political operatives would be brought in to prepare a new direction. You'll also learn how President Bush enjoys tutoring Prime Minister Maliki on how to create political consensus (talk about the blind leading the blind).

How did the surge turn out? So far, violence is down in Iraq. But apparently a lot of the credit goes to a change in leadership (General Petraeus) to bring more counterinsurgency techniques and a secret effort to assassinate the leaders of the insurgency. Also, al Qaeda was too violent for even the Iraqis and Sunnis began to sign up to fight them. In addition, we began to put the people who used to be in the Iraqi army back on our payroll. These methods could have been brought in during 2004.

We get a picture of a president aware that things are going downhill but totally deferential to what his military leaders on the ground propose while hinting that he would like to send them more troops . . . for years on end without looking for any ways to improve. This isn't a commander in chief . . . this is a part-time chairman of the board who happens to live in the White House.

The book is more eloquent for what it doesn't talk about, as President Bush presides over the destruction of the American economy by allowing even more looting through financial malfeasance than he permitted those contractors who were supposed to "rebuild" Iraq. Herbert Hoover starts to look better and better: At least he didn't preside over destroying the economy and a disastrous war through his bungling.

I do hope that Bob Woodward will expand his focus in future books to show the full range of the inattentiveness, incompetence, and arrogance of President George W. Bush . . . not just his mess in Iraq. Please pray for our president! He needs forgiveness.

Why did I grade the book at three stars? This book could have been summarized and made more interesting in about 150 pages. This book contains less relevant information than the others but he still wrote a long book.

"The United States today is an empire--but a peculiar kind of empire", writes Niall Ferguson in Colossus: the Price of America's Empire. Despite overwhelming military, economic and cultural dominance, the US has had a difficult time imposing its will on other nations, mostly because the country is uncomfortable with imperialism and thus unable to use this power most effectively and decisively. The origin of this attitude and its persistence is a principal theme of this thought-provoking book, including how domestic politics affects foreign policy, whether it is politicians worried about the next election or citizens who "like Social Security more than national security".

Ferguson, author of Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, has no objection to an American empire, as long as it is a liberal one actively underwriting the free exchange of goods, labour and capital. Further, he writes that "empire is more necessary in the 21st century than ever before" as a means to "contain epidemics, depose tyrants end local wars and eradicate terrorist organisations". The sooner America embraces this role and acts on it confidently, the better.

Ferguson contrasts this persistent anti-imperialistic urge with the attitude held by the British Empire and suggests that America has much to learn from that model if it is to achieve its stated foreign policy objectives of spreading social freedom, democracy, development and the free market to the world. He suggests that the US must be willing to send money, civilians and troops for a sustained period of time to troubled spots if there is to be real change, as in Japan and Germany after World War II--an idea that many American citizens and leaders now find repulsive. Rather than devoting limited resources and striving to get complex jobs done in a rush, Americans must be willing to integrate themselves into a foreign culture until a full Americanisation has occurred, he writes.

Overall, this is a trenchant examination of a uniquely American dilemma and its implications for the rest of the world. --Shawn Carkonen, Amazon.com

EXPLOSIVE READING, 30 Sep 2008
This literary masterpiece from Pulitzer prize winning author Steve Coll will blow your mind.The apparent relentless and exhaustive research that made this book shows Colls dedication to bringing the full story to the reader.Beginning with the US support of the Afghan fighters during the Soviet invasion and finishing just days before the attacks on 9/11 Coll will take you on a mind boggling journey encompassing delicate matters such as:the US support of the taliban,the CIA attempts to buy back Stinger missiles it had given to the Mujaheddin for $150,000 apiece!! hare brained and expensive attempts to remove Osama Bin Laden and constant policy changes and in-fighting within the CIA.Throw in the main characters:an impeached president,a president with no clue on foriegn policy,tribal leaders more concerned with personal enrichment than the liberation of their people and radical jihadists like Osama the world hide and seek champion!!Add to this mix the ineptitude of the CIA and you have an extremely interesting plot.Read this book for the story and you will become more informed on the origins of al-Qaeda,the history of Afghanistan and the entanglement of the US government.Study this book and you will see layer upon layer of CIA incompetence,could 9/11 have been prevented?

Whats Missing, 29 Jun 2008
Well after reading this book, iam think did Steve Coll write the 9/11 Commision Report. As the 9/11 Report blames nobody in the CIA, FBI, NSA for 9/11. Coll fails even to mention the Bin Ladens being flown out of the USA on 9/12/01, when nobody was flying. The book fails to menion the the guy who knew the most about Osama, AL"CIADA" John Oneil . Oneil was the lead FBI investigator of the Cole bombing, resigned from the FBI becuase the Bush administration told him to "back off the Bin Laddens". John Oneil took over secuirty in the Twin Towers on 9/11 , he never made it out . Also mising was this,The first instance is the electronic memo of July 10, 2001 from Kenneth Williams, an FBI agent in Phoenix, Arizona, noting the number of students with ties to radical Islamic fundamentalists enrolled at local aviation training schools, and suggesting that a nationwide canvass of these schools be carried out to determine if there was a pattern. The guy who sat on this memo David Fracsa , was promoted. Now there is some good information in the book, but its been editited t by Bush White House. . The Books says the CIA NEVER HAD ANY CONTACT WITH BIN LADDEN EVER. I wont be buying his new book The Bin Laddens. The paper back was published after the 9/11 commision report was put out.

Incredible, 05 Nov 2007
This has become my favourite book of all time. Each page is packed with information, the whole book is extensively referenced too. It also puts to bed many misconceptions and myths (a common one is that the CIA funded bin Laden, which is not true).
Coll also describes the feelings of those who worked in the CIA and State Dept. and he shows their many conflicts and competing ideologies. The split feelings and decisions within the U.S. policy makers with respect to Massoud, bin Laden and the Taliban are very well told.
Recommended.

You could not want for a better history, 31 Oct 2007
This is by far the clearest and most complete account I have yet read about the roots of al-Qaeda. The style of writing is exemplary: this is a big book on a tricky subject and could have turned out very dull and difficult indeed in the hands of a poorer writer, but Steve Coll deserves all the prizes and acolades that he has received for his work.

The book clearly traces the foundations of radical islam from the years before the Soviet invasion of Afgaistan, through the rise of the Taliban and up to the eve of 11th September 2001.

A must-read for anyone struggling to understand where why the world has got to today.


Brilliant, 08 Mar 2007
A brilliantly written book which goes into a great deal of detail. I found it interesting that the writing style almost perfectly matched that of Daniel Yergin's, who was also a recepient of a pulitzer prize

A Great Key to Understanding Our Time, 05 Sep 2008
While many people in the West have become familiar with words like outsourcing, offshoring and globalisation, some questions remain: what exactly do these words mean? When did globalisation as we know it begin? What are the forces that drive globalisation and what will the future of a globalised world look like? Thomas Friedman, the three-time Pulitzer prize winner, addresses these questions in an honest, informed way by arguing that the world has become flatter in the last 20 years.

The author begins by outlining the forces that led to globalisation or a flattening of the world: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; development of the internet and web browsers; offshoring; outsourcing; uploading (read Blogging, Youtube and the MySpace phenomenon) and improved supply chain management. He convincingly argues that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the development of the computers and the internet have led to an increase in the global (skilled) labour force and vast improvements in labour productivity. By using cogent examples from India, Thomas Friedman explained that the development of the internet and the presence of a skilled labour force in India enabled that country to jettison fifty years of Socialism in favour of a free market economy. This has in turn led to astronomical growth rates on the subcontinent.

The author then sets his sights on America's place in the flattening flat. He stresses that while the US has the best universities in the world, it (the US) cannot take it for granted that it will be the leader in science and technology in the new flat world. He presents interesting statistics, which indicate that, the number of US maths and science graduates is falling rapidly, a situation he calls a quiet crisis. Furthermore, Mr Friedman bemoans the failure of the US political class to see the looming crisis ahead. Instead, the politicians in Washington seem to be too busy fighting over petty issues such as drugs in sports and whether or not to teach intelligent design in America's schools.

Mr Friedman then examines the so-called Unflat World i.e. the Developing World (as if we needed another word to describe the poor). He states the inhabitants of the Unflat World (rural India, Africa, rural China) are either too sick or their local governments too broken to participate in the Flat World platform. Though his analysis is a tad too simplistic for me, it does have a ring of truth to it. Yes, bad governments can be a barrier to their people's economic progress. This is all the more regrettable in a world where the barriers to participation in the global economy are being constantly reduced.

The flattening of the world has enabled educated, savvy Indians and Chinese to access hitherto closed markets in the West. Furthermore, their increased prosperity has enabled them to buy more Western goods and services. In a flattening world, both rich and poor countries gain from trade and exchange. However, the book argues that there are also real losers in the flattening process chief among who are people who lose their jobs to oursourcing or offshoring. Friedman argues for more elaborate safety nets to help those who lose out in the globalisation game.

The book is quite US-centric but it does not detract from its main theme. The key message that I took from the book is on page 343. Mr Freidman: "Wealth in an age of flatness will increasingly gravitate to those countries that get three things right: the infrastructure to connect as efficiently and speedily as possible with the flat world platform, the right education programmes and knowledge skills to empower more of their people to innovate and do value-added work on that platform, and finally the right governance - that is, the right tax policies, the right investment and trade laws, and, most of all, the right inspirational leadership - to enhance and manage the flow with the flat world." It is a message that I, as a Nigerian, have taken to heart. I highly recommend The World is Flat to anyone interested in understanding the forces that drive globalisation and how they will affect him/her in the nest 20-30 years.


Disappointing, 10 Aug 2008
Friedman's latest book is just plain disappointing. We all know that the world is growing more connected -- the internet, cell phones, global trade, etc. are all growing quickly. The world is changing fast. We all know that.

Friedman's book does not add much. He is not an expert in any of the topics he discusses, and he does not do the kind of in-depth research or thinking needed to come up with an interesting prediction or observation. Rather, he just picked a "hot topic," did a few random interviews, and wrote a book.

Freidman oversimplifies an incredibly complex process, and he does not tell you anything you do not already know. He also repeats his catch phrase -- "the world is flat" -- over and over, as if trying to make you remember the name of his book.

I really enjoyed Beruit to Jerusalem when it came out, and I was very disappointed to read this one.

too simplistic though very good fairytale, 22 Dec 2007
Thomas Friedman charms the readers with his grand story of a fast changing world in a borderless life of business, wealth, competition and entrepreneurship. Interesting read, but his vision and messages are too narrow and even too simplistic. What is more, his knowledge about China and India and other parts of the world is less than profound. More serious readers should also read 2 other new books: 1. China's global reach; 2. China and the new world order, both by Chinese journalist/consultant George Zhibin Gu, which offers more dynamic and realistic insights on emerging China and India in relation to the established West.

Not too exciting..., 31 Oct 2007
I thought the idea was good, but like so many of these books, not enough to fill a few hundred pages. I think we know that the "world is getting flatter" (even the metaphor is a bit naff - the world is shrinking) and that this is changing business.

Don't bother.

In America or around the world., 19 Sep 2007
From the first few pages when Friedman leaps from level playing fields to a flat world, it is almost easy to understand why the cover shows ships falling off the edge of an un-flat world [NOTE: The current dust cover, changed since this review was written, no longer depicts ships falling off a 'flat' earth. You can draw your own conclusions as to the motives behind that decision.]. Something is missing here. "Level" is not "flat". And ships don't fall off a flat surface. Is he trying to be ironic? If so, Friedman ought to leave that to Tino Georgiou. If he thinks a "brief history" of the past five years is a funny concept, again I refer you to Tino Georgiou--"The Fates" for more robust and pointed humor.
As a journalist, with seemingly unlimited resources and the once-gilded New York Times brand name behind him, Friedman has leveraged his basic skills into best-sellerdom, all the while seemingly in shock and awe of all the things his rich travel budget allows him to take in. Yet I have to ask, where's the beef?

Yes, the world has shifted from networks based on mythology and monarchies, through manufacturing and Marxism, to today's global marketing, but services aren't a new phenomenon; they've always been with us. And although wireless communication has made the world faster and more competitive, life is no more ruthless, violent or uncertain now than when plagues, expansive military conquest, disease, poor hygiene, inbred monarchies, and wealth-by-acquisition ruled the world as they have for most of human existence. Sure, technology has increased the pace, but each generation seems to think that the last generation had it slow and easy, and that has never been the case. The poor villager who wandered too far away from his hut 1,500 years ago experienced no less a shock than today's global traveler stepping off a plane in Mumbai.

And this outsourcing 'problem' is not new and it is not based simply on information technology. For as long as man has tried to better his life and to leverage his advantages, he has hired someone else to produce the things he needs, be it food, cooking, child care, or production. Like services, outsourcing is not new. That villager from 1,500 years ago thought that outsourcing crop production to the next village over was no less daunting or distant than Americans importing oranges from Israel or roses from Brazil. And you can bet the other villagers were mad as hell at him for taking away 'their' work.

For more than fifty years, columnists, pundits, journalists, armchair analysts, and bad economists have been intrigued by each new emerging economic superpower, from the Soviet Union, to the European Union, to Japan, to China, and now India, and each time all that wonderment and starry-eyed predictions have come to nothing. Like Ayn Rand said, what separates America from the rest of the world is that we were the first to think of making money, not just taking money. And America still does that very well. I still have my doubts about the sustainability of growth in China and India. Sooner or later they are going to hit a consumer-oriented economy and demands for many things their people don't demand today. Besides, their growth has been exaggerated by the fact that they started basically at zero. Bad analysts like straight-line extrapolations. Not only do these growth lines sometimes flatten out, they can nose dive. And what's bigger and more dramatic, 3% growth in a $11 trillion economy or 7% in a $200 million economy?

Maybe the world has become more homogenous with technology and communications. But anyone who thinks that there is some huge melting pot, in America or around the world, would be better served by recognizing the world as a salad bowl, not a melting pot. And neither the pot or bowl are flat. Unless you must have this book, skip and get yourself a copy of Tino Georgiou--"The Fates"


A key essay, which provides for a new interpretation of the conflicts under way, 12 Nov 2008
The Descent into Chaos by Ahmed Rashid is going to alter the common view about what happened in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia after 9/11. It should be considered as a seminal work, for sure, because it challenges the current official version about the guidelines followed in the international reconstruction effort under way in Afghanistan. The most troubling assumption of the essay relates to the support accorded by the US to the warlords, which alienated, in Rashid's view, the Afghan people and opened a window of opportunity for the Taliban to come back. In Rashid opinion, since the very beginnig of his endeavour Karzai lacked adequate support by the US, because the Pentagon disregarded nation building, and wanted to avoid a larger military involvement on the field. The official story still mantains right the opposite. The Descent is telling troubling truths also about Pakistan and the real committment showed by former President Musharraf to the Global War on Terror, exposing all the setbacks suffered by the regional US policy. Rashid is very critical as well on the Bush administration stance about human rights, which in the end proved to be highly counterproductive for the US long term interests in Central Asia. Guantanamo and the renditions are strongly criticized. Finally, the book is rich in first hand infos. It is clearly a must read, also because Rashid has been called to give the US Strategic Review of the Afghan Strategy his own advice.

An excellent overview of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan., 27 Sep 2008
I've really enjoyed this wide ranging and very readable book. It is an excellent introduction to the complexities of Western involvement in Afghanistan, to the failures of policy in Pakistan and to the tactics employed by the CIA under the "war on terror" umbrella. This is an indispensable book for anyone interested in current day politics, because decisions and events which are played out in this region have a tremendous influence on Western governance. It deserves to be on the bookshelf of every NATO officer and NATO government MP.

Insane warmongering, 25 Sep 2008


Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid is a friend and supporter of Afghanistan's president Hamid Karzai. Rashid warns that Afghanistan is facing state collapse, Pakistan is in meltdown, and the five Central Asian states are dictatorships. He claims that the most important thing in the world is to rebuild these nations.

He shows that President Karzai's regime depends on warlords and drug barons, who are backed by the CIA. Britain's forces there are supposed to be helping to cut opium production, but their policy of paying farmers to destroy their opium crops has been `disastrous'. Opium production soared from 4,000 tons in 2005 to 8,200 in 2007. Half of this was grown in British-occupied Helmand, where the rest of Afghanistan's opium was sold.

The USA is allied to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which are al-Qaeda's main sponsors. The USA has given more than $10 billion to Pakistan's President Musharraf. Bush backed him even after he tore up the constitution, sacked the judges, imprisoned more than 12,000 people and muzzled the media. This `created immense hatred for the U.S. Army and America'.

The USA's torture of POWs has further increased this hatred. As Rashid writes, "By following America's lead in promoting or condoning disappearances, torture, and secret jails, these countries found their path to democracy and their struggle against Islamic extremism set back by decades. Western-led nation building had little credibility if it denied justice to the very people it was supposed to help. It could well be argued that over time Islamic extremists were emboldened rather than subdued by the travesty of justice the United States perpetrated. The people learned to hate America. ... The deterioration of human rights in each country became linked to that government's proximity to the CIA."

So the USA's wars have increased the al-Qaeda threat, particularly in Pakistan. Rashid also notes that US interventions have failed in Yugoslavia and East Timor and made a hell-hole of Iraq.

And then - after all this - Rashid calls on the USA, not to get out of the region, but to get deeper in. More sanely, he also calls on the peoples of the region to take responsibility for moving their nations towards democracy.


A deeply troubling book, 11 Jul 2008
Ahmed Rashid has long been a leading expert on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Muslim states of Central Asia that were once part of the Soviet Union. In 2000, the year before 9/11, he published 'Taliban', a book which politicians rushed to read after the attack on the Twin Towers; and if Central Asia catches fire, they will doubtlessly rush to his following book, 'Jihad', first published in 2002, which is an equally authoritative account of the dangers lurking in that area.

After a brilliant introduction of 21 pages, the first three chapters of the present book give the story of American involvement in Afghanistan before 9/11. The characteristic unreliability of American policy is brought out: help given to the Islamic forces and to Pakistan while the Soviets were in Afghanistan; then a