Facing reality, 27 Dec 2008
It is a sobering book. Indeed, there are no universal values that guide the activities of democratic countries and autocratic regional powers like China, Russia and Iran. States base their policies on national interests that they define by themselves - so it is really hard for other countries to say that we know better what is in your interests. There is ongoing competition between democracies and autocracies for power and spheres of influence.

The book has chapters on regional powers (China, Japan, Russia, EU, India, Iran) and the superpower. The author clarifies the recent moves (and the motives behind them) and aspirations of these powers in simple and succinct language. After tens of books on Russia, Kagan made me better understand the seemingly irrational behavior of our restless neighbor.

Good book; flawed conclusions, 03 Aug 2008


The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union led to many optimistic pronouncements on global politics: we had the peace dividend, the new world order and, in the title of Francis Fukuyama's book alluded to here, the end of history.

Maybe the big wake-up call from this reverie came on 11 September 2001, when the world realised that history red in tooth and claw still prowled the earth, but the asymmetric struggles those events represented are not the only ingredients of the dangerous geopolitical brew now cooking, and in this work Robert Kagan sounds a wake up call to the "democracies", summarising the potential perils of, amongst other things, the new-found power of Russia under Putin, of the growing economic clout of China, and the potential for mischief from the direction of India, also growing in influence within the international community.

Much of Kagan's presentation is irrefutable: Russia is able to intimidate other nations through its control of huge amounts of oil and gas, and its oligarchs are gobbling up energy companies in the West; China's voice in numerous international bodies does perpetuate any number of unsavoury regimes, from nearby Myanmar to Zimbabwe, and its holdings of US dollars have destabilising potential; India does indeed vacillate between blocs, apparently so as to play them off against each other.

But ultimately I couldn't help feeling that maybe in Kagan's conclusions regarding alliances of democracies against the "anti-democracies" had a little too much of the neocon Manifest Destiny message about it, and comes across as a little too cut and dried and unnuanced. It brought to mind the warnings of Japanese world domination by Paul Kennedy a couple of decades or so ago. Kennedy, like Kagan, has impeccable intellectual credentials, but overextrapolated.

So, agreed, there are some nasty forces at play in the world; they may possibly coalesce into a force that consumes capitalism as we know it; therefore be watchful, but rattling sabres right now may lead to nothing less than a self-fulfilling prophecy.


Baby it's a Wild World, 18 Jul 2008
This far-sighted examination of global politics identifies a new axis of evil rising in opposition to the West, based on rejection of democracy and the rule of law. Kagan predicts the return of nationalism and confrontation between the forces of democracy and autocracy. He believes that a nation's type of government instead of its culture, religion or geographic location will determine its global alignment. While not dismissing the terrorist threat, he does not consider it a primary menace as history proves that modernity has never lost against the traditionalism represented by the Islamists. That is true, but acts of terror might have unintended consequences in the development of state structures & the formation of alliances.

It's irresistible to compare Kagan's analysis with Margaret Thatcher's 2002 book Statecraft, in which she assessed the state of the globe and possible future trajectories. In chapters 3 and 4 Thatcher looks at Russia and China and India. Rogue states, religion and terrorism are discussed in chapter 6 with the emphasis on North Korea, Islam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran. Another relevant work, The New Cold War by Edward Lucas, corroborates Kagan's view. Russia is pursuing policies detrimental to its own citizens, neighboring states and the world at large. Lucas scrutinizes the ruling elite which emerged from the ranks of the old KGB. This dominant class harbors resentment against the West as a whole in an interesting parallel to the hostility of the Brussels Eurocracy towards the USA and Israel. The Russian government now openly competes with the West on the economic and political fronts.

Freedom of expression and the rule of law exist in name only; the state controls all the economic activity, political institutions and media that matter. Putin's term "managed" or "sovereign" democracy really means a revived Czarism. Despite Russia's demographic implosion, pervasive corruption and widespread lawlessness, it wages a new cold war through criminal actions against Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Georgia and the UK (in the Litvinenko case) and by supplying arms to rogue states Iran and Syria and their terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.

The Putin gang eagerly befriends all enemies of the West and it's becoming clear that Russia seeks an alliance with the Islamic world and a partial restoration of the Warsaw Pact through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which China is a member. The Kremlin ignores the long-term threat from China despite the particularly drastic demographic and infrastructural implosion in Russia's Far East. Russia's rejection of Western values promises to make it more barbaric internally and considerably more dangerous on the global stage. One may confidently expect it to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology and to support every oppressive regime that pollutes the planet.

It is pursuing an energy policy aimed at squeezing the liberal democracies through a gas cartel. An enlarged SCO that includes Iran, other Middle Eastern and African states like Libya and Sudan, plus Venezuela is a real possibility. The SCO will lock the Turkic speaking states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (plus Persian Tajikistan) firmly in the bear's embrace. The future role of Turkey will be crucial; it remains to be seen how its current pro-religious government will adapt its foreign policy in response to the country's certain exclusion from the European inner core. Economic ties to Europe are of course assured but it might significantly upgrade relations with the Central Asian states.

Kagan considers closer ties between the USA, India and Japan more important than a larger NATO role. Affirming the ideal expressed by Anne Bayefsky amongst others, Kagan calls for an international organization of democratic states. Perhaps he underestimates the ambition of the Brussels Eurocracy and its resentment of Israel and the US. Prospects for the closer union of a core group that includes Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and a few others look promising. Such a restructuring could be triggered by various factors such as the refusal of current member states to relinquish further sovereignty, severe economic problems or security concerns caused by terrorism or the behavior of Russia. Such a central Superstate will undoubtedly dictate the foreign policy of all Europe. By remaining a member, the UK will diminish the Anglosphere. A US alliance with India and Japan, on the other hand, might formidably enhance its influence and assure its strategic advantage of continued dominance over three of the world's oceans.

Isolationism is not an option anymore. Kagan's conclusions are markedly distinguished from those disproved notions of the 90s - Fukuyama's fatuous futurology and Huntington's culturally based theory. The paranoid and the resentful that demonized the "Hyperpower" will look back on the era of American "hegemony" with yearning and remorse once the dynamics of the new multipolar world become clear. How comfortable the decade of the Clintons now appears in the light of contemporary trends. Alarming as it may be, Kagan's message is the right medicine for identifying the formidable challenges of the future.


Worst of all possible worlds?, 18 Jul 2008
This is a perceptive and far-sighted examination on the state of global politics as the decade approaches its end, in the form of an extended essay. A new axis of evil is rising in opposition to the West, one not guided by a shared ideology except in so far as hostility to the rule of law and democracy might be considered ideological. Kagan predicts that the future will see the return of nationalism, growing tensions and confrontation between the forces of democracy and autocracy. What matters is a nation's nature of government, he observes, not its culture, religion or geographic location; and this will determine its international alignment. While not dismissing the terrorist threat, he does not consider it a primary menace as history proves that modernity has never lost against the traditionalism represented by the Islamists. True, but terrorism might have unintended consequences in the formation of alliances and the development of state structures.

It is interesting to compare Kagan's analysis with Margaret Thatcher's Statecraft, published in 2002, in which she assessed the state of the world and possible future trajectories. In chapters 3 and 4 of her book Thatcher looks at Russia and the Asian Giants China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) and India. Rogue states, religion and terrorism are discussed in chapter 6, with particular reference to North Korea, Islam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran. Another must-read: The New Cold War by Edward Lucas, already confirms Kagan's view. Russia is pursuing policies that threaten its own citizens, neighboring states and the world at large. Lucas takes a hard look at the ruling elite which emerged almost entirely from the ranks of the old KGB. This dominant class harbors resentment against the West as a whole in an interesting parallel to the hostility of the Brussels Eurocracy towards the USA and Israel. The Russian government now openly competes with the West on the economic and political fronts.

Freedom of expression and the rule of law exist in name only; the state controls all the economic activity, political institutions and media that matter. Putin's term "managed" or "sovereign" democracy really means a malignant form of Czarism. Despite Russia's demographic implosion, pervasive corruption and widespread lawlessness, a new cold war is being waged. Not only has the country displayed thuggish behavior against Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Georgia and the UK in the Litvinenko case, it is supplying arms to rogue states Iran and Syria and their terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. Anna Politkovskaya's A Russian Diary: A Journalist's Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin's Russia exposes the mentality and incompetence of the ruling class.

The geopolitical implications are staggering, as the Putin gang eagerly befriends all enemies of the West. Evidence is accumulating that Russia seeks an alliance with the Islamic world and a partial restoration of the Soviet Empire through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which China is a member. The Kremlin ignores the long-term threat from China despite the particularly drastic demographic and infrastructural implosion in Russia's Far East. Whatever other evils follow from Russia's abandonment of Western values, it is sure to become a more barbaric society for its citizens and a considerably more dangerous international player. One may confidently expect it to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology and to support every loathsome thugocracy that defiles the planet.

Russia is pursuing an energy policy aimed at strangling the liberal democracies by e.g. establishing a gas cartel. An expanded SCO that includes Iran, other Middle Eastern and African states like Libya and Sudan, plus Venezuela is a real possibility. Kagan correctly identifies it as a revived Warsaw Pact. The SCO will lock the Turkic speaking states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (plus Persian Tajikistan) firmly in the bear's embrace. The future role of Turkey will be crucial; it remains to be seen how its current pro-religious government will adapt its foreign policy as reaction to the country's certain exclusion from the European inner core. Economic ties to Europe are of course assured but the country might significantly upgrade relations with the Central Asian states and the SCO.

Kagan foresees closer future ties between the USA, India and Japan, rather than a larger role for NATO. Echoing the idea expressed in The UN and Beyond: United Democratic Nations (edited by Anne Bayefsky), Kagan proposes the same type of international organization consisting of democratic states co-coordinating their policies. Perhaps he underestimates the ambition of the Brussels Eurocracy and its resentment of the US. The likelihood of all 27 states uniting is slim, but prospects for closer union of a core group including Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and a few others are bright. Such a restructuring could be triggered by many factors like the refusal of current member states to relinquish further sovereignty, economic problems or security concerns. While retaining nominal autonomy, the other countries of Europe will undoubtedly accept the Superstate's foreign policy. The loss of the UK will diminish the Anglosphere whilst an alliance with India and Japan might formidably enhance its influence and assure its strategic advantage of continued dominance over three of the world's oceans.

One fact is certain: the USA follows the siren calls of isolationism at its great peril. And the paranoids that tried to demonize the "Hyperpower" will look back on the period of American "hegemony" with affection and nostalgia once the dynamics of the new multipolar world become clear. What distinguishes Kagan's conclusions from the discredited popular notions of the 90s - Fukuyama's fatuous futurology and Huntington's culturally based theory - is that elements of it have already begun to unfold. How comfortable the decade of the Clintons now seems in comparison to contemporary trends. Kagan's book is alarming and unsettling but a much needed tonic for identifying, and preparing for, the coming challenges.


Very good challenge to "clash of civilizations" theory, 14 Jun 2008
Kagan argues that the world is not divided by religion or race as Samuel Huntingdon's 'clash of civilizations' theory suggests and the modern trouble with Islam/West seems to vindicate. Rather he argues the real division in modern geopolitics is between democracies and autocracies, with places like the USA, Europe and Japan on one side, and countries like China, Russia and Iran on the other. As he explicitly states in the book, "But in today's world, a nation's form of government, not its `civilization' or its geographic location, maybe the best predictor of its geopolitical alignment". For example, China and Japan may have a shared Asian culture, but one is a democracy and the other is an autocracy, therefore, Japan will have more in common with another democracy, even if it is not culturally similar, that it will with China.

He argues that the autocracies are dangerous, not just because of their oppressive internal policies, but because they typically are experiencing rapid economic growth. This allows them to fund a more powerful and threatening military with which to threaten democracies: Russia's booming oil wealth has seen it pick fights with the EU and send nuclear bombers on training runs on Western cities, and China makes increasingly murderous demands on Taiwain. Also their economic success in the absence of democracy could lead other countries to emulate their autocratic rule as a means of imitating their success, and there are the beginnings of this in places like Venezuela.

Kagan acknowledges that one autocracy can have friction with another autocracy: for example, Russia and China may distrust each other over their mutual ambitions in Siberia. He also acknowledges that democracies can have friction with each other: for example, the bitter exchanges between the US and France on the eve of the Iraq war. However, Kagan's key point is that when push comes to shove, a democracy will always side with a democracy in conflict with an autocracy, and an autocracy will always side with an autocracy in a conflict with a democracy.

Perhaps most controversially, Kagan accuse the UN of sheltering autocracies under the guise of sovereignty. Also, China and Russia are permanent Security Council members with the veto, and thus can protect other client autocracies like Sudan and Turkmenistan from UN action. To solve this, Kagan advocates setting up a "League of Democracies", where democratic countries can co-ordinate policies for dealing with autocracies that compliment the UN, but which in fact will probably be an alternative to it. He claims the autocracies have already set up a "League of Autocracies" under the guise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which in his eyes is nothing more a Warsaw Pact for the 21st century which needs to be countered.

The book is not without weaknesses. Firstly, Kagan's plan for a League of Democracies is unconvincing on two levels. Firstly, it is hard to see how such a structure could be set up without it being seen as an alternative to the UN rather than a compliment. Secondly, democratic countries often have rivalries and friction with each other, for example France and America have a mutual hostility, and bitter memories of their clashes before the Iraq war. Kagan seems to dismiss these as trivial rivalries, but it is hard to see how such clashes would be avoided within his League of Democracies. Kagan's dismissive claim that democracies will overcome these due to greater fears of the autocracies are, in my view, unconvincing.

All in all, the book is an interesting overview of a reality that undoubtedly puzzles some political thinkers, and is well worth a read.

Facing reality, 27 Dec 2008
It is a sobering book. Indeed, there are no universal values that guide the activities of democratic countries and autocratic regional powers like China, Russia and Iran. States base their policies on national interests that they define by themselves - so it is really hard for other countries to say that we know better what is in your interests. There is ongoing competition between democracies and autocracies for power and spheres of influence.

The book has chapters on regional powers (China, Japan, Russia, EU, India, Iran) and the superpower. The author clarifies the recent moves (and the motives behind them) and aspirations of these powers in simple and succinct language. After tens of books on Russia, Kagan made me better understand the seemingly irrational behavior of our restless neighbor.

Good book; flawed conclusions, 03 Aug 2008


The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union led to many optimistic pronouncements on global politics: we had the peace dividend, the new world order and, in the title of Francis Fukuyama's book alluded to here, the end of history.

Maybe the big wake-up call from this reverie came on 11 September 2001, when the world realised that history red in tooth and claw still prowled the earth, but the asymmetric struggles those events represented are not the only ingredients of the dangerous geopolitical brew now cooking, and in this work Robert Kagan sounds a wake up call to the "democracies", summarising the potential perils of, amongst other things, the new-found power of Russia under Putin, of the growing economic clout of China, and the potential for mischief from the direction of India, also growing in influence within the international community.

Much of Kagan's presentation is irrefutable: Russia is able to intimidate other nations through its control of huge amounts of oil and gas, and its oligarchs are gobbling up energy companies in the West; China's voice in numerous international bodies does perpetuate any number of unsavoury regimes, from nearby Myanmar to Zimbabwe, and its holdings of US dollars have destabilising potential; India does indeed vacillate between blocs, apparently so as to play them off against each other.

But ultimately I couldn't help feeling that maybe in Kagan's conclusions regarding alliances of democracies against the "anti-democracies" had a little too much of the neocon Manifest Destiny message about it, and comes across as a little too cut and dried and unnuanced. It brought to mind the warnings of Japanese world domination by Paul Kennedy a couple of decades or so ago. Kennedy, like Kagan, has impeccable intellectual credentials, but overextrapolated.

So, agreed, there are some nasty forces at play in the world; they may possibly coalesce into a force that consumes capitalism as we know it; therefore be watchful, but rattling sabres right now may lead to nothing less than a self-fulfilling prophecy.


Baby it's a Wild World, 18 Jul 2008
This far-sighted examination of global politics identifies a new axis of evil rising in opposition to the West, based on rejection of democracy and the rule of law. Kagan predicts the return of nationalism and confrontation between the forces of democracy and autocracy. He believes that a nation's type of government instead of its culture, religion or geographic location will determine its global alignment. While not dismissing the terrorist threat, he does not consider it a primary menace as history proves that modernity has never lost against the traditionalism represented by the Islamists. That is true, but acts of terror might have unintended consequences in the development of state structures & the formation of alliances.

It's irresistible to compare Kagan's analysis with Margaret Thatcher's 2002 book Statecraft, in which she assessed the state of the globe and possible future trajectories. In chapters 3 and 4 Thatcher looks at Russia and China and India. Rogue states, religion and terrorism are discussed in chapter 6 with the emphasis on North Korea, Islam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran. Another relevant work, The New Cold War by Edward Lucas, corroborates Kagan's view. Russia is pursuing policies detrimental to its own citizens, neighboring states and the world at large. Lucas scrutinizes the ruling elite which emerged from the ranks of the old KGB. This dominant class harbors resentment against the West as a whole in an interesting parallel to the hostility of the Brussels Eurocracy towards the USA and Israel. The Russian government now openly competes with the West on the economic and political fronts.

Freedom of expression and the rule of law exist in name only; the state controls all the economic activity, political institutions and media that matter. Putin's term "managed" or "sovereign" democracy really means a revived Czarism. Despite Russia's demographic implosion, pervasive corruption and widespread lawlessness, it wages a new cold war through criminal actions against Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Georgia and the UK (in the Litvinenko case) and by supplying arms to rogue states Iran and Syria and their terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.

The Putin gang eagerly befriends all enemies of the West and it's becoming clear that Russia seeks an alliance with the Islamic world and a partial restoration of the Warsaw Pact through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which China is a member. The Kremlin ignores the long-term threat from China despite the particularly drastic demographic and infrastructural implosion in Russia's Far East. Russia's rejection of Western values promises to make it more barbaric internally and considerably more dangerous on the global stage. One may confidently expect it to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology and to support every oppressive regime that pollutes the planet.

It is pursuing an energy policy aimed at squeezing the liberal democracies through a gas cartel. An enlarged SCO that includes Iran, other Middle Eastern and African states like Libya and Sudan, plus Venezuela is a real possibility. The SCO will lock the Turkic speaking states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (plus Persian Tajikistan) firmly in the bear's embrace. The future role of Turkey will be crucial; it remains to be seen how its current pro-religious government will adapt its foreign policy in response to the country's certain exclusion from the European inner core. Economic ties to Europe are of course assured but it might significantly upgrade relations with the Central Asian states.

Kagan considers closer ties between the USA, India and Japan more important than a larger NATO role. Affirming the ideal expressed by Anne Bayefsky amongst others, Kagan calls for an international organization of democratic states. Perhaps he underestimates the ambition of the Brussels Eurocracy and its resentment of Israel and the US. Prospects for the closer union of a core group that includes Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and a few others look promising. Such a restructuring could be triggered by various factors such as the refusal of current member states to relinquish further sovereignty, severe economic problems or security concerns caused by terrorism or the behavior of Russia. Such a central Superstate will undoubtedly dictate the foreign policy of all Europe. By remaining a member, the UK will diminish the Anglosphere. A US alliance with India and Japan, on the other hand, might formidably enhance its influence and assure its strategic advantage of continued dominance over three of the world's oceans.

Isolationism is not an option anymore. Kagan's conclusions are markedly distinguished from those disproved notions of the 90s - Fukuyama's fatuous futurology and Huntington's culturally based theory. The paranoid and the resentful that demonized the "Hyperpower" will look back on the era of American "hegemony" with yearning and remorse once the dynamics of the new multipolar world become clear. How comfortable the decade of the Clintons now appears in the light of contemporary trends. Alarming as it may be, Kagan's message is the right medicine for identifying the formidable challenges of the future.


Worst of all possible worlds?, 18 Jul 2008
This is a perceptive and far-sighted examination on the state of global politics as the decade approaches its end, in the form of an extended essay. A new axis of evil is rising in opposition to the West, one not guided by a shared ideology except in so far as hostility to the rule of law and democracy might be considered ideological. Kagan predicts that the future will see the return of nationalism, growing tensions and confrontation between the forces of democracy and autocracy. What matters is a nation's nature of government, he observes, not its culture, religion or geographic location; and this will determine its international alignment. While not dismissing the terrorist threat, he does not consider it a primary menace as history proves that modernity has never lost against the traditionalism represented by the Islamists. True, but terrorism might have unintended consequences in the formation of alliances and the development of state structures.

It is interesting to compare Kagan's analysis with Margaret Thatcher's Statecraft, published in 2002, in which she assessed the state of the world and possible future trajectories. In chapters 3 and 4 of her book Thatcher looks at Russia and the Asian Giants China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) and India. Rogue states, religion and terrorism are discussed in chapter 6, with particular reference to North Korea, Islam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran. Another must-read: The New Cold War by Edward Lucas, already confirms Kagan's view. Russia is pursuing policies that threaten its own citizens, neighboring states and the world at large. Lucas takes a hard look at the ruling elite which emerged almost entirely from the ranks of the old KGB. This dominant class harbors resentment against the West as a whole in an interesting parallel to the hostility of the Brussels Eurocracy towards the USA and Israel. The Russian government now openly competes with the West on the economic and political fronts.

Freedom of expression and the rule of law exist in name only; the state controls all the economic activity, political institutions and media that matter. Putin's term "managed" or "sovereign" democracy really means a malignant form of Czarism. Despite Russia's demographic implosion, pervasive corruption and widespread lawlessness, a new cold war is being waged. Not only has the country displayed thuggish behavior against Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Georgia and the UK in the Litvinenko case, it is supplying arms to rogue states Iran and Syria and their terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. Anna Politkovskaya's A Russian Diary: A Journalist's Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin's Russia exposes the mentality and incompetence of the ruling class.

The geopolitical implications are staggering, as the Putin gang eagerly befriends all enemies of the West. Evidence is accumulating that Russia seeks an alliance with the Islamic world and a partial restoration of the Soviet Empire through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which China is a member. The Kremlin ignores the long-term threat from China despite the particularly drastic demographic and infrastructural implosion in Russia's Far East. Whatever other evils follow from Russia's abandonment of Western values, it is sure to become a more barbaric society for its citizens and a considerably more dangerous international player. One may confidently expect it to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology and to support every loathsome thugocracy that defiles the planet.

Russia is pursuing an energy policy aimed at strangling the liberal democracies by e.g. establishing a gas cartel. An expanded SCO that includes Iran, other Middle Eastern and African states like Libya and Sudan, plus Venezuela is a real possibility. Kagan correctly identifies it as a revived Warsaw Pact. The SCO will lock the Turkic speaking states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (plus Persian Tajikistan) firmly in the bear's embrace. The future role of Turkey will be crucial; it remains to be seen how its current pro-religious government will adapt its foreign policy as reaction to the country's certain exclusion from the European inner core. Economic ties to Europe are of course assured but the country might significantly upgrade relations with the Central Asian states and the SCO.

Kagan foresees closer future ties between the USA, India and Japan, rather than a larger role for NATO. Echoing the idea expressed in The UN and Beyond: United Democratic Nations (edited by Anne Bayefsky), Kagan proposes the same type of international organization consisting of democratic states co-coordinating their policies. Perhaps he underestimates the ambition of the Brussels Eurocracy and its resentment of the US. The likelihood of all 27 states uniting is slim, but prospects for closer union of a core group including Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and a few others are bright. Such a restructuring could be triggered by many factors like the refusal of current member states to relinquish further sovereignty, economic problems or security concerns. While retaining nominal autonomy, the other countries of Europe will undoubtedly accept the Superstate's foreign policy. The loss of the UK will diminish the Anglosphere whilst an alliance with India and Japan might formidably enhance its influence and assure its strategic advantage of continued dominance over three of the world's oceans.

One fact is certain: the USA follows the siren calls of isolationism at its great peril. And the paranoids that tried to demonize the "Hyperpower" will look back on the period of American "hegemony" with affection and nostalgia once the dynamics of the new multipolar world become clear. What distinguishes Kagan's conclusions from the discredited popular notions of the 90s - Fukuyama's fatuous futurology and Huntington's culturally based theory - is that elements of it have already begun to unfold. How comfortable the decade of the Clintons now seems in comparison to contemporary trends. Kagan's book is alarming and unsettling but a much needed tonic for identifying, and preparing for, the coming challenges.


Very good challenge to "clash of civilizations" theory, 14 Jun 2008
Kagan argues that the world is not divided by religion or race as Samuel Huntingdon's 'clash of civilizations' theory suggests and the modern trouble with Islam/West seems to vindicate. Rather he argues the real division in modern geopolitics is between democracies and autocracies, with places like the USA, Europe and Japan on one side, and countries like China, Russia and Iran on the other. As he explicitly states in the book, "But in today's world, a nation's form of government, not its `civilization' or its geographic location, maybe the best predictor of its geopolitical alignment". For example, China and Japan may have a shared Asian culture, but one is a democracy and the other is an autocracy, therefore, Japan will have more in common with another democracy, even if it is not culturally similar, that it will with China.

He argues that the autocracies are dangerous, not just because of their oppressive internal policies, but because they typically are experiencing rapid economic growth. This allows them to fund a more powerful and threatening military with which to threaten democracies: Russia's booming oil wealth has seen it pick fights with the EU and send nuclear bombers on training runs on Western cities, and China makes increasingly murderous demands on Taiwain. Also their economic success in the absence of democracy could lead other countries to emulate their autocratic rule as a means of imitating their success, and there are the beginnings of this in places like Venezuela.

Kagan acknowledges that one autocracy can have friction with another autocracy: for example, Russia and China may distrust each other over their mutual ambitions in Siberia. He also acknowledges that democracies can have friction with each other: for example, the bitter exchanges between the US and France on the eve of the Iraq war. However, Kagan's key point is that when push comes to shove, a democracy will always side with a democracy in conflict with an autocracy, and an autocracy will always side with an autocracy in a conflict with a democracy.

Perhaps most controversially, Kagan accuse the UN of sheltering autocracies under the guise of sovereignty. Also, China and Russia are permanent Security Council members with the veto, and thus can protect other client autocracies like Sudan and Turkmenistan from UN action. To solve this, Kagan advocates setting up a "League of Democracies", where democratic countries can co-ordinate policies for dealing with autocracies that compliment the UN, but which in fact will probably be an alternative to it. He claims the autocracies have already set up a "League of Autocracies" under the guise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which in his eyes is nothing more a Warsaw Pact for the 21st century which needs to be countered.

The book is not without weaknesses. Firstly, Kagan's plan for a League of Democracies is unconvincing on two levels. Firstly, it is hard to see how such a structure could be set up without it being seen as an alternative to the UN rather than a compliment. Secondly, democratic countries often have rivalries and friction with each other, for example France and America have a mutual hostility, and bitter memories of their clashes before the Iraq war. Kagan seems to dismiss these as trivial rivalries, but it is hard to see how such clashes would be avoided within his League of Democracies. Kagan's dismissive claim that democracies will overcome these due to greater fears of the autocracies are, in my view, unconvincing.

All in all, the book is an interesting overview of a reality that undoubtedly puzzles some political thinkers, and is well worth a read.


A witty and personal polemic, 30 Dec 2008

Many reviewers of this book - whether writing in newspapers or here on Amazon - seem to distort its arguments. I think (cross) leftists and (smug) rightists both want Cohen's conversion to be more dramatic than in fact it is. I'd skimmed through some of these reviews before reading "What's Left?" and was expecting his perspective to be close to that of, say, Melanie Phillips. But he hasn't abandoned the Left completely, only certain tendencies and views within the Left which he sees as sinister. He has been characterised by some reviewers as a fan of Bush and an unequivocal supporter of the second Iraq war. But this clearly isn't the position he sets out in "What's Left?"

The book is polemical and aimed at general readers, and clearly Cohen has had to shape and select his material in the most rhetorically effective way. Sometimes I felt the argument had been flattened, a middle position excluded. Yet on the whole I thought "What's Left?" was nuanced, thoughtful and consistently absorbing.


What's Left? Not Nick Cohen, 18 Dec 2008
I can't help but get annoyed at nearly every book, article or other piece of work this man does. What person to the left spends more time criticising the left than the right? Nick Cohen sure as hell does. Furthermore, Nick Cohen's objection here is almost solely to do with his unconditional support for Israel. He sees that an alliance between British muslims (and by that I don't mean extremists) and the left (whether it be centre-left or further to the left) could mean a shift in UK policy in favour of Palestine at the expense of Israel retaining the occupied territories. Public opinion suggests that a large majority of British people want to see an independent Palestine. Nick Cohen is trying to undermine that with a very well written but hideously flawed piece.

Serious political writing, 05 Dec 2008
An uncompromising take on the state of the left wing today. Cohen does not shirk from calling the left wing lily livered where he feels appropriate.

He reviews the burning issues of our time and takes the left to task for what he sees as its failings. He is particularly astute on academics and what they write.

This is by no means an easy read, nor is it intended to be. What it is is serious political writing from a hard hitting heavyweight, which demands and rewards perseverance on the part of the reader. That does mean, however, that, for all the good intentions and high-quality research, the audience for the book is likely to be limited.

Late You Come But Still You Come, 16 Sep 2008
Like many who start out on the left, Nick Cohen was an idealist.
He'd like to have stayed that way; it's just that that pesky old human nature, and the immutable laws of life, kept getting in the way.
'What's Left' is a readable and enjoyable journey through one man's realisation that what he thought was cast iron, solid gold fact isn't.
His isn't as important or dramatic a conversion as that of - say - David Horowitz, but it's important, nonetheless.
I'd recomment this book to anyone struggling with the evidence of his or her own eyes - decaying streets while crime is 'lower than ever', shocking educational standards while education is 'better than ever', soldiers dying in wars where not a round was supposed to have been fired... it might tip you over the edge.
Oh, and read those two one star reviews for the sound and smell of panic among the diehards.

High Time, 02 May 2008
At last, a writer who isn't afraid to challenge the posturing of a now ridiculous 'liberal left', a loose political grouping who really should have the collective intelligence to know better. Until recently I've counted myself as one of them but now I just feel ashamed. This fine writer will tell you why. But one of his chapter titles, 'Kill us, we deserve it', pretty well sums it all up.

Cohen's analysis is as sober as it is disturbing and I read this book well into the night, as gripped as by any thriller. He also writes lucidly, an especial advantage and in direct contrast to the disappointing traditions of inpenetrable prose by many leftist thinkers.

Nick Cohen, given his fine liberal background, is a brave man to have written this book. He has had the courage to stand up and be counted and should be applauded for it.

Facing reality, 27 Dec 2008
It is a sobering book. Indeed, there are no universal values that guide the activities of democratic countries and autocratic regional powers like China, Russia and Iran. States base their policies on national interests that they define by themselves - so it is really hard for other countries to say that we know better what is in your interests. There is ongoing competition between democracies and autocracies for power and spheres of influence.

The book has chapters on regional powers (China, Japan, Russia, EU, India, Iran) and the superpower. The author clarifies the recent moves (and the motives behind them) and aspirations of these powers in simple and succinct language. After tens of books on Russia, Kagan made me better understand the seemingly irrational behavior of our restless neighbor.

Good book; flawed conclusions, 03 Aug 2008


The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union led to many optimistic pronouncements on global politics: we had the peace dividend, the new world order and, in the title of Francis Fukuyama's book alluded to here, the end of history.

Maybe the big wake-up call from this reverie came on 11 September 2001, when the world realised that history red in tooth and claw still prowled the earth, but the asymmetric struggles those events represented are not the only ingredients of the dangerous geopolitical brew now cooking, and in this work Robert Kagan sounds a wake up call to the "democracies", summarising the potential perils of, amongst other things, the new-found power of Russia under Putin, of the growing economic clout of China, and the potential for mischief from the direction of India, also growing in influence within the international community.

Much of Kagan's presentation is irrefutable: Russia is able to intimidate other nations through its control of huge amounts of oil and gas, and its oligarchs are gobbling up energy companies in the West; China's voice in numerous international bodies does perpetuate any number of unsavoury regimes, from nearby Myanmar to Zimbabwe, and its holdings of US dollars have destabilising potential; India does indeed vacillate between blocs, apparently so as to play them off against each other.

But ultimately I couldn't help feeling that maybe in Kagan's conclusions regarding alliances of democracies against the "anti-democracies" had a little too much of the neocon Manifest Destiny message about it, and comes across as a little too cut and dried and unnuanced. It brought to mind the warnings of Japanese world domination by Paul Kennedy a couple of decades or so ago. Kennedy, like Kagan, has impeccable intellectual credentials, but overextrapolated.

So, agreed, there are some nasty forces at play in the world; they may possibly coalesce into a force that consumes capitalism as we know it; therefore be watchful, but rattling sabres right now may lead to nothing less than a self-fulfilling prophecy.


Baby it's a Wild World, 18 Jul 2008
This far-sighted examination of global politics identifies a new axis of evil rising in opposition to the West, based on rejection of democracy and the rule of law. Kagan predicts the return of nationalism and confrontation between the forces of democracy and autocracy. He believes that a nation's type of government instead of its culture, religion or geographic location will determine its global alignment. While not dismissing the terrorist threat, he does not consider it a primary menace as history proves that modernity has never lost against the traditionalism represented by the Islamists. That is true, but acts of terror might have unintended consequences in the development of state structures & the formation of alliances.

It's irresistible to compare Kagan's analysis with Margaret Thatcher's 2002 book Statecraft, in which she assessed the state of the globe and possible future trajectories. In chapters 3 and 4 Thatcher looks at Russia and China and India. Rogue states, religion and terrorism are discussed in chapter 6 with the emphasis on North Korea, Islam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran. Another relevant work, The New Cold War by Edward Lucas, corroborates Kagan's view. Russia is pursuing policies detrimental to its own citizens, neighboring states and the world at large. Lucas scrutinizes the ruling elite which emerged from the ranks of the old KGB. This dominant class harbors resentment against the West as a whole in an interesting parallel to the hostility of the Brussels Eurocracy towards the USA and Israel. The Russian government now openly competes with the West on the economic and political fronts.

Freedom of expression and the rule of law exist in name only; the state controls all the economic activity, political institutions and media that matter. Putin's term "managed" or "sovereign" democracy really means a revived Czarism. Despite Russia's demographic implosion, pervasive corruption and widespread lawlessness, it wages a new cold war through criminal actions against Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Georgia and the UK (in the Litvinenko case) and by supplying arms to rogue states Iran and Syria and their terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.

The Putin gang eagerly befriends all enemies of the West and it's becoming clear that Russia seeks an alliance with the Islamic world and a partial restoration of the Warsaw Pact through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which China is a member. The Kremlin ignores the long-term threat from China despite the particularly drastic demographic and infrastructural implosion in Russia's Far East. Russia's rejection of Western values promises to make it more barbaric internally and considerably more dangerous on the global stage. One may confidently expect it to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology and to support every oppressive regime that pollutes the planet.

It is pursuing an energy policy aimed at squeezing the liberal democracies through a gas cartel. An enlarged SCO that includes Iran, other Middle Eastern and African states like Libya and Sudan, plus Venezuela is a real possibility. The SCO will lock the Turkic speaking states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (plus Persian Tajikistan) firmly in the bear's embrace. The future role of Turkey will be crucial; it remains to be seen how its current pro-religious government will adapt its foreign policy in response to the country's certain exclusion from the European inner core. Economic ties to Europe are of course assured but it might significantly upgrade relations with the Central Asian states.

Kagan considers closer ties between the USA, India and Japan more important than a larger NATO role. Affirming the ideal expressed by Anne Bayefsky amongst others, Kagan calls for an international organization of democratic states. Perhaps he underestimates the ambition of the Brussels Eurocracy and its resentment of Israel and the US. Prospects for the closer union of a core group that includes Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and a few others look promising. Such a restructuring could be triggered by various factors such as the refusal of current member states to relinquish further sovereignty, severe economic problems or security concerns caused by terrorism or the behavior of Russia. Such a central Superstate will undoubtedly dictate the foreign policy of all Europe. By remaining a member, the UK will diminish the Anglosphere. A US alliance with India and Japan, on the other hand, might formidably enhance its influence and assure its strategic advantage of continued dominance over three of the world's oceans.

Isolationism is not an option anymore. Kagan's conclusions are markedly distinguished from those disproved notions of the 90s - Fukuyama's fatuous futurology and Huntington's culturally based theory. The paranoid and the resentful that demonized the "Hyperpower" will look back on the era of American "hegemony" with yearning and remorse once the dynamics of the new multipolar world become clear. How comfortable the decade of the Clintons now appears in the light of contemporary trends. Alarming as it may be, Kagan's message is the right medicine for identifying the formidable challenges of the future.


Worst of all possible worlds?, 18 Jul 2008
This is a perceptive and far-sighted examination on the state of global politics as the decade approaches its end, in the form of an extended essay. A new axis of evil is rising in opposition to the West, one not guided by a shared ideology except in so far as hostility to the rule of law and democracy might be considered ideological. Kagan predicts that the future will see the return of nationalism, growing tensions and confrontation between the forces of democracy and autocracy. What matters is a nation's nature of government, he observes, not its culture, religion or geographic location; and this will determine its international alignment. While not dismissing the terrorist threat, he does not consider it a primary menace as history proves that modernity has never lost against the traditionalism represented by the Islamists. True, but terrorism might have unintended consequences in the formation of alliances and the development of state structures.

It is interesting to compare Kagan's analysis with Margaret Thatcher's Statecraft, published in 2002, in which she assessed the state of the world and possible future trajectories. In chapters 3 and 4 of her book Thatcher looks at Russia and the Asian Giants China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) and India. Rogue states, religion and terrorism are discussed in chapter 6, with particular reference to North Korea, Islam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran. Another must-read: The New Cold War by Edward Lucas, already confirms Kagan's view. Russia is pursuing policies that threaten its own citizens, neighboring states and the world at large. Lucas takes a hard look at the ruling elite which emerged almost entirely from the ranks of the old KGB. This dominant class harbors resentment against the West as a whole in an interesting parallel to the hostility of the Brussels Eurocracy towards the USA and Israel. The Russian government now openly competes with the West on the economic and political fronts.

Freedom of expression and the rule of law exist in name only; the state controls all the economic activity, political institutions and media that matter. Putin's term "managed" or "sovereign" democracy really means a malignant form of Czarism. Despite Russia's demographic implosion, pervasive corruption and widespread lawlessness, a new cold war is being waged. Not only has the country displayed thuggish behavior against Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Georgia and the UK in the Litvinenko case, it is supplying arms to rogue states Iran and Syria and their terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. Anna Politkovskaya's A Russian Diary: A Journalist's Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin's Russia exposes the mentality and incompetence of the ruling class.

The geopolitical implications are staggering, as the Putin gang eagerly befriends all enemies of the West. Evidence is accumulating that Russia seeks an alliance with the Islamic world and a partial restoration of the Soviet Empire through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which China is a member. The Kremlin ignores the long-term threat from China despite the particularly drastic demographic and infrastructural implosion in Russia's Far East. Whatever other evils follow from Russia's abandonment of Western values, it is sure to become a more barbaric society for its citizens and a considerably more dangerous international player. One may confidently expect it to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology and to support every loathsome thugocracy that defiles the planet.

Russia is pursuing an energy policy aimed at strangling the liberal democracies by e.g. establishing a gas cartel. An expanded SCO that includes Iran, other Middle Eastern and African states like Libya and Sudan, plus Venezuela is a real possibility. Kagan correctly identifies it as a revived Warsaw Pact. The SCO will lock the Turkic speaking states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (plus Persian Tajikistan) firmly in the bear's embrace. The future role of Turkey will be crucial; it remains to be seen how its current pro-religious government will adapt its foreign policy as reaction to the country's certain exclusion from the European inner core. Economic ties to Europe are of course assured but the country might significantly upgrade relations with the Central Asian states and the SCO.

Kagan foresees closer future ties between the USA, India and Japan, rather than a larger role for NATO. Echoing the idea expressed in The UN and Beyond: United Democratic Nations (edited by Anne Bayefsky), Kagan proposes the same type of international organization consisting of democratic states co-coordinating their policies. Perhaps he underestimates the ambition of the Brussels Eurocracy and its resentment of the US. The likelihood of all 27 states uniting is slim, but prospects for closer union of a core group including Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and a few others are bright. Such a restructuring could be triggered by many factors like the refusal of current member states to relinquish further sovereignty, economic problems or security concerns. While retaining nominal autonomy, the other countries of Europe will undoubtedly accept the Superstate's foreign policy. The loss of the UK will diminish the Anglosphere whilst an alliance with India and Japan might formidably enhance its influence and assure its strategic advantage of continued dominance over three of the world's oceans.

One fact is certain: the USA follows the siren calls of isolationism at its great peril. And the paranoids that tried to demonize the "Hyperpower" will look back on the period of American "hegemony" with affection and nostalgia once the dynamics of the new multipolar world become clear. What distinguishes Kagan's conclusions from the discredited popular notions of the 90s - Fukuyama's fatuous futurology and Huntington's culturally based theory - is that elements of it have already begun to unfold. How comfortable the decade of the Clintons now seems in comparison to contemporary trends. Kagan's book is alarming and unsettling but a much needed tonic for identifying, and preparing for, the coming challenges.


Very good challenge to "clash of civilizations" theory, 14 Jun 2008
Kagan argues that the world is not divided by religion or race as Samuel Huntingdon's 'clash of civilizations' theory suggests and the modern trouble with Islam/West seems to vindicate. Rather he argues the real division in modern geopolitics is between democracies and autocracies, with places like the USA, Europe and Japan on one side, and countries like China, Russia and Iran on the other. As he explicitly states in the book, "But in today's world, a nation's form of government, not its `civilization' or its geographic location, maybe the best predictor of its geopolitical alignment". For example, China and Japan may have a shared Asian culture, but one is a democracy and the other is an autocracy, therefore, Japan will have more in common with another democracy, even if it is not culturally similar, that it will with China.

He argues that the autocracies are dangerous, not just because of their oppressive internal policies, but because they typically are experiencing rapid economic growth. This allows them to fund a more powerful and threatening military with which to threaten democracies: Russia's booming oil wealth has seen it pick fights with the EU and send nuclear bombers on training runs on Western cities, and China makes increasingly murderous demands on Taiwain. Also their economic success in the absence of democracy could lead other countries to emulate their autocratic rule as a means of imitating their success, and there are the beginnings of this in places like Venezuela.

Kagan acknowledges that one autocracy can have friction with another autocracy: for example, Russia and China may distrust each other over their mutual ambitions in Siberia. He also acknowledges that democracies can have friction with each other: for example, the bitter exchanges between the US and France on the eve of the Iraq war. However, Kagan's key point is that when push comes to shove, a democracy will always side with a democracy in conflict with an autocracy, and an autocracy will always side with an autocracy in a conflict with a democracy.

Perhaps most controversially, Kagan accuse the UN of sheltering autocracies under the guise of sovereignty. Also, China and Russia are permanent Security Council members with the veto, and thus can protect other client autocracies like Sudan and Turkmenistan from UN action. To solve this, Kagan advocates setting up a "League of Democracies", where democratic countries can co-ordinate policies for dealing with autocracies that compliment the UN, but which in fact will probably be an alternative to it. He claims the autocracies have already set up a "League of Autocracies" under the guise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which in his eyes is nothing more a Warsaw Pact for the 21st century which needs to be countered.

The book is not without weaknesses. Firstly, Kagan's plan for a League of Democracies is unconvincing on two levels. Firstly, it is hard to see how such a structure could be set up without it being seen as an alternative to the UN rather than a compliment. Secondly, democratic countries often have rivalries and friction with each other, for example France and America have a mutual hostility, and bitter memories of their clashes before the Iraq war. Kagan seems to dismiss these as trivial rivalries, but it is hard to see how such clashes would be avoided within his League of Democracies. Kagan's dismissive claim that democracies will overcome these due to greater fears of the autocracies are, in my view, unconvincing.

All in all, the book is an interesting overview of a reality that undoubtedly puzzles some political thinkers, and is well worth a read.


A witty and personal polemic, 30 Dec 2008

Many reviewers of this book - whether writing in newspapers or here on Amazon - seem to distort its arguments. I think (cross) leftists and (smug) rightists both want Cohen's conversion to be more dramatic than in fact it is. I'd skimmed through some of these reviews before reading "What's Left?" and was expecting his perspective to be close to that of, say, Melanie Phillips. But he hasn't abandoned the Left completely, only certain tendencies and views within the Left which he sees as sinister. He has been characterised by some reviewers as a fan of Bush and an unequivocal supporter of the second Iraq war. But this clearly isn't the position he sets out in "What's Left?"

The book is polemical and aimed at general readers, and clearly Cohen has had to shape and select his material in the most rhetorically effective way. Sometimes I felt the argument had been flattened, a middle position excluded. Yet on the whole I thought "What's Left?" was nuanced, thoughtful and consistently absorbing.


What's Left? Not Nick Cohen, 18 Dec 2008
I can't help but get annoyed at nearly every book, article or other piece of work this man does. What person to the left spends more time criticising the left than the right? Nick Cohen sure as hell does. Furthermore, Nick Cohen's objection here is almost solely to do with his unconditional support for Israel. He sees that an alliance between British muslims (and by that I don't mean extremists) and the left (whether it be centre-left or further to the left) could mean a shift in UK policy in favour of Palestine at the expense of Israel retaining the occupied territories. Public opinion suggests that a large majority of British people want to see an independent Palestine. Nick Cohen is trying to undermine that with a very well written but hideously flawed piece.

Serious political writing, 05 Dec 2008
An uncompromising take on the state of the left wing today. Cohen does not shirk from calling the left wing lily livered where he feels appropriate.

He reviews the burning issues of our time and takes the left to task for what he sees as its failings. He is particularly astute on academics and what they write.

This is by no means an easy read, nor is it intended to be. What it is is serious political writing from a hard hitting heavyweight, which demands and rewards perseverance on the part of the reader. That does mean, however, that, for all the good intentions and high-quality research, the audience for the book is likely to be limited.

Late You Come But Still You Come, 16 Sep 2008
Like many who start out on the left, Nick Cohen was an idealist.
He'd like to have stayed that way; it's just that that pesky old human nature, and the immutable laws of life, kept getting in the way.
'What's Left' is a readable and enjoyable journey through one man's realisation that what he thought was cast iron, solid gold fact isn't.
His isn't as important or dramatic a conversion as that of - say - David Horowitz, but it's important, nonetheless.
I'd recomment this book to anyone struggling with the evidence of his or her own eyes - decaying streets while crime is 'lower than ever', shocking educational standards while education is 'better than ever', soldiers dying in wars where not a round was supposed to have been fired... it might tip you over the edge.
Oh, and read those two one star reviews for the sound and smell of panic among the diehards.

High Time, 02 May 2008
At last, a writer who isn't afraid to challenge the posturing of a now ridiculous 'liberal left', a loose political grouping who really should have the collective intelligence to know better. Until recently I've counted myself as one of them but now I just feel ashamed. This fine writer will tell you why. But one of his chapter titles, 'Kill us, we deserve it', pretty well sums it all up.

Cohen's analysis is as sober as it is disturbing and I read this book well into the night, as gripped as by any thriller. He also writes lucidly, an especial advantage and in direct contrast to the disappointing traditions of inpenetrable prose by many leftist thinkers.

Nick Cohen, given his fine liberal background, is a brave man to have written this book. He has had the courage to stand up and be counted and should be applauded for it.

A must read!, 05 Dec 2008
The War on Terror is a concern for us all, and understanding it is imperitive. Of course our governments make mistakes and do some very illiberal things, but there are plenty of writers, good and awful who document that. What this book analyses is the ideology of totalitarian islam and pan-arabism, the dangerous conclusion of moral relativsim, and also why we cannot reason with these people. It is monumental work that gets some real intellectual spunk into this highly misinformed debate, where the winner seems to have the most appealing linguistics, this book wins on all counts. Read it, it might change you.

Brilliant!, 02 Sep 2006
Considering the current situation around the world, Paul Berman's book is one of the finest in print. The background material is laid out clearly and convincingly. I stopped taking notes because I found I was just copying everything written. Each sentence holds so much truth and gives you a better understanding of what terror and liberalism really mean. Once the concept of totalitarianism is spelled out your eyes are opened and you can see what your politicians and news moguls do not want you to see. A brave book from a brilliant author. Read it!

A guide to the post 9/11 era, 04 Mar 2005
Paul Berman wrote a compelling book about the dangers that current terrorism provide for the cause of freedom and liberalism. This case - that there are forces that are at war with liberalism and that we need to rise up to the challenge - has been made enough by some commentators but not heard enough, especially in some circles and through the major media channels. In particular, in Europe such a case has been often derided as simply an ad hoc justification for an 'imperialist war' or, when recognised for what it is, an unnecessary war on terror. Paul Berman is no neo-conservative. Actually in the preface he raises the question whether this book should position itself on the left or right side of the political spectrum. The author clearly would like to put himself on the moderate left side, but makes often argument that are heard more from commentators on the moderate right side. The reason is simple: with regard to the current 'terror war', there is no right or left, but only a liberal society and its enemies. Berman traces the history of this clash, between liberty and totalitarianism, back a century, to First World, Second world war and the cold war. Liberalism has fought many enemies, and many faces of the same enemy. We need to recognise terrorists for what they are and they they, those who harbour them, and dictators are the enemy of liberalism, under another face maybe, but animated by the same avulsion for our principles of freedom and equality as previous totalitarianisms, such as nazism and communism, were. The fact that this call to arms comes from somebody that would like to place himself on the left side is even more encouraging, as today there are too many people willing to deny the reality of our world and indulge themselves in wishful thinking. And here is the second main contribution of this book. The denunciation of the wishful thinking of some - not to say most - of the people on the left (and some on the right too, but to a far lesser degree). The author draw parallels from recent history; as socialists in France took a sympathetic view of Hitler in the 1930s (because they were opposed to war in any circumstance), and most of the left were more than sympathetic with communism during the Cold War, so today, opponents of war fail to recognise the dangers we are facing. Berman does not fail to criticise American foreign policy when it's needed (he understands the current administration foreign policy strategy better than most other people); and it does not fail to criticise the failure of liberalism when they happens ("the totalitarian movements arise because of failures in the liberal civilisation"). However, it is also clearly states what we should be for: we are the anti-nihilists, we are for the freedom for others. And this is way this book should be read by everybody interested in understanding what is happening today; in particular it should be read by those who two years ago demonstrated against the Iraq invasion. Some of them had good and sensible reasons to oppose the invasion (some others did not), but the irony was clear: "the largest mass demonstrations in the history of the world were aimed at preventing the overthrow of one of the worst tyrannies in the modern age". We should be for the freedom of others.

Appeasement or intervention, 14 Nov 2004
Terrorism and suicide attacks have a long history across the world. Berman is analysing the cultural foundations of totalitarian thought, which is leading states as well as dissident groups to commit acts of terror - carefully targeted or randomly causing the maximum number of casualties. In a mostly balanced discussion, Berman talks us through Camus' reaction to holocaust and gulag, "The Rebel", tracing back apocalyptic visions in Christian thought to the Book of Revelation: a realm of purity to be built by murderous struggle.
In response to Tariq Ramadan's contention that Islamic civilisation cannot be understood in Western terms of reference, Berman then examines the writings of one of the most influential Muslim fundamentalist writers, Sayyid Qutb, contrasting Camus' tales of rebellion with Islamic pledges for submission. What we see, though, is not the independent development of isolated civilisations: Arab and Islamic revivalism at the beginning of the twentieth century is profoundly influenced by European Socialism and, soon, National Socialism (Berman does not mention the even earlier wave of nationalism, shortly after Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in1798). Qutb himself acknowledged Western cultural influences, through readings and during a short visit as a student in the USA, which left him with admiration for scientific progress, but deeply appalled by what he saw as moral depravity. Berman understands Qutb's call for a Holy War to establish an authentic Islamic community as another manifestation of western totalitarian ideologies aimed at creating a perfect, utopian society, the "End of History", the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, brought about by a small vanguard of fighters prepared to die (the latter supported by Cold War aids from the West).
But then, disappointingly, in a single phrase on page 129, Berman takes sides, turning the experience of failed appeasement confronting Nazi aggression in the 1930s against support for Palestinian struggle for a viable state today: "Clinton's principal negotiator, Dennis Ross, has explained that, in the offer to Arafat, the new Palestinian state was going to be contiguous, except for the Gaza strip." The official map depicting the Oslo agreement has been published on countless websites; it seems Berman is giving the term "contiguous" a wholly new meaning. Thus, denying any possible rational argument for liberal understanding of suicide bombers, Berman is bringing in a psychoanalytical explanation ("sheerest speculation", he admits), with de Sade, Baudelaire, and Camus: "the sinister excites". His hopes lie with liberal thinkers raising their voices from within formerly totalitarian societies, East and West, but he is not an avowed pacifist, warning about the dangers of appeasement, the illusion of believing in a rational world.
What to do? Berman cannot answer Qutb's question, but his book does offer a wealth of thought and historical information to further this debate.

Excellent Analysis of Middle-Eastern Totalitarianism, 30 Jun 2003
Paul Berman is from the left politically, but, as with Christopher Hitchens, is appalled at the current attitude of the liberal left to the Iraqi war and the Palestinian situation. He argues that the short 20th century (1914-1989) didn't see the final defeat of the totalitarianisms of left and right, but that these survive in the Middle East, both in the teachings of Islamic fundamentalists and with the secular Baathists. Both of these groups in their different ways incorporated elements of the worst of European totalitarian philosophies. And the left, following the ignoble traditions of many in the thirties (Berman cites the example of the French socialists under Paul Faure), pretend it isn't happening.

One of the most interesting points that Berman raises, for me, is the question of the Palestinian suicide bombers. I find it quite extraordinary that this repellent form of terrorism is so remarkably effective in raising support for the Palestinian cause, and how many on the left think it quite reasonable (well yes, it's a shame about those innocent deaths, but...), and take it as proof that the Palestinians are suffering so appallingly under the Israelis that comparisons are blithely made not just with apartheid South Africa, but even, pace Tom Paulin and others, with Nazi Germany. But this is completely to misunderstand the mentality involved here. These suicide bombers are part of a profound pathology within the Arab world, a chiliastic movement, where death is glory. The same lazy shallow thinking, whereby everyone acts rationally in the light of their perceived interests, had it that the 9/11 bombers were protesting American foreign policy and the plight of the Palestinians. No, no, no. These people were protesting the very existence of liberalism. These people were fanatics.

Read the book. It's well-written, and will make you think.

Facing reality, 27 Dec 2008
It is a sobering book. Indeed, there are no universal values that guide the activities of democratic countries and autocratic regional powers like China, Russia and Iran. States base their policies on national interests that they define by themselves - so it is really hard for other countries to say that we know better what is in your interests. There is ongoing competition between democracies and autocracies for power and spheres of influence.

The book has chapters on regional powers (China, Japan, Russia, EU, India, Iran) and the superpower. The author clarifies the recent moves (and the motives behind them) and aspirations of these powers in simple and succinct language. After tens of books on Russia, Kagan made me better understand the seemingly irrational behavior of our restless neighbor.

Good book; flawed conclusions, 03 Aug 2008


The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union led to many optimistic pronouncements on global politics: we had the peace dividend, the new world order and, in the title of Francis Fukuyama's book alluded to here, the end of history.

Maybe the big wake-up call from this reverie came on 11 September 2001, when the world realised that history red in tooth and claw still prowled the earth, but the asymmetric struggles those events represented are not the only ingredients of the dangerous geopolitical brew now cooking, and in this work Robert Kagan sounds a wake up call to the "democracies", summarising the potential perils of, amongst other things, the new-found power of Russia under Putin, of the growing economic clout of China, and the potential for mischief from the direction of India, also growing in influence within the international community.

Much of Kagan's presentation is irrefutable: Russia is able to intimidate other nations through its control of huge amounts of oil and gas, and its oligarchs are gobbling up energy companies in the West; China's voice in numerous international bodies does perpetuate any number of unsavoury regimes, from nearby Myanmar to Zimbabwe, and its holdings of US dollars have destabilising potential; India does indeed vacillate between blocs, apparently so as to play them off against each other.

But ultimately I couldn't help feeling that maybe in Kagan's conclusions regarding alliances of democracies against the "anti-democracies" had a little too much of the neocon Manifest Destiny message about it, and comes across as a little too cut and dried and unnuanced. It brought to mind the warnings of Japanese world domination by Paul Kennedy a couple of decades or so ago. Kennedy, like Kagan, has impeccable intellectual credentials, but overextrapolated.

So, agreed, there are some nasty forces at play in the world; they may possibly coalesce into a force that consumes capitalism as we know it; therefore be watchful, but rattling sabres right now may lead to nothing less than a self-fulfilling prophecy.


Baby it's a Wild World, 18 Jul 2008
This far-sighted examination of global politics identifies a new axis of evil rising in opposition to the West, based on rejection of democracy and the rule of law. Kagan predicts the return of nationalism and confrontation between the forces of democracy and autocracy. He believes that a nation's type of government instead of its culture, religion or geographic location will determine its global alignment. While not dismissing the terrorist threat, he does not consider it a primary menace as history proves that modernity has never lost against the traditionalism represented by the Islamists. That is true, but acts of terror might have unintended consequences in the development of state structures & the formation of alliances.

It's irresistible to compare Kagan's analysis with Margaret Thatcher's 2002 book Statecraft, in which she assessed the state of the globe and possible future trajectories. In chapters 3 and 4 Thatcher looks at Russia and China and India. Rogue states, religion and terrorism are discussed in chapter 6 with the emphasis on North Korea, Islam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran. Another relevant work, The New Cold War by Edward Lucas, corroborates Kagan's view. Russia is pursuing policies detrimental to its own citizens, neighboring states and the world at large. Lucas scrutinizes the ruling elite which emerged from the ranks of the old KGB. This dominant class harbors resentment against the West as a whole in an interesting parallel to the hostility of the Brussels Eurocracy towards the USA and Israel. The Russian government now openly competes with the West on the economic and political fronts.

Freedom of expression and the rule of law exist in name only; the state controls all the economic activity, political institutions and media that matter. Putin's term "managed" or "sovereign" democracy really means a revived Czarism. Despite Russia's demographic implosion, pervasive corruption and widespread lawlessness, it wages a new cold war through criminal actions against Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Georgia and the UK (in the Litvinenko case) and by supplying arms to rogue states Iran and Syria and their terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.

The Putin gang eagerly befriends all enemies of the West and it's becoming clear that Russia seeks an alliance with the Islamic world and a partial restoration of the Warsaw Pact through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which China is a member. The Kremlin ignores the long-term threat from China despite the particularly drastic demographic and infrastructural implosion in Russia's Far East. Russia's rejection of Western values promises to make it more barbaric internally and considerably more dangerous on the global stage. One may confidently expect it to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology and to support every oppressive regime that pollutes the planet.

It is pursuing an energy policy aimed at squeezing the liberal democracies through a gas cartel. An enlarged SCO that includes Iran, other Middle Eastern and African states like Libya and Sudan, plus Venezuela is a real possibility. The SCO will lock the Turkic speaking states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (plus Persian Tajikistan) firmly in the bear's embrace. The future role of Turkey will be crucial; it remains to be seen how its current pro-religious government will adapt its foreign policy in response to the country's certain exclusion from the European inner core. Economic ties to Europe are of course assured but it might significantly upgrade relations with the Central Asian states.

Kagan considers closer ties between the USA, India and Japan more important than a larger NATO role. Affirming the ideal expressed by Anne Bayefsky amongst others, Kagan calls for an international organization of democratic states. Perhaps he underestimates the ambition of the Brussels Eurocracy and its resentment of Israel and the US. Prospects for the closer union of a core group that includes Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and a few others look promising. Such a restructuring could be triggered by various factors such as the refusal of current member states to relinquish further sovereignty, severe economic problems or security concerns caused by terrorism or the behavior of Russia. Such a central Superstate will undoubtedly dictate the foreign policy of all Europe. By remaining a member, the UK will diminish the Anglosphere. A US alliance with India and Japan, on the other hand, might formidably enhance its influence and assure its strategic advantage of continued dominance over three of the world's oceans.

Isolationism is not an option anymore. Kagan's conclusions are markedly distinguished from those disproved notions of the 90s - Fukuyama's fatuous futurology and Huntington's culturally based theory. The paranoid and the resentful that demonized the "Hyperpower" will look back on the era of American "hegemony" with yearning and remorse once the dynamics of the new multipolar world become clear. How comfortable the decade of the Clintons now appears in the light of contemporary trends. Alarming as it may be, Kagan's message is the right medicine for identifying the formidable challenges of the future.


Worst of all possible worlds?, 18 Jul 2008
This is a perceptive and far-sighted examination on the state of global politics as the decade approaches its end, in the form of an extended essay. A new axis of evil is rising in opposition to the West, one not guided by a shared ideology except in so far as hostility to the rule of law and democracy might be considered ideological. Kagan predicts that the future will see the return of nationalism, growing tensions and confrontation between the forces of democracy and autocracy. What matters is a nation's nature of government, he observes, not its culture, religion or geographic location; and this will determine its international alignment. While not dismissing the terrorist threat, he does not consider it a primary menace as history proves that modernity has never lost against the traditionalism represented by the Islamists. True, but terrorism might have unintended consequences in the formation of alliances and the development of state structures.

It is interesting to compare Kagan's analysis with Margaret Thatcher's Statecraft, published in 2002, in which she assessed the state of the world and possible future trajectories. In chapters 3 and 4 of her book Thatcher looks at Russia and the Asian Giants China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) and India. Rogue states, religion and terrorism are discussed in chapter 6, with particular reference to North Korea, Islam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran. Another must-read: The New Cold War by Edward Lucas, already confirms Kagan's view. Russia is pursuing policies that threaten its own citizens, neighboring states and the world at large. Lucas takes a hard look at the ruling elite which emerged almost entirely from the ranks of the old KGB. This dominant class harbors resentment against the West as a whole in an interesting parallel to the hostility of the Brussels Eurocracy towards the USA and Israel. The Russian government now openly competes with the West on the economic and political fronts.

Freedom of expression and the rule of law exist in name only; the state controls all the economic activity, political institutions and media that matter. Putin's term "managed" or "sovereign" democracy really means a malignant form of Czarism. Despite Russia's demographic implosion, pervasive corruption and widespread lawlessness, a new cold war is being waged. Not only has the country displayed thuggish behavior against Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Georgia and the UK in the Litvinenko case, it is supplying arms to rogue states Iran and Syria and their terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. Anna Politkovskaya's A Russian Diary: A Journalist's Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin's Russia exposes the mentality and incompetence of the ruling class.

The geopolitical implications are staggering, as the Putin gang eagerly befriends all enemies of the West. Evidence is accumulating that Russia seeks an alliance with the Islamic world and a partial restoration of the Soviet Empire through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which China is a member. The Kremlin ignores the long-term threat from China despite the particularly drastic demographic and infrastructural implosion in Russia's Far East. Whatever other evils follow from Russia's abandonment of Western values, it is sure to become a more barbaric society for its citizens and a considerably more dangerous international player. One may confidently expect it to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology and to support every loathsome thugocracy that defiles the planet.

Russia is pursuing an energy policy aimed at strangling the liberal democracies by e.g. establishing a gas cartel. An expanded SCO that includes Iran, other Middle Eastern and African states like Libya and Sudan, plus Venezuela is a real possibility. Kagan correctly identifies it as a revived Warsaw Pact. The SCO will lock the Turkic speaking states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (plus Persian Tajikistan) firmly in the bear's embrace. The future role of Turkey will be crucial; it remains to be seen how its current pro-religious government will adapt its foreign policy as reaction to the country's certain exclusion from the European inner core. Economic ties to Europe are of course assured but the country might significantly upgrade relations with the Central Asian states and the SCO.

Kagan foresees closer future ties between the USA, India and Japan, rather than a larger role for NATO. Echoing the idea expressed in The UN and Beyond: United Democratic Nations (edited by Anne Bayefsky), Kagan proposes the same type of international organization consisting of democratic states co-coordinating their policies. Perhaps he underestimates the ambition of the Brussels Eurocracy and its resentment of the US. The likelihood of all 27 states uniting is slim, but prospects for closer union of a core group including Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and a few others are bright. Such a restructuring could be triggered by many factors like the refusal of current member states to relinquish further sovereignty, economic problems or security concerns. While retaining nominal autonomy, the other countries of Europe will undoubtedly accept the Superstate's foreign policy. The loss of the UK will diminish the Anglosphere whilst an alliance with India and Japan might formidably enhance its influence and assure its strategic advantage of continued dominance over three of the world's oceans.

One fact is certain: the USA follows the siren calls of isolationism at its great peril. And the paranoids that tried to demonize the "Hyperpower" will look back on the period of American "hegemony" with affection and nostalgia once the dynamics of the new multipolar world become clear. What distinguishes Kagan's conclusions from the discredited popular notions of the 90s - Fukuyama's fatuous futurology and Huntington's culturally based theory - is that elements of it have already begun to unfold. How comfortable the decade of the Clintons now seems in comparison to contemporary trends. Kagan's book is alarming and unsettling but a much needed tonic for identifying, and preparing for, the coming challenges.


Very good challenge to "clash of civilizations" theory, 14 Jun 2008
Kagan argues that the world is not divided by religion or race as Samuel Huntingdon's 'clash of civilizations' theory suggests and the modern trouble with Islam/West seems to vindicate. Rather he argues the real division in modern geopolitics is between democracies and autocracies, with places like the USA, Europe and Japan on one side, and countries like China, Russia and Iran on the other. As he explicitly states in the book, "But in today's world, a nation's form of government, not its `civilization' or its geographic location, maybe the best predictor of its geopolitical alignment". For example, China and Japan may have a shared Asian culture, but one is a democracy and the other is an autocracy, therefore, Japan will have more in common with another democracy, even if it is not culturally similar, that it will with China.

He argues that the autocracies are dangerous, not just because of their oppressive internal policies, but because they typically are experiencing rapid economic growth. This allows them to fund a more powerful and threatening military with which to threaten democracies: Russia's booming oil wealth has seen it pick fights with the EU and send nuclear bombers on training runs on Western cities, and China makes increasingly murderous demands on Taiwain. Also their economic success in the absence of democracy could lead other countries to emulate their autocratic rule as a means of imitating their success, and there are the beginnings of this in places like Venezuela.

Kagan acknowledges that one autocracy can have friction with another autocracy: for example, Russia and China may distrust each other over their mutual ambitions in Siberia. He also acknowledges that democracies can have friction with each other: for example, the bitter exchanges between the US and France on the eve of the Iraq war. However, Kagan's key point is that when push comes to shove, a democracy will always side with a democracy in conflict with an autocracy, and an autocracy will always side with an autocracy in a conflict with a democracy.

Perhaps most controversially, Kagan accuse the UN of sheltering autocracies under the guise of sovereignty. Also, China and Russia are permanent Security Council members with the veto, and thus can protect other client autocracies like Sudan and Turkmenistan from UN action. To solve this, Kagan advocates setting up a "League of Democracies", where democratic countries can co-ordinate policies for dealing with autocracies that compliment the UN, but which in fact will probably be an alternative to it. He claims the autocracies have already set up a "League of Autocracies" under the guise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which in his eyes is nothing more a Warsaw Pact for the 21st century which needs to be countered.

The book is not without weaknesses. Firstly, Kagan's plan for a League of Democracies is unconvincing on two levels. Firstly, it is hard to see how such a structure could be set up without it being seen as an alternative to the UN rather than a compliment. Secondly, democratic countries often have rivalries and friction with each other, for example France and America have a mutual hostility, and bitter memories of their clashes before the Iraq war. Kagan seems to dismiss these as trivial rivalries, but it is hard to see how such clashes would be avoided within his League of Democracies. Kagan's dismissive claim that democracies will overcome these due to greater fears of the autocracies are, in my view, unconvincing.

All in all, the book is an interesting overview of a reality that undoubtedly puzzles some political thinkers, and is well worth a read.


A witty and personal polemic, 30 Dec 2008

Many reviewers of this book - whether writing in newspapers or here on Amazon - seem to distort its arguments. I think (cross) leftists and (smug) rightists both want Cohen's conversion to be more dramatic than in fact it is. I'd skimmed through some of these reviews before reading "What's Left?" and was expecting his perspective to be close to that of, say, Melanie Phillips. But he hasn't abandoned the Left completely, only certain tendencies and views within the Left which he sees as sinister. He has been characterised by some reviewers as a fan of Bush and an unequivocal supporter of the second Iraq war. But this clearly isn't the position he sets out in "What's Left?"

The book is polemical and aimed at general readers, and clearly Cohen has had to shape and select his material in the most rhetorically effective way. Sometimes I felt the argument had been flattened, a middle position excluded. Yet on the whole I thought "What's Left?" was nuanced, thoughtful and consistently absorbing.


What's Left? Not Nick Cohen, 18 Dec 2008
I can't help but get annoyed at nearly every book, article or other piece of work this man does. What person to the left spends more time criticising the left than the right? Nick Cohen sure as hell does. Furthermore, Nick Cohen's objection here is almost solely to do with his unconditional support for Israel. He sees that an alliance between British muslims (and by that I don't mean extremists) and the left (whether it be centre-left or further to the left) could mean a shift in UK policy in favour of Palestine at the expense of Israel retaining the occupied territories. Public opinion suggests that a large majority of British people want to see an independent Palestine. Nick Cohen is trying to undermine that with a very well written but hideously flawed piece.

Serious political writing, 05 Dec 2008
An uncompromising take on the state of the left wing today. Cohen does not shirk from calling the left wing lily livered where he feels appropriate.

He reviews the burning issues of our time and takes the left to task for what he sees as its failings. He is particularly astute on academics and what they write.

This is by no means an easy read, nor is it intended to be. What it is is serious political writing from a hard hitting heavyweight, which demands and rewards perseverance on the part of the reader. That does mean, however, that, for all the good intentions and high-quality research, the audience for the book is likely to be limited.

Late You Come But Still You Come, 16 Sep 2008
Like many who start out on the left, Nick Cohen was an idealist.
He'd like to have stayed that way; it's just that that pesky old human nature, and the immutable laws of life, kept getting in the way.
'What's Left' is a readable and enjoyable journey through one man's realisation that what he thought was cast iron, solid gold fact isn't.
His isn't as important or dramatic a conversion as that of - say - David Horowitz, but it's important, nonetheless.
I'd recomment this book to anyone struggling with the evidence of his or her own eyes - decaying streets while crime is 'lower than ever', shocking educational standards while education is 'better than ever', soldiers dying in wars where not a round was supposed to have been fired... it might tip you over the edge.
Oh, and read those two one star reviews for the sound and smell of panic among the diehards.

High Time, 02 May 2008
At last, a writer who isn't afraid to challenge the posturing of a now ridiculous 'liberal left', a loose political grouping who really should have the collective intelligence to know better. Until recently I've counted myself as one of them but now I just feel ashamed. This fine writer will tell you why. But one of his chapter titles, 'Kill us, we deserve it', pretty well sums it all up.

Cohen's analysis is as sober as it is disturbing and I read this book well into the night, as gripped as by any thriller. He also writes lucidly, an especial advantage and in direct contrast to the disappointing traditions of inpenetrable prose by many leftist thinkers.

Nick Cohen, given his fine liberal background, is a brave man to have written this book. He has had the courage to stand up and be counted and should be applauded for it.

A must read!, 05 Dec 2008
The War on Terror is a concern for us all, and understanding it is imperitive. Of course our governments make mistakes and do some very illiberal things, but there are plenty of writers, good and awful who document that. What this book analyses is the ideology of totalitarian islam and pan-arabism, the dangerous conclusion of moral relativsim, and also why we cannot reason with these people. It is monumental work that gets some real intellectual spunk into this highly misinformed debate, where the winner seems to have the most appealing linguistics, this book wins on all counts. Read it, it might change you.

Brilliant!, 02 Sep 2006
Considering the current situation around the world, Paul Berman's book is one of the finest in print. The background material is laid out clearly and convincingly. I stopped taking notes because I found I was just copying everything written. Each sentence holds so much truth and gives you a better understanding of what terror and liberalism really mean. Once the concept of totalitarianism is spelled out your eyes are opened and you can see what your politicians and news moguls do not want you to see. A brave book from a brilliant author. Read it!

A guide to the post 9/11 era, 04 Mar 2005
Paul Berman wrote a compelling book about the dangers that current terrorism provide for the cause of freedom and liberalism. This case - that there are forces that are at war with liberalism and that we need to rise up to the challenge - has been made enough by some commentators but not heard enough, especially in some circles and through the major media channels. In particular, in Europe such a case has been often derided as simply an ad hoc justification for an 'imperialist war' or, when recognised for what it is, an unnecessary war on terror. Paul Berman is no neo-conservative. Actually in the preface he raises the question whether this book should position itself on the left or right side of the political spectrum. The author clearly would like to put himself on the moderate left side, but makes often argument that are heard more from commentators on the moderate right side. The reason is simple: with regard to the current 'terror war', there is no right or left, but only a liberal society and its enemies. Berman traces the history of this clash, between liberty and totalitarianism, back a century, to First World, Second world war and the cold war. Liberalism has fought many enemies, and many faces of the same enemy. We need to recognise terrorists for what they are and they they, those who harbour them, and dictators are the enemy of liberalism, under another face maybe, but animated by the same avulsion for our principles of freedom and equality as previous totalitarianisms, such as nazism and communism, were. The fact that this call to arms comes from somebody that would like to place himself on the left side is even more encouraging, as today there are too many people willing to deny the reality of our world and indulge themselves in wishful thinking. And here is the second main contribution of this book. The denunciation of the wishful thinking of some - not to say most - of the people on the left (and some on the right too, but to a far lesser degree). The author draw parallels from recent history; as socialists in France took a sympathetic view of Hitler in the 1930s (because they were opposed to war in any circumstance), and most of the left were more than sympathetic with communism during the Cold War, so today, opponents of war fail to recognise the dangers we are facing. Berman does not fail to criticise American foreign policy when it's needed (he understands the current administration foreign policy strategy better than most other people); and it does not fail to criticise the failure of liberalism when they happens ("the totalitarian movements arise because of failures in the liberal civilisation"). However, it is also clearly states what we should be for: we are the anti-nihilists, we are for the freedom for others. And this is way this book should be read by everybody interested in understanding what is happening today; in particular it should be read by those who two years ago demonstrated against the Iraq invasion. Some of them had good and sensible reasons to oppose the invasion (some others did not), but the irony was clear: "the largest mass demonstrations in the history of the world were aimed at preventing the overthrow of one of the worst tyrannies in the modern age". We should be for the freedom of others.

Appeasement or intervention, 14 Nov 2004
Terrorism and suicide attacks have a long history across the world. Berman is analysing the cultural foundations of totalitarian thought, which is leading states as well as dissident groups to commit acts of terror - carefully targeted or randomly causing the maximum number of casualties. In a mostly balanced discussion, Berman talks us through Camus' reaction to holocaust and gulag, "The Rebel", tracing back apocalyptic visions in Christian thought to the Book of Revelation: a realm of purity to be built by murderous struggle.
In response to Tariq Ramadan's contention that Islamic civilisation cannot be understood in Western terms of reference, Berman then examines the writings of one of the most influential Muslim fundamentalist writers, Sayyid Qutb, contrasting Camus' tales of rebellion with Islamic pledges for submission. What we see, though, is not the independent development of isolated civilisations: Arab and Islamic revivalism at the beginning of the twentieth century is profoundly influenced by European Socialism and, soon, National Socialism (Berman does not mention the even earlier wave of nationalism, shortly after Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in1798). Qutb himself acknowledged Western cultural influences, through readings and during a short visit as a student in the USA, which left him with admiration for scientific progress, but deeply appalled by what he saw as moral depravity. Berman understands Qutb's call for a Holy War to establish an authentic Islamic community as another manifestation of western totalitarian ideologies aimed at creating a perfect, utopian society, the "End of History", the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, brought about by a small vanguard of fighters prepared to die (the latter supported by Cold War aids from the West).
But then, disappointingly, in a single phrase on page 129, Berman takes sides, turning the experience of failed appeasement confronting Nazi aggression in the 1930s against support for Palestinian struggle for a viable state today: "Clinton's principal negotiator, Dennis Ross, has explained that, in the offer to Arafat, the new Palestinian state was going to be contiguous, except for the Gaza strip." The official map depicting the Oslo agreement has been published on countless websites; it seems Berman is giving the term "contiguous" a wholly new meaning. Thus, denying any possible rational argument for liberal understanding of suicide bombers, Berman is bringing in a psychoanalytical explanation ("sheerest speculation", he admits), with de Sade, Baudelaire, and Camus: "the sinister excites". His hopes lie with liberal thinkers raising their voices from withi