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Customer Reviews
Perfect introduction to a complex and profound subject, 06 Jul 2008
The relationship between mind and body, and the tremendous difficulty of explaining that relationship, has been a central theme in modern philosophy since Descartes' famous 'cogito ergo sum'. In the subsequent centuries the entire heavy artillary of analytical philosophy has been brought to bear, categorical mistakes have been claimed, behavourist theories championed, yet the awkard I stubbornly remains, peering out at the world. A bundle of neurons and synapses themselves composed of randomly spinning atoms and electrons, somehow able to ask questions 'why am I? who am I? What am I?'.
Recently however, the problem of mind has taken on a new academic guise - the study of consciousness. The ancient riddle has been reframed into a seemingly narrower and more fundamental question - the problem of how physical matter be self-aware, how can the brain think and feel? The central question may have become more focused, yet suddenly it is not just the philosophers who are discussing it. The study of consciousness is now truly a multi-disciplinary subject, drawing in experts in psychology and neuro-science amonst others. Suddenly a subject so old and profound appears to be one of the most exciting fields in academia. One that might even be on the verge of providing answers that would transform our very sense of self and identity.
Susan Blackmore does a remarkably good job here of introducing such a complex and wideranging subject. You really do get a sense of what the question is and just why it is so challenging. Not only that but you should get a feel of why the subject is particularly exciting at the moment and for those versed in the 'traditional' formulations of the philosophy of mind, this book stands as testamant to the fact that the study of consciousness is really a subject in its own right now.
Having said all that, this book (and others by Susan Blackmore) really should come with a government health warning. I've read David Hume's reflections on the illusory nature of the self, as well as some of those of Eastern Philosophy. Like Hume, I feel largely able to set aside such considerations as soon as I attend to other matters. Reading Blackmore, I really do feel a little shaken. I can give up the idea of a concrete self lurking behind my eyes controlling my fingers as I type this review, but when plausible argument after plausible argument chips away at the belief in consciousness itself, or at least our faith that there is a stream of consciousness, then the effect is rather more disturbing and profound.
Blackmore introduces all the main theories relating to consciousness here, in a very readable and succinct manner. You are fully made aware of her own viewpoint, but that is not a bad thing, as they are clearly put in contrast with the others and in a way that helps you come to your own conclusion, though as I just said, it may leave you a little unsettled.
Though the stream of consciousness mayby some kind of 'grand illusion' as Blackmore and of course Daniel Dennet quite persuasively argue for, its not clear that the problem of explaining consciousness is in anyway diminished. No matter how many insignificant little pieces you try to break conscious awareness into, the fundamental problem still remains : how does physical matter achieve any consciousness at all?
A must read introduction for those interested in the study of consciousness and the philosophy of mind. I'd also fully recomend her longer introduction (as a follow up) which has student exercises and chapter summaries etc. Just take care!
A great little primer on the subject, 18 Oct 2007
A terrific little book that should only have taken me a few hours to read, but instead took a week because I frequently stopped to ponder the philosophically challenging examples she uses. I thought I already knew the subject reasonably well, but there's plenty in this small volume I found new and challenging.
Well worth reading her other book too: Conversations on Consciousness in which she talks to several leading figures in the field, and where her own biases on the subject rub up against theirs.
Very easy to read, with illustrations and no jargon. Heartily recommended!
"The subjective experience is only a fleeting event that gives rise to a delusion.", 25 Sep 2007
And what's worse, "If you go on believing you are always conscious, and construct metaphors about streams and theatres, then you only dig yourself deeper and deeper into confusion."
First we're introduced to the influence of specific brain regions on consciousness. So the temporal cortex is responsible for our changing perceptions, whilst the visual cortex simply processes retinal input which is interpreted later. All this might suggest the temporal cortex is more `subjective', but as Blackmore points out, "correlations alone do not solve the mystery... how can some cells give rise to subjective experience and some not?"
Delving deeper into the brain only confuses the issue though. It turns out that much of what we think we're conscious of is in fact illusion. Chapters 3 & 4 concentrate on these illusions. Libet's `neuronal adequacy for consciousness', the cutaneous rabbit experiment, daydreaming and such are all pulled in to break up William James' good old-fashioned stream-of-consciousness theory. Some visual games emphasise how much of our sensory world is constructed; inattentional blindness and Ramachandran's `filling-in' are the main culprits.
With all these thrown at our sense of the world, Blackmore then proceeds towards our concept of the self. Most religions and common sense generally perceive a continuous I, a self, in relation to the world; this is ego-theory. Against this is Buddhism and the 18th century Scot, David Hume, who said that the self is more like a "bundle of sensations" threaded together by memory and relationships. The self then becomes a "centre of narrative gravity", "a useful fiction" for relating experiences to each other. But though Bundle theory is useful in relation to some strange neurophysiological effects, it soes remain deeply counter-intuitive.
Finally, even our sense of free-will is preceded by electrical stimuli, shown in Libet's `consciousness-timing' experiments, leading psychologists to produce true-order diagrams for thought processes along the lines of, 1) the brain begins planning an action, 2) the brain activity leads to thought about the action, 3) we assume the thoughts caused the action. She concedes by the end that Dennett's `multiple draft' theory may be the closest have to understanding all of what we don't know; the brain plays out parallel translations of the world of its own accord and not until it's asked to account for its experience does it bother at all with consciousness. In this way maintaining consciousness becomes (for Blackmore at least) a matter of application, of repeating Zen koan-style questions, like `Am I conscious now?', or `Who am I?', etc.
Overall, this is a good read. The visual games (like those of the VSI to the Brain) are a good, cheap laugh, and the sheer number of theories sketched show just how confused consciousness studies is at the moment. The only gripe is that the theories are spread about between the chapters rather than coherently stated and contrasted. Blackmore's priority is the brain and the faculties of consciousness it attends to, only sprinkling along the way parts of related theories which by the end became, for me, confused and nebulous. Anyway, good for prodding your bonce. Definitely recommended.
Understanding consciousness: A brief review, 29 Aug 2007
What is consciousness? How do a set of electrical responses of millions of brain cells produce private, subjective conscious experience? Several theories have been proposed, and they include, grand unifying theories, quantum mechanical theories, biophysical/neurochemical mechanisms, philosophical, and spiritual theories. None of these completely explain the relationship between mind and brain (body), or subjective and objective thoughts. That is, the way things seem to me as opposed to how they should be objectively; in other words, the theory has to explain how subjective experience arises from objective brains? How billions of interconnections of neurons produce perception, learning, memory, reasoning, language, and finally consciousness. Different areas of brain perform different functions, such as, vision, hearing, speech, body image, motor control, and many other tasks. They are linked to each other but not into one control processor to produce consciousness. For example, pain is visible to a certain extent, but one can not fully comprehend another person's pain unless one experience that pain oneself.
Throughout history, philosophers and scientists proposed some form of dualism that mind and brain are different, however, some scientists prefer monism; the mind and body are one and the same, but this does not explain a consistent physical world. A third form preferred by physicists is materialism, which makes matter most fundamental. This also does not explain how a physical brain (matter) can give rise conscious experience. It is also unclear if consciousness is a power (energy) or a force but the laws physics relate each other.
Could consciousness lags behind the events of the world? The experimental results of Benjamin Libet are discussed (chapter 3) in light of dualist theories, quantum mechanics, Higher order of thought (HOT) theory, and Global workplace theory. Each theory offers explanation for certain aspect of consciousness, but eludes from addressing the subjectivity experience. In chapter 4, there is a brief discussion of weather consciousness is a grand illusion: Much of this concept depends on individual visual awareness. In chapter 5, the spirit, self and souls are discussed in light of many theories. The Upanishads, the sacred scriptures of Hindus, and Buddhist philosophy propose self is as an independent entity, but modern philosophers such as David Hume claim that self is a bundle of sensations. The experimental results of psychologists Roger Perry, Michael Gazzaniga, and Earnest Hilgard have been discussed. Most theories equate self with a particular brain process, but fail to explain the relationship of self with consciousness. Chapter 6 discusses the origin of free will that makes the decision or expresses willingness, is that inner self or due to power of consciousness? Since all events in the universe are deterministic, i.e. all events are determined by prior events. It follows that everything happens in future is inevitable; hence no room for free will! However some philosophers argue that deterministic process is chaotic and outcomes are complex, which may not be predictable. Therefore both determinism and free will could coexist independently. Many psychologists believe that free will is an illusion. In chapter 7, altered states of consciousness, due to sleep and dream, psychoactive drugs, stimulants, out of body experiences, and meditation are discussed in relation to mind and consciousness. The last chapter presents an interesting discussion about the evolution of consciousness and examines if animals have consciousness. The author presents arguments in favor of lack of consciousness in animals because they do not have language skills. It is proposed that language and mathematical skills coupled with deep thoughts help humans to communicate about past, present and future that may confer consciousness. This argument is unclear since the term consciousness itself needs to be defined. This book is well written and it is recommended.
A great scientist takes a wrong turning, 12 Aug 2007
I first encountered Blackmore when, after searching long and hard for a scientific explanation of out-of-body experiences, I came across her book Beyond the Body. It was astonishingly well researched and offered a rational, convincing explanation for phenomena that were usually neglected by the scientific community. I became an instant fan and have followed her work ever since. But now, alas, she has aligned herself with the Dawkins/Dennett axis of drivel, and my loyalty to her is badly shaken. In this book (a shorter version of her Consciousness: An Introduction) she follows Dennett by denying the existence of consciousness and then indulging in much speculation about the properties and evolutionary history of this non-existent entity. Consciousness, she maintains, is an 'illusion', which she defines as something that exists but does not have the properties it appears to have. She then proceeds to discuss it as if it does not in fact exist, and slips into calling it a 'delusion', which she apparently regards as a synonymous term. So far, so Dennett. She follows Dawkins by labeling just about everything a 'meme' (as Poe might have said 'All that we see or seem is but a meme within a meme'), unless she happens not to approve of it, in which case it is 'a virus of the mind'. As an example, she indulges in a quite intemperate and completely irrelevant rant against religion, in which Roman Catholicism is described as a parasitic infection. Like Dennett and Dawkins, she leaves no axe unground.
So why do I give the book 5 stars if I disagree with so much of it? Well, I guess you can't keep a good scientist down, and Blackmore is still a great scientist. She brings considerable knowledge and erudition to the subject, presents fair summaries of opposing views, and gives excellent descriptions of odd phenomena like Libet's Delay and the Cutaneous Rabbit. And her style is as readable as ever. I was suspicious when I saw that her son Jolyon had contributed many of the illustrations - it smacked of nepotism - but I have to say his drawings are really charming and add greatly to the text. The other illustrations are useful too - with the possible exception of a photograph of the author opening a fridge door - which isn't always the case with this series. The book ends with a very useful Further Reading list. It's thus an excellent introduction to the subject (although I think John Searle's The Mystery of Consciousness is still the best place to start).
So, I shall keep the faith and continue to read everything Susan Blackmore publishes. I just hope that one day, just as she once abandoned a belief in the paranormal, she sees the light and abandons the axis of drivel.
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Principles of Development
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Lewis WolpertJim SmithTom JessellPeter LawrenceElizabeth RobertsonElliot Meyerowitz;
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*Amazon: £26.99
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Customer Reviews
Perfect introduction to a complex and profound subject, 06 Jul 2008
The relationship between mind and body, and the tremendous difficulty of explaining that relationship, has been a central theme in modern philosophy since Descartes' famous 'cogito ergo sum'. In the subsequent centuries the entire heavy artillary of analytical philosophy has been brought to bear, categorical mistakes have been claimed, behavourist theories championed, yet the awkard I stubbornly remains, peering out at the world. A bundle of neurons and synapses themselves composed of randomly spinning atoms and electrons, somehow able to ask questions 'why am I? who am I? What am I?'.
Recently however, the problem of mind has taken on a new academic guise - the study of consciousness. The ancient riddle has been reframed into a seemingly narrower and more fundamental question - the problem of how physical matter be self-aware, how can the brain think and feel? The central question may have become more focused, yet suddenly it is not just the philosophers who are discussing it. The study of consciousness is now truly a multi-disciplinary subject, drawing in experts in psychology and neuro-science amonst others. Suddenly a subject so old and profound appears to be one of the most exciting fields in academia. One that might even be on the verge of providing answers that would transform our very sense of self and identity.
Susan Blackmore does a remarkably good job here of introducing such a complex and wideranging subject. You really do get a sense of what the question is and just why it is so challenging. Not only that but you should get a feel of why the subject is particularly exciting at the moment and for those versed in the 'traditional' formulations of the philosophy of mind, this book stands as testamant to the fact that the study of consciousness is really a subject in its own right now.
Having said all that, this book (and others by Susan Blackmore) really should come with a government health warning. I've read David Hume's reflections on the illusory nature of the self, as well as some of those of Eastern Philosophy. Like Hume, I feel largely able to set aside such considerations as soon as I attend to other matters. Reading Blackmore, I really do feel a little shaken. I can give up the idea of a concrete self lurking behind my eyes controlling my fingers as I type this review, but when plausible argument after plausible argument chips away at the belief in consciousness itself, or at least our faith that there is a stream of consciousness, then the effect is rather more disturbing and profound.
Blackmore introduces all the main theories relating to consciousness here, in a very readable and succinct manner. You are fully made aware of her own viewpoint, but that is not a bad thing, as they are clearly put in contrast with the others and in a way that helps you come to your own conclusion, though as I just said, it may leave you a little unsettled.
Though the stream of consciousness mayby some kind of 'grand illusion' as Blackmore and of course Daniel Dennet quite persuasively argue for, its not clear that the problem of explaining consciousness is in anyway diminished. No matter how many insignificant little pieces you try to break conscious awareness into, the fundamental problem still remains : how does physical matter achieve any consciousness at all?
A must read introduction for those interested in the study of consciousness and the philosophy of mind. I'd also fully recomend her longer introduction (as a follow up) which has student exercises and chapter summaries etc. Just take care!
A great little primer on the subject, 18 Oct 2007
A terrific little book that should only have taken me a few hours to read, but instead took a week because I frequently stopped to ponder the philosophically challenging examples she uses. I thought I already knew the subject reasonably well, but there's plenty in this small volume I found new and challenging.
Well worth reading her other book too: Conversations on Consciousness in which she talks to several leading figures in the field, and where her own biases on the subject rub up against theirs.
Very easy to read, with illustrations and no jargon. Heartily recommended!
"The subjective experience is only a fleeting event that gives rise to a delusion.", 25 Sep 2007
And what's worse, "If you go on believing you are always conscious, and construct metaphors about streams and theatres, then you only dig yourself deeper and deeper into confusion."
First we're introduced to the influence of specific brain regions on consciousness. So the temporal cortex is responsible for our changing perceptions, whilst the visual cortex simply processes retinal input which is interpreted later. All this might suggest the temporal cortex is more `subjective', but as Blackmore points out, "correlations alone do not solve the mystery... how can some cells give rise to subjective experience and some not?"
Delving deeper into the brain only confuses the issue though. It turns out that much of what we think we're conscious of is in fact illusion. Chapters 3 & 4 concentrate on these illusions. Libet's `neuronal adequacy for consciousness', the cutaneous rabbit experiment, daydreaming and such are all pulled in to break up William James' good old-fashioned stream-of-consciousness theory. Some visual games emphasise how much of our sensory world is constructed; inattentional blindness and Ramachandran's `filling-in' are the main culprits.
With all these thrown at our sense of the world, Blackmore then proceeds towards our concept of the self. Most religions and common sense generally perceive a continuous I, a self, in relation to the world; this is ego-theory. Against this is Buddhism and the 18th century Scot, David Hume, who said that the self is more like a "bundle of sensations" threaded together by memory and relationships. The self then becomes a "centre of narrative gravity", "a useful fiction" for relating experiences to each other. But though Bundle theory is useful in relation to some strange neurophysiological effects, it soes remain deeply counter-intuitive.
Finally, even our sense of free-will is preceded by electrical stimuli, shown in Libet's `consciousness-timing' experiments, leading psychologists to produce true-order diagrams for thought processes along the lines of, 1) the brain begins planning an action, 2) the brain activity leads to thought about the action, 3) we assume the thoughts caused the action. She concedes by the end that Dennett's `multiple draft' theory may be the closest have to understanding all of what we don't know; the brain plays out parallel translations of the world of its own accord and not until it's asked to account for its experience does it bother at all with consciousness. In this way maintaining consciousness becomes (for Blackmore at least) a matter of application, of repeating Zen koan-style questions, like `Am I conscious now?', or `Who am I?', etc.
Overall, this is a good read. The visual games (like those of the VSI to the Brain) are a good, cheap laugh, and the sheer number of theories sketched show just how confused consciousness studies is at the moment. The only gripe is that the theories are spread about between the chapters rather than coherently stated and contrasted. Blackmore's priority is the brain and the faculties of consciousness it attends to, only sprinkling along the way parts of related theories which by the end became, for me, confused and nebulous. Anyway, good for prodding your bonce. Definitely recommended.
Understanding consciousness: A brief review, 29 Aug 2007
What is consciousness? How do a set of electrical responses of millions of brain cells produce private, subjective conscious experience? Several theories have been proposed, and they include, grand unifying theories, quantum mechanical theories, biophysical/neurochemical mechanisms, philosophical, and spiritual theories. None of these completely explain the relationship between mind and brain (body), or subjective and objective thoughts. That is, the way things seem to me as opposed to how they should be objectively; in other words, the theory has to explain how subjective experience arises from objective brains? How billions of interconnections of neurons produce perception, learning, memory, reasoning, language, and finally consciousness. Different areas of brain perform different functions, such as, vision, hearing, speech, body image, motor control, and many other tasks. They are linked to each other but not into one control processor to produce consciousness. For example, pain is visible to a certain extent, but one can not fully comprehend another person's pain unless one experience that pain oneself.
Throughout history, philosophers and scientists proposed some form of dualism that mind and brain are different, however, some scientists prefer monism; the mind and body are one and the same, but this does not explain a consistent physical world. A third form preferred by physicists is materialism, which makes matter most fundamental. This also does not explain how a physical brain (matter) can give rise conscious experience. It is also unclear if consciousness is a power (energy) or a force but the laws physics relate each other.
Could consciousness lags behind the events of the world? The experimental results of Benjamin Libet are discussed (chapter 3) in light of dualist theories, quantum mechanics, Higher order of thought (HOT) theory, and Global workplace theory. Each theory offers explanation for certain aspect of consciousness, but eludes from addressing the subjectivity experience. In chapter 4, there is a brief discussion of weather consciousness is a grand illusion: Much of this concept depends on individual visual awareness. In chapter 5, the spirit, self and souls are discussed in light of many theories. The Upanishads, the sacred scriptures of Hindus, and Buddhist philosophy propose self is as an independent entity, but modern philosophers such as David Hume claim that self is a bundle of sensations. The experimental results of psychologists Roger Perry, Michael Gazzaniga, and Earnest Hilgard have been discussed. Most theories equate self with a particular brain process, but fail to explain the relationship of self with consciousness. Chapter 6 discusses the origin of free will that makes the decision or expresses willingness, is that inner self or due to power of consciousness? Since all events in the universe are deterministic, i.e. all events are determined by prior events. It follows that everything happens in future is inevitable; hence no room for free will! However some philosophers argue that deterministic process is chaotic and outcomes are complex, which may not be predictable. Therefore both determinism and free will could coexist independently. Many psychologists believe that free will is an illusion. In chapter 7, altered states of consciousness, due to sleep and dream, psychoactive drugs, stimulants, out of body experiences, and meditation are discussed in relation to mind and consciousness. The last chapter presents an interesting discussion about the evolution of consciousness and examines if animals have consciousness. The author presents arguments in favor of lack of consciousness in animals because they do not have language skills. It is proposed that language and mathematical skills coupled with deep thoughts help humans to communicate about past, present and future that may confer consciousness. This argument is unclear since the term consciousness itself needs to be defined. This book is well written and it is recommended.
A great scientist takes a wrong turning, 12 Aug 2007
I first encountered Blackmore when, after searching long and hard for a scientific explanation of out-of-body experiences, I came across her book Beyond the Body. It was astonishingly well researched and offered a rational, convincing explanation for phenomena that were usually neglected by the scientific community. I became an instant fan and have followed her work ever since. But now, alas, she has aligned herself with the Dawkins/Dennett axis of drivel, and my loyalty to her is badly shaken. In this book (a shorter version of her Consciousness: An Introduction) she follows Dennett by denying the existence of consciousness and then indulging in much speculation about the properties and evolutionary history of this non-existent entity. Consciousness, she maintains, is an 'illusion', which she defines as something that exists but does not have the properties it appears to have. She then proceeds to discuss it as if it does not in fact exist, and slips into calling it a 'delusion', which she apparently regards as a synonymous term. So far, so Dennett. She follows Dawkins by labeling just about everything a 'meme' (as Poe might have said 'All that we see or seem is but a meme within a meme'), unless she happens not to approve of it, in which case it is 'a virus of the mind'. As an example, she indulges in a quite intemperate and completely irrelevant rant against religion, in which Roman Catholicism is described as a parasitic infection. Like Dennett and Dawkins, she leaves no axe unground.
So why do I give the book 5 stars if I disagree with so much of it? Well, I guess you can't keep a good scientist down, and Blackmore is still a great scientist. She brings considerable knowledge and erudition to the subject, presents fair summaries of opposing views, and gives excellent descriptions of odd phenomena like Libet's Delay and the Cutaneous Rabbit. And her style is as readable as ever. I was suspicious when I saw that her son Jolyon had contributed many of the illustrations - it smacked of nepotism - but I have to say his drawings are really charming and add greatly to the text. The other illustrations are useful too - with the possible exception of a photograph of the author opening a fridge door - which isn't always the case with this series. The book ends with a very useful Further Reading list. It's thus an excellent introduction to the subject (although I think John Searle's The Mystery of Consciousness is still the best place to start).
So, I shall keep the faith and continue to read everything Susan Blackmore publishes. I just hope that one day, just as she once abandoned a belief in the paranormal, she sees the light and abandons the axis of drivel.
A development book that actually makes sense!, 30 Apr 2000
Presents the information in a logical and understandable way, as opposed to many alternatives out there that manage to make it all more complicated than it needs to be.
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Customer Reviews
Perfect introduction to a complex and profound subject, 06 Jul 2008
The relationship between mind and body, and the tremendous difficulty of explaining that relationship, has been a central theme in modern philosophy since Descartes' famous 'cogito ergo sum'. In the subsequent centuries the entire heavy artillary of analytical philosophy has been brought to bear, categorical mistakes have been claimed, behavourist theories championed, yet the awkard I stubbornly remains, peering out at the world. A bundle of neurons and synapses themselves composed of randomly spinning atoms and electrons, somehow able to ask questions 'why am I? who am I? What am I?'.
Recently however, the problem of mind has taken on a new academic guise - the study of consciousness. The ancient riddle has been reframed into a seemingly narrower and more fundamental question - the problem of how physical matter be self-aware, how can the brain think and feel? The central question may have become more focused, yet suddenly it is not just the philosophers who are discussing it. The study of consciousness is now truly a multi-disciplinary subject, drawing in experts in psychology and neuro-science amonst others. Suddenly a subject so old and profound appears to be one of the most exciting fields in academia. One that might even be on the verge of providing answers that would transform our very sense of self and identity.
Susan Blackmore does a remarkably good job here of introducing such a complex and wideranging subject. You really do get a sense of what the question is and just why it is so challenging. Not only that but you should get a feel of why the subject is particularly exciting at the moment and for those versed in the 'traditional' formulations of the philosophy of mind, this book stands as testamant to the fact that the study of consciousness is really a subject in its own right now.
Having said all that, this book (and others by Susan Blackmore) really should come with a government health warning. I've read David Hume's reflections on the illusory nature of the self, as well as some of those of Eastern Philosophy. Like Hume, I feel largely able to set aside such considerations as soon as I attend to other matters. Reading Blackmore, I really do feel a little shaken. I can give up the idea of a concrete self lurking behind my eyes controlling my fingers as I type this review, but when plausible argument after plausible argument chips away at the belief in consciousness itself, or at least our faith that there is a stream of consciousness, then the effect is rather more disturbing and profound.
Blackmore introduces all the main theories relating to consciousness here, in a very readable and succinct manner. You are fully made aware of her own viewpoint, but that is not a bad thing, as they are clearly put in contrast with the others and in a way that helps you come to your own conclusion, though as I just said, it may leave you a little unsettled.
Though the stream of consciousness mayby some kind of 'grand illusion' as Blackmore and of course Daniel Dennet quite persuasively argue for, its not clear that the problem of explaining consciousness is in anyway diminished. No matter how many insignificant little pieces you try to break conscious awareness into, the fundamental problem still remains : how does physical matter achieve any consciousness at all?
A must read introduction for those interested in the study of consciousness and the philosophy of mind. I'd also fully recomend her longer introduction (as a follow up) which has student exercises and chapter summaries etc. Just take care!
A great little primer on the subject, 18 Oct 2007
A terrific little book that should only have taken me a few hours to read, but instead took a week because I frequently stopped to ponder the philosophically challenging examples she uses. I thought I already knew the subject reasonably well, but there's plenty in this small volume I found new and challenging.
Well worth reading her other book too: Conversations on Consciousness in which she talks to several leading figures in the field, and where her own biases on the subject rub up against theirs.
Very easy to read, with illustrations and no jargon. Heartily recommended!
"The subjective experience is only a fleeting event that gives rise to a delusion.", 25 Sep 2007
And what's worse, "If you go on believing you are always conscious, and construct metaphors about streams and theatres, then you only dig yourself deeper and deeper into confusion."
First we're introduced to the influence of specific brain regions on consciousness. So the temporal cortex is responsible for our changing perceptions, whilst the visual cortex simply processes retinal input which is interpreted later. All this might suggest the temporal cortex is more `subjective', but as Blackmore points out, "correlations alone do not solve the mystery... how can some cells give rise to subjective experience and some not?"
Delving deeper into the brain only confuses the issue though. It turns out that much of what we think we're conscious of is in fact illusion. Chapters 3 & 4 concentrate on these illusions. Libet's `neuronal adequacy for consciousness', the cutaneous rabbit experiment, daydreaming and such are all pulled in to break up William James' good old-fashioned stream-of-consciousness theory. Some visual games emphasise how much of our sensory world is constructed; inattentional blindness and Ramachandran's `filling-in' are the main culprits.
With all these thrown at our sense of the world, Blackmore then proceeds towards our concept of the self. Most religions and common sense generally perceive a continuous I, a self, in relation to the world; this is ego-theory. Against this is Buddhism and the 18th century Scot, David Hume, who said that the self is more like a "bundle of sensations" threaded together by memory and relationships. The self then becomes a "centre of narrative gravity", "a useful fiction" for relating experiences to each other. But though Bundle theory is useful in relation to some strange neurophysiological effects, it soes remain deeply counter-intuitive.
Finally, even our sense of free-will is preceded by electrical stimuli, shown in Libet's `consciousness-timing' experiments, leading psychologists to produce true-order diagrams for thought processes along the lines of, 1) the brain begins planning an action, 2) the brain activity leads to thought about the action, 3) we assume the thoughts caused the action. She concedes by the end that Dennett's `multiple draft' theory may be the closest have to understanding all of what we don't know; the brain plays out parallel translations of the world of its own accord and not until it's asked to account for its experience does it bother at all with consciousness. In this way maintaining consciousness becomes (for Blackmore at least) a matter of application, of repeating Zen koan-style questions, like `Am I conscious now?', or `Who am I?', etc.
Overall, this is a good read. The visual games (like those of the VSI to the Brain) are a good, cheap laugh, and the sheer number of theories sketched show just how confused consciousness studies is at the moment. The only gripe is that the theories are spread about between the chapters rather than coherently stated and contrasted. Blackmore's priority is the brain and the faculties of consciousness it attends to, only sprinkling along the way parts of related theories which by the end became, for me, confused and nebulous. Anyway, good for prodding your bonce. Definitely recommended.
Understanding consciousness: A brief review, 29 Aug 2007
What is consciousness? How do a set of electrical responses of millions of brain cells produce private, subjective conscious experience? Several theories have been proposed, and they include, grand unifying theories, quantum mechanical theories, biophysical/neurochemical mechanisms, philosophical, and spiritual theories. None of these completely explain the relationship between mind and brain (body), or subjective and objective thoughts. That is, the way things seem to me as opposed to how they should be objectively; in other words, the theory has to explain how subjective experience arises from objective brains? How billions of interconnections of neurons produce perception, learning, memory, reasoning, language, and finally consciousness. Different areas of brain perform different functions, such as, vision, hearing, speech, body image, motor control, and many other tasks. They are linked to each other but not into one control processor to produce consciousness. For example, pain is visible to a certain extent, but one can not fully comprehend another person's pain unless one experience that pain oneself.
Throughout history, philosophers and scientists proposed some form of dualism that mind and brain are different, however, some scientists prefer monism; the mind and body are one and the same, but this does not explain a consistent physical world. A third form preferred by physicists is materialism, which makes matter most fundamental. This also does not explain how a physical brain (matter) can give rise conscious experience. It is also unclear if consciousness is a power (energy) or a force but the laws physics relate each other.
Could consciousness lags behind the events of the world? The experimental results of Benjamin Libet are discussed (chapter 3) in light of dualist theories, quantum mechanics, Higher order of thought (HOT) theory, and Global workplace theory. Each theory offers explanation for certain aspect of consciousness, but eludes from addressing the subjectivity experience. In chapter 4, there is a brief discussion of weather consciousness is a grand illusion: Much of this concept depends on individual visual awareness. In chapter 5, the spirit, self and souls are discussed in light of many theories. The Upanishads, the sacred scriptures of Hindus, and Buddhist philosophy propose self is as an independent entity, but modern philosophers such as David Hume claim that self is a bundle of sensations. The experimental results of psychologists Roger Perry, Michael Gazzaniga, and Earnest Hilgard have been discussed. Most theories equate self with a particular brain process, but fail to explain the relationship of self with consciousness. Chapter 6 discusses the origin of free will that makes the decision or expresses willingness, is that inner self or due to power of consciousness? Since all events in the universe are deterministic, i.e. all events are determined by prior events. It follows that everything happens in future is inevitable; hence no room for free will! However some philosophers argue that deterministic process is chaotic and outcomes are complex, which may not be predictable. Therefore both determinism and free will could coexist independently. Many psychologists believe that free will is an illusion. In chapter 7, altered states of consciousness, due to sleep and dream, psychoactive drugs, stimulants, out of body experiences, and meditation are discussed in relation to mind and consciousness. The last chapter presents an interesting discussion about the evolution of consciousness and examines if animals have consciousness. The author presents arguments in favor of lack of consciousness in animals because they do not have language skills. It is proposed that language and mathematical skills coupled with deep thoughts help humans to communicate about past, present and future that may confer consciousness. This argument is unclear since the term consciousness itself needs to be defined. This book is well written and it is recommended.
A great scientist takes a wrong turning, 12 Aug 2007
I first encountered Blackmore when, after searching long and hard for a scientific explanation of out-of-body experiences, I came across her book Beyond the Body. It was astonishingly well researched and offered a rational, convincing explanation for phenomena that were usually neglected by the scientific community. I became an instant fan and have followed her work ever since. But now, alas, she has aligned herself with the Dawkins/Dennett axis of drivel, and my loyalty to her is badly shaken. In this book (a shorter version of her Consciousness: An Introduction) she follows Dennett by denying the existence of consciousness and then indulging in much speculation about the properties and evolutionary history of this non-existent entity. Consciousness, she maintains, is an 'illusion', which she defines as something that exists but does not have the properties it appears to have. She then proceeds to discuss it as if it does not in fact exist, and slips into calling it a 'delusion', which she apparently regards as a synonymous term. So far, so Dennett. She follows Dawkins by labeling just about everything a 'meme' (as Poe might have said 'All that we see or seem is but a meme within a meme'), unless she happens not to approve of it, in which case it is 'a virus of the mind'. As an example, she indulges in a quite intemperate and completely irrelevant rant against religion, in which Roman Catholicism is described as a parasitic infection. Like Dennett and Dawkins, she leaves no axe unground.
So why do I give the book 5 stars if I disagree with so much of it? Well, I guess you can't keep a good scientist down, and Blackmore is still a great scientist. She brings considerable knowledge and erudition to the subject, presents fair summaries of opposing views, and gives excellent descriptions of odd phenomena like Libet's Delay and the Cutaneous Rabbit. And her style is as readable as ever. I was suspicious when I saw that her son Jolyon had contributed many of the illustrations - it smacked of nepotism - but I have to say his drawings are really charming and add greatly to the text. The other illustrations are useful too - with the possible exception of a photograph of the author opening a fridge door - which isn't always the case with this series. The book ends with a very useful Further Reading list. It's thus an excellent introduction to the subject (although I think John Searle's The Mystery of Consciousness is still the best place to start).
So, I shall keep the faith and continue to read everything Susan Blackmore publishes. I just hope that one day, just as she once abandoned a belief in the paranormal, she sees the light and abandons the axis of drivel.
A development book that actually makes sense!, 30 Apr 2000
Presents the information in a logical and understandable way, as opposed to many alternatives out there that manage to make it all more complicated than it needs to be.
A well organised overview of Developmental Biology, 22 Nov 2001
This book sets out very clearly the basic concepts of the subject. The diagrams are simple to comprehend and the format of the book encourages the reader to focus on the most important points.
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Customer Reviews
Perfect introduction to a complex and profound subject, 06 Jul 2008
The relationship between mind and body, and the tremendous difficulty of explaining that relationship, has been a central theme in modern philosophy since Descartes' famous 'cogito ergo sum'. In the subsequent centuries the entire heavy artillary of analytical philosophy has been brought to bear, categorical mistakes have been claimed, behavourist theories championed, yet the awkard I stubbornly remains, peering out at the world. A bundle of neurons and synapses themselves composed of randomly spinning atoms and electrons, somehow able to ask questions 'why am I? who am I? What am I?'.
Recently however, the problem of mind has taken on a new academic guise - the study of consciousness. The ancient riddle has been reframed into a seemingly narrower and more fundamental question - the problem of how physical matter be self-aware, how can the brain think and feel? The central question may have become more focused, yet suddenly it is not just the philosophers who are discussing it. The study of consciousness is now truly a multi-disciplinary subject, drawing in experts in psychology and neuro-science amonst others. Suddenly a subject so old and profound appears to be one of the most exciting fields in academia. One that might even be on the verge of providing answers that would transform our very sense of self and identity.
Susan Blackmore does a remarkably good job here of introducing such a complex and wideranging subject. You really do get a sense of what the question is and just why it is so challenging. Not only that but you should get a feel of why the subject is particularly exciting at the moment and for those versed in the 'traditional' formulations of the philosophy of mind, this book stands as testamant to the fact that the study of consciousness is really a subject in its own right now.
Having said all that, this book (and others by Susan Blackmore) really should come with a government health warning. I've read David Hume's reflections on the illusory nature of the self, as well as some of those of Eastern Philosophy. Like Hume, I feel largely able to set aside such considerations as soon as I attend to other matters. Reading Blackmore, I really do feel a little shaken. I can give up the idea of a concrete self lurking behind my eyes controlling my fingers as I type this review, but when plausible argument after plausible argument chips away at the belief in consciousness itself, or at least our faith that there is a stream of consciousness, then the effect is rather more disturbing and profound.
Blackmore introduces all the main theories relating to consciousness here, in a very readable and succinct manner. You are fully made aware of her own viewpoint, but that is not a bad thing, as they are clearly put in contrast with the others and in a way that helps you come to your own conclusion, though as I just said, it may leave you a little unsettled.
Though the stream of consciousness mayby some kind of 'grand illusion' as Blackmore and of course Daniel Dennet quite persuasively argue for, its not clear that the problem of explaining consciousness is in anyway diminished. No matter how many insignificant little pieces you try to break conscious awareness into, the fundamental problem still remains : how does physical matter achieve any consciousness at all?
A must read introduction for those interested in the study of consciousness and the philosophy of mind. I'd also fully recomend her longer introduction (as a follow up) which has student exercises and chapter summaries etc. Just take care! A great little primer on the subject, 18 Oct 2007
A terrific little book that should only have taken me a few hours to read, but instead took a week because I frequently stopped to ponder the philosophically challenging examples she uses. I thought I already knew the subject reasonably well, but there's plenty in this small volume I found new and challenging.
Well worth reading her other book too: Conversations on Consciousness in which she talks to several leading figures in the field, and where her own biases on the subject rub up against theirs.
Very easy to read, with illustrations and no jargon. Heartily recommended! "The subjective experience is only a fleeting event that gives rise to a delusion.", 25 Sep 2007
And what's worse, "If you go on believing you are always conscious, and construct metaphors about streams and theatres, then you only dig yourself deeper and deeper into confusion."
First we're introduced to the influence of specific brain regions on consciousness. So the temporal cortex is responsible for our changing perceptions, whilst the visual cortex simply processes retinal input which is interpreted later. All this might suggest the temporal cortex is more `subjective', but as Blackmore points out, "correlations alone do not solve the mystery... how can some cells give rise to subjective experience and some not?"
Delving deeper into the brain only confuses the issue though. It turns out that much of what we think we're conscious of is in fact illusion. Chapters 3 & 4 concentrate on these illusions. Libet's `neuronal adequacy for consciousness', the cutaneous rabbit experiment, daydreaming and such are all pulled in to break up William James' good old-fashioned stream-of-consciousness theory. Some visual games emphasise how much of our sensory world is constructed; inattentional blindness and Ramachandran's `filling-in' are the main culprits.
With all these thrown at our sense of the world, Blackmore then proceeds towards our concept of the self. Most religions and common sense generally perceive a continuous I, a self, in relation to the world; this is ego-theory. Against this is Buddhism and the 18th century Scot, David Hume, who said that the self is more like a "bundle of sensations" threaded together by memory and relationships. The self then becomes a "centre of narrative gravity", "a useful fiction" for relating experiences to each other. But though Bundle theory is useful in relation to some strange neurophysiological effects, it soes remain deeply counter-intuitive.
Finally, even our sense of free-will is preceded by electrical stimuli, shown in Libet's `consciousness-timing' experiments, leading psychologists to produce true-order diagrams for thought processes along the lines of, 1) the brain begins planning an action, 2) the brain activity leads to thought about the action, 3) we assume the thoughts caused the action. She concedes by the end that Dennett's `multiple draft' theory may be the closest have to understanding all of what we don't know; the brain plays out parallel translations of the world of its own accord and not until it's asked to account for its experience does it bother at all with consciousness. In this way maintaining consciousness becomes (for Blackmore at least) a matter of application, of repeating Zen koan-style questions, like `Am I conscious now?', or `Who am I?', etc.
Overall, this is a good read. The visual games (like those of the VSI to the Brain) are a good, cheap laugh, and the sheer number of theories sketched show just how confused consciousness studies is at the moment. The only gripe is that the theories are spread about between the chapters rather than coherently stated and contrasted. Blackmore's priority is the brain and the faculties of consciousness it attends to, only sprinkling along the way parts of related theories which by the end became, for me, confused and nebulous. Anyway, good for prodding your bonce. Definitely recommended. Understanding consciousness: A brief review, 29 Aug 2007
What is consciousness? How do a set of electrical responses of millions of brain cells produce private, subjective conscious experience? Several theories have been proposed, and they include, grand unifying theories, quantum mechanical theories, biophysical/neurochemical mechanisms, philosophical, and spiritual theories. None of these completely explain the relationship between mind and brain (body), or subjective and objective thoughts. That is, the way things seem to me as opposed to how they should be objectively; in other words, the theory has to explain how subjective experience arises from objective brains? How billions of interconnections of neurons produce perception, learning, memory, reasoning, language, and finally consciousness. Different areas of brain perform different functions, such as, vision, hearing, speech, body image, motor control, and many other tasks. They are linked to each other but not into one control processor to produce consciousness. For example, pain is visible to a certain extent, but one can not fully comprehend another person's pain unless one experience that pain oneself.
Throughout history, philosophers and scientists proposed some form of dualism that mind and brain are different, however, some scientists prefer monism; the mind and body are one and the same, but this does not explain a consistent physical world. A third form preferred by physicists is materialism, which makes matter most fundamental. This also does not explain how a physical brain (matter) can give rise conscious experience. It is also unclear if consciousness is a power (energy) or a force but the laws physics relate each other.
Could consciousness lags behind the events of the world? The experimental results of Benjamin Libet are discussed (chapter 3) in light of dualist theories, quantum mechanics, Higher order of thought (HOT) theory, and Global workplace theory. Each theory offers explanation for certain aspect of consciousness, but eludes from addressing the subjectivity experience. In chapter 4, there is a brief discussion of weather consciousness is a grand illusion: Much of this concept depends on individual visual awareness. In chapter 5, the spirit, self and souls are discussed in light of many theories. The Upanishads, the sacred scriptures of Hindus, and Buddhist philosophy propose self is as an independent entity, but modern philosophers such as David Hume claim that self is a bundle of sensations. The experimental results of psychologists Roger Perry, Michael Gazzaniga, and Earnest Hilgard have been discussed. Most theories equate self with a particular brain process, but fail to explain the relationship of self with consciousness. Chapter 6 discusses the origin of free will that makes the decision or expresses willingness, is that inner self or due to power of consciousness? Since all events in the universe are deterministic, i.e. all events are determined by prior events. It follows that everything happens in future is inevitable; hence no room for free will! However some philosophers argue that deterministic process is chaotic and outcomes are complex, which may not be predictable. Therefore both determinism and free will could coexist independently. Many psychologists believe that free will is an illusion. In chapter 7, altered states of consciousness, due to sleep and dream, psychoactive drugs, stimulants, out of body experiences, and meditation are discussed in relation to mind and consciousness. The last chapter presents an interesting discussion about the evolution of consciousness and examines if animals have consciousness. The author presents arguments in favor of lack of consciousness in animals because they do not have language skills. It is proposed that language and mathematical skills coupled with deep thoughts help humans to communicate about past, present and future that may confer consciousness. This argument is unclear since the term consciousness itself needs to be defined. This book is well written and it is recommended.
A great scientist takes a wrong turning, 12 Aug 2007
I first encountered Blackmore when, after searching long and hard for a scientific explanation of out-of-body experiences, I came across her book Beyond the Body. It was astonishingly well researched and offered a rational, convincing explanation for phenomena that were usually neglected by the scientific community. I became an instant fan and have followed her work ever since. But now, alas, she has aligned herself with the Dawkins/Dennett axis of drivel, and my loyalty to her is badly shaken. In this book (a shorter version of her Consciousness: An Introduction) she follows Dennett by denying the existence of consciousness and then indulging in much speculation about the properties and evolutionary history of this non-existent entity. Consciousness, she maintains, is an 'illusion', which she defines as something that exists but does not have the properties it appears to have. She then proceeds to discuss it as if it does not in fact exist, and slips into calling it a 'delusion', which she apparently regards as a synonymous term. So far, so Dennett. She follows Dawkins by labeling just about everything a 'meme' (as Poe might have said 'All that we see or seem is but a meme within a meme'), unless she happens not to approve of it, in which case it is 'a virus of the mind'. As an example, she indulges in a quite intemperate and completely irrelevant rant against religion, in which Roman Catholicism is described as a parasitic infection. Like Dennett and Dawkins, she leaves no axe unground.
So why do I give the book 5 stars if I disagree with so much of it? Well, I guess you can't keep a good scientist down, and Blackmore is still a great scientist. She brings considerable knowledge and erudition to the subject, presents fair summaries of opposing views, and gives excellent descriptions of odd phenomena like Libet's Delay and the Cutaneous Rabbit. And her style is as readable as ever. I was suspicious when I saw that her son Jolyon had contributed many of the illustrations - it smacked of nepotism - but I have to say his drawings are really charming and add greatly to the text. The other illustrations are useful too - with the possible exception of a photograph of the author opening a fridge door - which isn't always the case with this series. The book ends with a very useful Further Reading list. It's thus an excellent introduction to the subject (although I think John Searle's The Mystery of Consciousness is still the best place to start).
So, I shall keep the faith and continue to read everything Susan Blackmore publishes. I just hope that one day, just as she once abandoned a belief in the paranormal, she sees the light and abandons the axis of drivel.
A development book that actually makes sense!, 30 Apr 2000
Presents the information in a logical and understandable way, as opposed to many alternatives out there that manage to make it all more complicated than it needs to be. A well organised overview of Developmental Biology, 22 Nov 2001
This book sets out very clearly the basic concepts of the subject. The diagrams are simple to comprehend and the format of the book encourages the reader to focus on the most important points. Crazily... plausible..., 30 Dec 2006
The disclaimer I should give first is this: I'm not a trained anthropologist, and I don't have a background in anthropological study far beyond this work. It's also the case that, while the ideas it contains are becoming slowly more accepted, they are very much outside the mainstream.
But it is wonderful.
Beautifully written, authoritatively referenced (four or five a page, almost all with page numbers) and closely argued; it's an argument for the origins of modern humanity - culturally, biologically (in many ways) and psychologically. Despite myself, and my oxbridge scepticism, I found myself drawn into its thesis. Not without reservation - I couldn't agree with all of it, especially concerning the determination of the structure of kinship by the rest of the theory - but generally, I'm sold. It's not a quick read, but well worth it. The volume provides a rich mine of symbolism and meaning for creative projects as well as containing an encyclopaedic overview of origins theory in the last 100 or more years.
Even if it's not true, it's worth it in a purely literary sense to get yourself into the head-space where you can believe (one amongst other equally astonishing theses) that the edifice of the dragon in human mythology is a reification of female menstrual solidarity during the period (ah hem) of human revolution depicted by the book. Paradigm-shifting work that revalidates Afrocentrism, 20 Nov 2002
"The notion of tabu as connoting both 'danger' and 'power' belongs in fact to a venerable tradition. One source of this is the work of Durkheim...a pioneering article on menstrual symbolism published in 1898...Durkheim argued that women established the exogamy rule by periodically BLEEDING so as to repulse the opposite sex...[women] were the immediate agents of religious ideology's segregating action." "...But of course, the model of cultural origins advocated in this book would lead us to trace the underlying abstract logic of the Rainbow Snake...much further back into the Aborigines past--indeed, right back to their first entry into Australia [from central Africa]..." "It would be interesting to study the ideological and political factors which led to Durkheim's insights being virtually ignored for a hundred years." Chris Knight, BLOOD RELATIONS Chapter 11: "The Raw and The Cooked" and Chapter 14: "The Dragon Within" " At Yirkalla, in...north-east Arnhem Land [aboriginal Australia]...women's solidarity is still very strong, menstrual blood is regarded as 'sacred'... It is only when this snake power of the women themselves has been established that the conditions are felt appropriate for the climax of the ceremony... '...really we have been stealing what belongs to them (the women) for it is mostly women's business... Women can't see what men are doing...This is because all the Dreaming business came out of women--everything...In the beginning we had nothing...we took these things from women.' "It is one of the severest indictments of 20th Century anti-evolutionist anthropology that its models have led ethnographers to dismiss such profound Aboriginal insights as scientifically valueless." Chris Knight, BLOOD RELATIONS Chapter 13: "The Rainbow Snake" This is a five star, paradigm-shifting treatise on human cultural origins if there ever was one. Chris Knight's rendering of the four plus million years of primate and proto-human history in BLOOD RELATIONS, right up to the latest 200,000 years that begin true humankind and human culture in central Africa and along the Nile, through to the psychic/motivational bedrock of our conflicted modern society, becomes more impressive, more inclusive--and more impregnable with every chapter and every turn of the page. My test for the far-reaching influence and power of any theorist--particularly of the wannabe revolutionary kind--is three-fold. One, their theory must be completely plausible; i.e. not needing simple revolt from detractors and complimentary but poorly explained aspects of ITSELF to proclaim and rationalize its essential relevance. Two, they must have the ability to completely encapsulate the foundational principles, concepts and findings of the other historical and competitive theories within its discipline as an integral part of its own new perspective; showing their ideas to be the great quantum leap beyond our sense of reality and the all inclusive step toward truth. And third, perhaps most important of all, it has to excite me. There may be things my mind will not be specifically educated enough, multi-lingual enough or quick enough to pick up, but you cannot fool my heart. All these three are BLOOD RELATIONS's great achievement and great contribution. Chris Knight, the brilliant and controversial London anthropologist, does this all in BLOOD RELATIONS with such remarkable clarity and erudition, in fact, attempts to disagree with his findings becomes pointless. His unified field-theory of the prehistoric African woman's role in the formation of human culture is so incredibly well done, and so profoundly earth shattering in its implications, that I read the book twice to fully soak in all the sacred pre-verbal intuitions I have had that it reveals to be historical fact and obvious science. So far the only complaint of BLOOD RELATIONS I could have is the only one possible: he seemingly focuses too much on the Marxist avatar of revolutionary cultural ideas while using it as the lens via which the origins of culture could be best understood. This at times seems to ironically minimize the revolutionary spirit of humankind that produced them. None less than the great Picasso was once quoted in saying "today's artists are tomorrow's politicians;" focusing more on the *artistic* power of the creative human spirit (my bias) may have put his new paradigm in an even more inclusive perspective. Yet even there he establishes, to my knowledge, the first credible dialectic between the devolved, political diseases of 20th century Stalinism/Maoism and the philosophical/scientific postulates of the 19th century Marxism upon which their regimes were originally based. So powerfully, in fact, that the Marxist perspective he examines and explains driving his reevaluation of 20th century anthropology--and, in turn, our entire view of human culture--need not (and in his book does not) come with the kind of intellectual apologies that would otherwise signify an inherent lack of validity. Chris Knight with BLOOD RELATIONS shows unquestionably that women, via sex and the rhythm of menstruation, nurtured the primal creative impulse of civilization and they essentially created human culture. And he shows it to be made up of communal solidarity against oppressors and oppressive situations (be it prehistoric animals or alpha males), symbol-driven creativity, and achieving a certain oneness with the rhythms of nature. This primal social movement that is the womb of human culture, told in every ancient culture's foundational myths, could naturally just as easily explain the birth of democracy and/or capitalism in the historical ages of feudalism as it does the advent of Marxism in the age of capitalism...and what is next for human kind. This is another of the great books of our time whose far-reaching influence in modern culture has not even begun to be felt. One can only imagine what anthropological works throughout history that have been ignored because of intellectual biases will now be reexamined and redeemed through his paradigm shifting work. I would combine this with Barbara Ehrenreich's 1995 work BLOOD RITES, and the 19th Century Gerald Massey's ANCIENT EGYPT, THE LIGHT OF THE WORLD as an anthropological trinity of monumental, paradigm shifting proportions that will change your view of humankind-our true past, present and potential-forever. BLOOD RELATIONS is beautiful.
An impressive read, 03 Aug 2001
Blood Relations is a fascinating account of a possible way culture may have arisen. It is a ground breaking study in as much that it re-evaluates women's role in the cultural evolution proces, rather than see everything from a uniform (male oriented) point of view. At the same time it does not yield to feminist propaganda, and retains its objectivity throughout. Perhaps exagerating the uniformous interpretation of the various myths discussed at the end of the book, Chris Knight does voice a lot a thought provoking ideas. The sheer volume and encyclopedic qualities of the work allow for sound evaluation of the proposed thesis. Not one for the summer holidays, nor one for the unprepared, but this tough read is certainly one to at least make you re-evaluate culture and its origins. Much more so than most popular science titles. Unfortunately you will have to read these as well if you do not yet have the required background. If the origin of culture is your quest, than this book is an absolute must!!
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Mechanisms in Plant Development
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Ottoline LeyserStephen Day;
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Usually dispatched within 1-2 business days *Best price found from Amazon Marketplace seller
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*Amazon: £31.47
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Mechanics of the Cell
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*Amazon: £40.42
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Customer Reviews
Perfect introduction to a complex and profound subject, 06 Jul 2008
The relationship between mind and body, and the tremendous difficulty of explaining that relationship, has been a central theme in modern philosophy since Descartes' famous 'cogito ergo sum'. In the subsequent centuries the entire heavy artillary of analytical philosophy has been brought to bear, categorical mistakes have been claimed, behavourist theories championed, yet the awkard I stubbornly remains, peering out at the world. A bundle of neurons and synapses themselves composed of randomly spinning atoms and electrons, somehow able to ask questions 'why am I? who am I? What am I?'.
Recently however, the problem of mind has taken on a new academic guise - the study of consciousness. The ancient riddle has been reframed into a seemingly narrower and more fundamental question - the problem of how physical matter be self-aware, how can the brain think and feel? The central question may have become more focused, yet suddenly it is not just the philosophers who are discussing it. The study of consciousness is now truly a multi-disciplinary subject, drawing in experts in psychology and neuro-science amonst others. Suddenly a subject so old and profound appears to be one of the most exciting fields in academia. One that might even be on the verge of providing answers that would transform our very sense of self and identity.
Susan Blackmore does a remarkably good job here of introducing such a complex and wideranging subject. You really do get a sense of what the question is and just why it is so challenging. Not only that but you should get a feel of why the subject is particularly exciting at the moment and for those versed in the 'traditional' formulations of the philosophy of mind, this book stands as testamant to the fact that the study of consciousness is really a subject in its own right now.
Having said all that, this book (and others by Susan Blackmore) really should come with a government health warning. I've read David Hume's reflections on the illusory nature of the self, as well as some of those of Eastern Philosophy. Like Hume, I feel largely able to set aside such considerations as soon as I attend to other matters. Reading Blackmore, I really do feel a little shaken. I can give up the idea of a concrete self lurking behind my eyes controlling my fingers as I type this review, but when plausible argument after plausible argument chips away at the belief in consciousness itself, or at least our faith that there is a stream of consciousness, then the effect is rather more disturbing and profound.
Blackmore introduces all the main theories relating to consciousness here, in a very readable and succinct manner. You are fully made aware of her own viewpoint, but that is not a bad thing, as they are clearly put in contrast with the others and in a way that helps you come to your own conclusion, though as I just said, it may leave you a little unsettled.
Though the stream of consciousness mayby some kind of 'grand illusion' as Blackmore and of course Daniel Dennet quite persuasively argue for, its not clear that the problem of explaining consciousness is in anyway diminished. No matter how many insignificant little pieces you try to break conscious awareness into, the fundamental problem still remains : how does physical matter achieve any consciousness at all?
A must read introduction for those interested in the study of consciousness and the philosophy of mind. I'd also fully recomend her longer introduction (as a follow up) which has student exercises and chapter summaries etc. Just take care!
A great little primer on the subject, 18 Oct 2007
A terrific little book that should only have taken me a few hours to read, but instead took a week because I frequently stopped to ponder the philosophically challenging examples she uses. I thought I already knew the subject reasonably well, but there's plenty in this small volume I found new and challenging.
Well worth reading her other book too: Conversations on Consciousness in which she talks to several leading figures in the field, and where her own biases on the subject rub up against theirs.
Very easy to read, with illustrations and no jargon. Heartily recommended!
"The subjective experience is only a fleeting event that gives rise to a delusion.", 25 Sep 2007
And what's worse, "If you go on believing you are always conscious, and construct metaphors about streams and theatres, then you only dig yourself deeper and deeper into confusion."
First we're introduced to the influence of specific brain regions on consciousness. So the temporal cortex is responsible for our changing perceptions, whilst the visual cortex simply processes retinal input which is interpreted later. All this might suggest the temporal cortex is more `subjective', but as Blackmore points out, "correlations alone do not solve the mystery... how can some cells give rise to subjective experience and some not?"
Delving deeper into the brain only confuses the issue though. It turns out that much of what we think we're conscious of is in fact illusion. Chapters 3 & 4 concentrate on these illusions. Libet's `neuronal adequacy for consciousness', the cutaneous rabbit experiment, daydreaming and such are all pulled in to break up William James' good old-fashioned stream-of-consciousness theory. Some visual games emphasise how much of our sensory world is constructed; inattentional blindness and Ramachandran's `filling-in' are the main culprits.
With all these thrown at our sense of the world, Blackmore then proceeds towards our concept of the self. Most religions and common sense generally perceive a continuous I, a self, in relation to the world; this is ego-theory. Against this is Buddhism and the 18th century Scot, David Hume, who said that the self is more like a "bundle of sensations" threaded together by memory and relationships. The self then becomes a "centre of narrative gravity", "a useful fiction" for relating experiences to each other. But though Bundle theory is useful in relation to some strange neurophysiological effects, it soes remain deeply counter-intuitive.
Finally, even our sense | | |