how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

A vivid history and critique of the 1907 financial crisis, 21 Oct 2008
If you compare the 1907 crisis that struck U.S. and European financial institutions with 2008's economic emergencies, you will discover striking similarities. (In fact, the uncanny parallels have made this fascinating book a bestseller.) Strong interconnectivity between financial firms meant that trouble at one migrated to others. Both crises involved serious credit and liquidity concerns. Both provoked populist attacks against Wall Street. In part, the trusts hit trouble in 1907 because of insufficient regulation. The 1907 crisis started on Wall Street, and quickly jumped to European institutions. In 2008, the trajectory was even more global. Of course, marked differences also separate these episodes. In 1907, fabled financier J.P. Morgan exercised remarkable leadership to end the crisis, and to reassure depositors and investors that their savings and equity holdings were secure. Morgan calmed the waters so the panic would not spread. "This is the place to stop this trouble," he said of the Trust Company of America. Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr explain why the 1907 panic occurred and use it as a valuable case study for understanding other monetary crises. getAbstract is confident that history lovers, businesspeople, financial executives and anyone who enjoys a well-told, real-life drama will love this book.

how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

A vivid history and critique of the 1907 financial crisis, 21 Oct 2008
If you compare the 1907 crisis that struck U.S. and European financial institutions with 2008's economic emergencies, you will discover striking similarities. (In fact, the uncanny parallels have made this fascinating book a bestseller.) Strong interconnectivity between financial firms meant that trouble at one migrated to others. Both crises involved serious credit and liquidity concerns. Both provoked populist attacks against Wall Street. In part, the trusts hit trouble in 1907 because of insufficient regulation. The 1907 crisis started on Wall Street, and quickly jumped to European institutions. In 2008, the trajectory was even more global. Of course, marked differences also separate these episodes. In 1907, fabled financier J.P. Morgan exercised remarkable leadership to end the crisis, and to reassure depositors and investors that their savings and equity holdings were secure. Morgan calmed the waters so the panic would not spread. "This is the place to stop this trouble," he said of the Trust Company of America. Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr explain why the 1907 panic occurred and use it as a valuable case study for understanding other monetary crises. getAbstract is confident that history lovers, businesspeople, financial executives and anyone who enjoys a well-told, real-life drama will love this book.

Good beginners book, 22 May 2008
This is a lovely book for the beginner, since there are lovely colour photos and bite size information covering what you need to know to get into keeping chickens. It is limited, in that once you have your chickens you probably want to have more information and there are only a limited amount of breeds covered but the lay out is reader friendly, digestible and sufficient for the novice to make a good start. Then the fun begins! The book does relay the real joy of keeping chickens and the benefits for children. Well worth reading before getting started on buying coop, hens etc.

The best introduction to keeping chickens we've found, 23 Jan 2008
We've been keeping chickens for a couple of years now, and we wish we had this book when (or even before) we started out. It has information on all aspects of keeping chickens, from coops and enclosures, avoiding health problems, integrating with the existing family, feeding, etc. The text is well-thought-out and clearly written, and the pictures with their associated captions add even more information. Buy this book before you dive in and get your first chook. If you're already a chicken-parent, buy it anyway and keep it to hand always!

Excellent - well worth the price, 01 Nov 2007
If you are thinking about keeping chickens everything that you need to know is in this book. Absolutely excellent!!

This is just the book I was looking for! Highly Recommended!!, 04 May 2007
Ideal book for anyone who is thinking to keep chickens! Great introduction to all aspects of keeping chickens with just the right depth covering everything from housing, litter materials, feed types, chicken well beings, natural vs artificial fertilised eggs incubations, chicken breeds... etc etc.. All these are explained in plain English together with excellent colour photos to maintain reader interest throughout the book. Did you know that chickens need to eat sand or grits to help digestions? I did not before reading this book! All in all, a great book which is both entertaining and educational to read before keeping your first chicken in your backyard! Definately a 5-Start for this book!!!

A good introduction to keeping chickens, 24 Nov 2006
I've just started looking into keeping chickens in my back garden and found this book really helpful - from picking the right breed to how to house and care for them. It's clearly set out with sound advice and the large colour pictures of the different breed types are great!

how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

A vivid history and critique of the 1907 financial crisis, 21 Oct 2008
If you compare the 1907 crisis that struck U.S. and European financial institutions with 2008's economic emergencies, you will discover striking similarities. (In fact, the uncanny parallels have made this fascinating book a bestseller.) Strong interconnectivity between financial firms meant that trouble at one migrated to others. Both crises involved serious credit and liquidity concerns. Both provoked populist attacks against Wall Street. In part, the trusts hit trouble in 1907 because of insufficient regulation. The 1907 crisis started on Wall Street, and quickly jumped to European institutions. In 2008, the trajectory was even more global. Of course, marked differences also separate these episodes. In 1907, fabled financier J.P. Morgan exercised remarkable leadership to end the crisis, and to reassure depositors and investors that their savings and equity holdings were secure. Morgan calmed the waters so the panic would not spread. "This is the place to stop this trouble," he said of the Trust Company of America. Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr explain why the 1907 panic occurred and use it as a valuable case study for understanding other monetary crises. getAbstract is confident that history lovers, businesspeople, financial executives and anyone who enjoys a well-told, real-life drama will love this book.

Good beginners book, 22 May 2008
This is a lovely book for the beginner, since there are lovely colour photos and bite size information covering what you need to know to get into keeping chickens. It is limited, in that once you have your chickens you probably want to have more information and there are only a limited amount of breeds covered but the lay out is reader friendly, digestible and sufficient for the novice to make a good start. Then the fun begins! The book does relay the real joy of keeping chickens and the benefits for children. Well worth reading before getting started on buying coop, hens etc.

The best introduction to keeping chickens we've found, 23 Jan 2008
We've been keeping chickens for a couple of years now, and we wish we had this book when (or even before) we started out. It has information on all aspects of keeping chickens, from coops and enclosures, avoiding health problems, integrating with the existing family, feeding, etc. The text is well-thought-out and clearly written, and the pictures with their associated captions add even more information. Buy this book before you dive in and get your first chook. If you're already a chicken-parent, buy it anyway and keep it to hand always!

Excellent - well worth the price, 01 Nov 2007
If you are thinking about keeping chickens everything that you need to know is in this book. Absolutely excellent!!

This is just the book I was looking for! Highly Recommended!!, 04 May 2007
Ideal book for anyone who is thinking to keep chickens! Great introduction to all aspects of keeping chickens with just the right depth covering everything from housing, litter materials, feed types, chicken well beings, natural vs artificial fertilised eggs incubations, chicken breeds... etc etc.. All these are explained in plain English together with excellent colour photos to maintain reader interest throughout the book. Did you know that chickens need to eat sand or grits to help digestions? I did not before reading this book! All in all, a great book which is both entertaining and educational to read before keeping your first chicken in your backyard! Definately a 5-Start for this book!!!

A good introduction to keeping chickens, 24 Nov 2006
I've just started looking into keeping chickens in my back garden and found this book really helpful - from picking the right breed to how to house and care for them. It's clearly set out with sound advice and the large colour pictures of the different breed types are great!

A great introduction to bee keeping, 09 Aug 2008
I bought this book as I inherited a hive and wanted to keep the tradition alive. It was a great place to start, giving not only sound, practical advice but also an interesting overview of the history of bee keeping. It linked in with the bee keeping associations around the country and the recipes at the back were not only lovely but gave me some great ideas for when my harvest is ready! A great book with lovely photographs and excellent advice for first time bee keepers.

how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

A vivid history and critique of the 1907 financial crisis, 21 Oct 2008
If you compare the 1907 crisis that struck U.S. and European financial institutions with 2008's economic emergencies, you will discover striking similarities. (In fact, the uncanny parallels have made this fascinating book a bestseller.) Strong interconnectivity between financial firms meant that trouble at one migrated to others. Both crises involved serious credit and liquidity concerns. Both provoked populist attacks against Wall Street. In part, the trusts hit trouble in 1907 because of insufficient regulation. The 1907 crisis started on Wall Street, and quickly jumped to European institutions. In 2008, the trajectory was even more global. Of course, marked differences also separate these episodes. In 1907, fabled financier J.P. Morgan exercised remarkable leadership to end the crisis, and to reassure depositors and investors that their savings and equity holdings were secure. Morgan calmed the waters so the panic would not spread. "This is the place to stop this trouble," he said of the Trust Company of America. Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr explain why the 1907 panic occurred and use it as a valuable case study for understanding other monetary crises. getAbstract is confident that history lovers, businesspeople, financial executives and anyone who enjoys a well-told, real-life drama will love this book.

Good beginners book, 22 May 2008
This is a lovely book for the beginner, since there are lovely colour photos and bite size information covering what you need to know to get into keeping chickens. It is limited, in that once you have your chickens you probably want to have more information and there are only a limited amount of breeds covered but the lay out is reader friendly, digestible and sufficient for the novice to make a good start. Then the fun begins! The book does relay the real joy of keeping chickens and the benefits for children. Well worth reading before getting started on buying coop, hens etc.

The best introduction to keeping chickens we've found, 23 Jan 2008
We've been keeping chickens for a couple of years now, and we wish we had this book when (or even before) we started out. It has information on all aspects of keeping chickens, from coops and enclosures, avoiding health problems, integrating with the existing family, feeding, etc. The text is well-thought-out and clearly written, and the pictures with their associated captions add even more information. Buy this book before you dive in and get your first chook. If you're already a chicken-parent, buy it anyway and keep it to hand always!

Excellent - well worth the price, 01 Nov 2007
If you are thinking about keeping chickens everything that you need to know is in this book. Absolutely excellent!!

This is just the book I was looking for! Highly Recommended!!, 04 May 2007
Ideal book for anyone who is thinking to keep chickens! Great introduction to all aspects of keeping chickens with just the right depth covering everything from housing, litter materials, feed types, chicken well beings, natural vs artificial fertilised eggs incubations, chicken breeds... etc etc.. All these are explained in plain English together with excellent colour photos to maintain reader interest throughout the book. Did you know that chickens need to eat sand or grits to help digestions? I did not before reading this book! All in all, a great book which is both entertaining and educational to read before keeping your first chicken in your backyard! Definately a 5-Start for this book!!!

A good introduction to keeping chickens, 24 Nov 2006
I've just started looking into keeping chickens in my back garden and found this book really helpful - from picking the right breed to how to house and care for them. It's clearly set out with sound advice and the large colour pictures of the different breed types are great!

A great introduction to bee keeping, 09 Aug 2008
I bought this book as I inherited a hive and wanted to keep the tradition alive. It was a great place to start, giving not only sound, practical advice but also an interesting overview of the history of bee keeping. It linked in with the bee keeping associations around the country and the recipes at the back were not only lovely but gave me some great ideas for when my harvest is ready! A great book with lovely photographs and excellent advice for first time bee keepers.

Interesting but misjudged, 06 Oct 2008
I would recommend this book to readers of Greenspan's Age of Turbulence as a relevant counterargument. However, I would do so with some significant reservations. The key criticism leveled at Greenspan is that his monetary policy encouraged rather than hindered the Dot com and property bubbles. Fleckenstein's contention however is based on an erroneous assumption. The author implies that it was Fed's job to constrain ASSET price inflation. In fact the orthodox economic view, throughout this period, was that central banks should concern themselves entirely with achieving low and stable CONSUMER price inflation. Perhaps the Fed chairman did allow himself, at times, to become distracted by the performance of the US stock market but ultimately it wasn't in his job spec. to stop the speculative excesses of joe public. Trying to lay the blame solely at his door is ill conceived.

This account, written in the context of the current financial crisis, is a knee jerk and reactionary response. Nonetheless, it does contain the grain of truth that, going forward, economic policymakers will need to start focusing more on different types of price inflation to ensure economic stability over the longer term. No doubt, a much more balanced account of the man who ran US monetary policy for so long will be written in the years to come. In the meantime this effort shouldn't be ignored.

Excellent study of a failed system, 12 Sep 2008
In this fascinating book, financial journalist William Fleckenstein studies the record of Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006.

Between 1937 and 1987 there were no bubbles, but Greenspan helped to create two bubbles in ten years - in stocks and then in real estate - by holding interest rates too low, punishing savers. He helped to make the American people worse off by redistributing wealth to the rich, the bubbles' boosters and sponsors.

Greenspan viewed new technology expenses as assets. So he thought that productivity and profits were higher than they really were, that inflation was overstated and that stocks were understated. In 1998 firms spent $95 billion on computers. After Greenspan's `hedonic adjustment', this came out as $352 billion, adding 2% to US GDP.

Governments want to understate inflation and overstate growth, productivity and incomes. So now, most price rises seem to be way above the rate of inflation.

Greenspan's rate cut of 15 October 1998 triggered the stock market bubble. By 1999 the stock market was valued at 180% of US GDP. (In the last bubble, in 1929, it was 85% of GDP.) In 2000-01 this bubble burst - the new technology miracle proved to be a mirage. In 1992-99 there was zero productivity growth in 99% of the US economy, and growth only in 1%, computer hardware.

In 2001-03, housing `saved' the US economy from the aftershock of the stock bubble. De-regulation led to lower lending standards with more `creative' financial instruments, like the $500 trillion worth of derivatives, which Warren Buffett described as `financial instruments of mass destruction'.

So from 2003 to 2007 there was a real estate bubble, based on huge debts. Mortgage-equity withdrawals created half US GDP growth between 2001 and 2007. By 2006, household debt was 97% of GDP: mortgage debt was $13.3 trillion. Total US debt in 2007 was 325% of GDP.

This ocean of debts rested on a falling real estate market, a sinking economy and a weak currency. Where could the next economic rebound come from? Capitalism has destroyed production and destroyed the housing market: it is running out of options.



The condemnation of Alan Greenspan, in brief., 23 Jun 2008
This book states the argument of those who oppose Alan Greenspan, the former chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve. William A. Fleckenstein and Frederick Sheehan, who sometimes seem to go a bit over the top in the intensity of their attacks, write that Greenspan, despite his reputation, was no "maestro." Instead, they report he was a poor manager with a habit of either deception or self-delusion. The authors support their argument by drawing heavily on extensive quotations from Greenspan's testimony before Congress and on minutes of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee meetings. Although getAbstract might wish for less fervor in this presentation, it forwards this book to policy makers, financial services executives and others who wish to understand the downside of Greenspan's policies and how he may have contributed to the U.S. economy's current dilemma.

Detractors take the stand, 02 Apr 2008
Public men in the public eye and with very public actions tend to have eulogists and detractors.
Alan Greenspan was Chairman of the FED for 19 years and three Presidents. During his tenure as Chairman, globalisation came of age, China erupted in the world scene, geopolitical trends shifted with the fall of the Wall, the Euro and September 11th.
The only strange thing in this long period is that no catastrophic event occurred, although a lot of recessions and financial crisis took place throughout the world.
There was never a unanimity about Greenspan's actions and decisions (although they were not only his) and those who read Joseph Stiglitz's «The Roaring Nineties» noticed that he took more then a few pot-shots at Alan Greenspan, to give an example.
When an economic downturn occurs, like the one triggered by the sub-prime crisis, those who dislike the market economics blame it on the market and its rules and of course on its Heralds and Icons; But, making an idiot and a blunderer of the man who oversaw one of the longest and most ebullient periods of growth in the United Sates and the world at large is not an useful contribution to the understanding of what is at stake now.
"Greenspan's Bubbles: The Age of Ignorance at the Federal Reserve" by William Fleckenstein and Fred Sheehan will not go down in any serious analysis of the period. The Age of Turbulence by Alan Greenspan will. Read it instead.


GREENSPAN'S BUBBLES, 02 Mar 2008
I always thought Greenspan was an idiot but had no idea how big an idiot he was/is. EZ-AL was nothing more then a snake oil salesman that promised great things and delivered misery. The collapse of the U.S. financial system can be directly tied to Greenspan through his not having a clue as to what he was doing while the head of the Federal Reserve. Perhaps now the U.S. is entering into the largest financial disaster since the Great Depression, citizens will come to realize that Alan Greenspan was a major contributor through his mismanagement of the supply/cost of money. In Congressional testimony he admitted it wasn't "possible to manage something" you couldn't define. This admission from the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States!!!!!!
In the mean time, we pay while Alan played.
READ THE BOOK FOR FUTURE REFERENCE BECAUSE WE ARE GOING TO NEED IT.

how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

A vivid history and critique of the 1907 financial crisis, 21 Oct 2008
If you compare the 1907 crisis that struck U.S. and European financial institutions with 2008's economic emergencies, you will discover striking similarities. (In fact, the uncanny parallels have made this fascinating book a bestseller.) Strong interconnectivity between financial firms meant that trouble at one migrated to others. Both crises involved serious credit and liquidity concerns. Both provoked populist attacks against Wall Street. In part, the trusts hit trouble in 1907 because of insufficient regulation. The 1907 crisis started on Wall Street, and quickly jumped to European institutions. In 2008, the trajectory was even more global. Of course, marked differences also separate these episodes. In 1907, fabled financier J.P. Morgan exercised remarkable leadership to end the crisis, and to reassure depositors and investors that their savings and equity holdings were secure. Morgan calmed the waters so the panic would not spread. "This is the place to stop this trouble," he said of the Trust Company of America. Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr explain why the 1907 panic occurred and use it as a valuable case study for understanding other monetary crises. getAbstract is confident that history lovers, businesspeople, financial executives and anyone who enjoys a well-told, real-life drama will love this book.

Good beginners book, 22 May 2008
This is a lovely book for the beginner, since there are lovely colour photos and bite size information covering what you need to know to get into keeping chickens. It is limited, in that once you have your chickens you probably want to have more information and there are only a limited amount of breeds covered but the lay out is reader friendly, digestible and sufficient for the novice to make a good start. Then the fun begins! The book does relay the real joy of keeping chickens and the benefits for children. Well worth reading before getting started on buying coop, hens etc.

The best introduction to keeping chickens we've found, 23 Jan 2008
We've been keeping chickens for a couple of years now, and we wish we had this book when (or even before) we started out. It has information on all aspects of keeping chickens, from coops and enclosures, avoiding health problems, integrating with the existing family, feeding, etc. The text is well-thought-out and clearly written, and the pictures with their associated captions add even more information. Buy this book before you dive in and get your first chook. If you're already a chicken-parent, buy it anyway and keep it to hand always!

Excellent - well worth the price, 01 Nov 2007
If you are thinking about keeping chickens everything that you need to know is in this book. Absolutely excellent!!

This is just the book I was looking for! Highly Recommended!!, 04 May 2007
Ideal book for anyone who is thinking to keep chickens! Great introduction to all aspects of keeping chickens with just the right depth covering everything from housing, litter materials, feed types, chicken well beings, natural vs artificial fertilised eggs incubations, chicken breeds... etc etc.. All these are explained in plain English together with excellent colour photos to maintain reader interest throughout the book. Did you know that chickens need to eat sand or grits to help digestions? I did not before reading this book! All in all, a great book which is both entertaining and educational to read before keeping your first chicken in your backyard! Definately a 5-Start for this book!!!

A good introduction to keeping chickens, 24 Nov 2006
I've just started looking into keeping chickens in my back garden and found this book really helpful - from picking the right breed to how to house and care for them. It's clearly set out with sound advice and the large colour pictures of the different breed types are great!

A great introduction to bee keeping, 09 Aug 2008
I bought this book as I inherited a hive and wanted to keep the tradition alive. It was a great place to start, giving not only sound, practical advice but also an interesting overview of the history of bee keeping. It linked in with the bee keeping associations around the country and the recipes at the back were not only lovely but gave me some great ideas for when my harvest is ready! A great book with lovely photographs and excellent advice for first time bee keepers.

Interesting but misjudged, 06 Oct 2008
I would recommend this book to readers of Greenspan's Age of Turbulence as a relevant counterargument. However, I would do so with some significant reservations. The key criticism leveled at Greenspan is that his monetary policy encouraged rather than hindered the Dot com and property bubbles. Fleckenstein's contention however is based on an erroneous assumption. The author implies that it was Fed's job to constrain ASSET price inflation. In fact the orthodox economic view, throughout this period, was that central banks should concern themselves entirely with achieving low and stable CONSUMER price inflation. Perhaps the Fed chairman did allow himself, at times, to become distracted by the performance of the US stock market but ultimately it wasn't in his job spec. to stop the speculative excesses of joe public. Trying to lay the blame solely at his door is ill conceived.

This account, written in the context of the current financial crisis, is a knee jerk and reactionary response. Nonetheless, it does contain the grain of truth that, going forward, economic policymakers will need to start focusing more on different types of price inflation to ensure economic stability over the longer term. No doubt, a much more balanced account of the man who ran US monetary policy for so long will be written in the years to come. In the meantime this effort shouldn't be ignored.

Excellent study of a failed system, 12 Sep 2008
In this fascinating book, financial journalist William Fleckenstein studies the record of Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006.

Between 1937 and 1987 there were no bubbles, but Greenspan helped to create two bubbles in ten years - in stocks and then in real estate - by holding interest rates too low, punishing savers. He helped to make the American people worse off by redistributing wealth to the rich, the bubbles' boosters and sponsors.

Greenspan viewed new technology expenses as assets. So he thought that productivity and profits were higher than they really were, that inflation was overstated and that stocks were understated. In 1998 firms spent $95 billion on computers. After Greenspan's `hedonic adjustment', this came out as $352 billion, adding 2% to US GDP.

Governments want to understate inflation and overstate growth, productivity and incomes. So now, most price rises seem to be way above the rate of inflation.

Greenspan's rate cut of 15 October 1998 triggered the stock market bubble. By 1999 the stock market was valued at 180% of US GDP. (In the last bubble, in 1929, it was 85% of GDP.) In 2000-01 this bubble burst - the new technology miracle proved to be a mirage. In 1992-99 there was zero productivity growth in 99% of the US economy, and growth only in 1%, computer hardware.

In 2001-03, housing `saved' the US economy from the aftershock of the stock bubble. De-regulation led to lower lending standards with more `creative' financial instruments, like the $500 trillion worth of derivatives, which Warren Buffett described as `financial instruments of mass destruction'.

So from 2003 to 2007 there was a real estate bubble, based on huge debts. Mortgage-equity withdrawals created half US GDP growth between 2001 and 2007. By 2006, household debt was 97% of GDP: mortgage debt was $13.3 trillion. Total US debt in 2007 was 325% of GDP.

This ocean of debts rested on a falling real estate market, a sinking economy and a weak currency. Where could the next economic rebound come from? Capitalism has destroyed production and destroyed the housing market: it is running out of options.



The condemnation of Alan Greenspan, in brief., 23 Jun 2008
This book states the argument of those who oppose Alan Greenspan, the former chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve. William A. Fleckenstein and Frederick Sheehan, who sometimes seem to go a bit over the top in the intensity of their attacks, write that Greenspan, despite his reputation, was no "maestro." Instead, they report he was a poor manager with a habit of either deception or self-delusion. The authors support their argument by drawing heavily on extensive quotations from Greenspan's testimony before Congress and on minutes of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee meetings. Although getAbstract might wish for less fervor in this presentation, it forwards this book to policy makers, financial services executives and others who wish to understand the downside of Greenspan's policies and how he may have contributed to the U.S. economy's current dilemma.

Detractors take the stand, 02 Apr 2008
Public men in the public eye and with very public actions tend to have eulogists and detractors.
Alan Greenspan was Chairman of the FED for 19 years and three Presidents. During his tenure as Chairman, globalisation came of age, China erupted in the world scene, geopolitical trends shifted with the fall of the Wall, the Euro and September 11th.
The only strange thing in this long period is that no catastrophic event occurred, although a lot of recessions and financial crisis took place throughout the world.
There was never a unanimity about Greenspan's actions and decisions (although they were not only his) and those who read Joseph Stiglitz's «The Roaring Nineties» noticed that he took more then a few pot-shots at Alan Greenspan, to give an example.
When an economic downturn occurs, like the one triggered by the sub-prime crisis, those who dislike the market economics blame it on the market and its rules and of course on its Heralds and Icons; But, making an idiot and a blunderer of the man who oversaw one of the longest and most ebullient periods of growth in the United Sates and the world at large is not an useful contribution to the understanding of what is at stake now.
"Greenspan's Bubbles: The Age of Ignorance at the Federal Reserve" by William Fleckenstein and Fred Sheehan will not go down in any serious analysis of the period. The Age of Turbulence by Alan Greenspan will. Read it instead.


GREENSPAN'S BUBBLES, 02 Mar 2008
I always thought Greenspan was an idiot but had no idea how big an idiot he was/is. EZ-AL was nothing more then a snake oil salesman that promised great things and delivered misery. The collapse of the U.S. financial system can be directly tied to Greenspan through his not having a clue as to what he was doing while the head of the Federal Reserve. Perhaps now the U.S. is entering into the largest financial disaster since the Great Depression, citizens will come to realize that Alan Greenspan was a major contributor through his mismanagement of the supply/cost of money. In Congressional testimony he admitted it wasn't "possible to manage something" you couldn't define. This admission from the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States!!!!!!
In the mean time, we pay while Alan played.
READ THE BOOK FOR FUTURE REFERENCE BECAUSE WE ARE GOING TO NEED IT.

Understanding China, 04 Nov 2008
This is a wonderfully-written book that shows how difficult it used to be to invest in China and get a return. It remains hard for westerners, and there is a terribly damaging legacy of forty years of communist mismanagement of the economy. However, I think that an investor reading this book today might be unduly discouraged by the difficulties that Clissold brilliantly, and hilariously, describes.

The core point of the book, that doing business the western way, having contracts that legally enforcible and which the parties regard as inviolable, remains a problem. Free private property in the absence of good enforcement of property rights remains a chimera. Investing in China can be profitable, but is definitely not for the faint-hearted, nor for those with short-term investment horizons.

A Gripping Business Book, 30 Oct 2008
I was asked to write a speech for a Chinese-American lady, and she recommended this book. I'd read it within four days of buying it. It's fantastic story about how making agreements, and getting those agreements fulfilled are two very different things - theory is one thing, practice is quite another - China is a very different country and their way of doing things is eye-poppingly different.

Tim Clissold lived the drama. He went through hell and just about came out the other side. Even if you weren't going to do business with China, it's an excellent story of how human nature can defy management. It also shows how many things we take for granted in the West. This is a beautiful book.

China for beginners, 28 Jul 2008
I met a German chap in Hong Kong once, who was a buyer in the Chinese markets for a consortium of European companies. Every time we talked about China and doing business there, he would develop a nervous twitch and his right eyebrow would start to shake. All he would say was "Weird. It is very weird", which he would keep on repeating without ever elaborating. This book explains his behaviour.



What a book!, 25 Mar 2008
Is it a travelogue? Is it a business book? Is it an adventure book? Or is it a book for understanding a culture? I felt it is all of those. For someone wanting to get an outside-in view of China, this book surprises, amazes, imparts knowledge, challenges the basis of rational thought and leaves one wanting to know more.
I personally think the author has done a fantastic job in his narration. Most definitely a must read even though it is about China as it was in early to mid nineties. It will be interesting to see how far China has changed since then.

My International Business Professor recommended this book late last year. I will probably ask for more book recommendations from him .

couldn't put it down, 06 Feb 2007
what a hilarious account. I read this on a plane on my way to canada and had to stifle loud laughs often. Written in that typical style of the unflappable englishman with the stiff upper lip who will not let anhything, no matter how trying, get to him. Read it and you will laugh, feel anger, frustration and sadness...but totally enjoyable!!!

how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

A vivid history and critique of the 1907 financial crisis, 21 Oct 2008
If you compare the 1907 crisis that struck U.S. and European financial institutions with 2008's economic emergencies, you will discover striking similarities. (In fact, the uncanny parallels have made this fascinating book a bestseller.) Strong interconnectivity between financial firms meant that trouble at one migrated to others. Both crises involved serious credit and liquidity concerns. Both provoked populist attacks against Wall Street. In part, the trusts hit trouble in 1907 because of insufficient regulation. The 1907 crisis started on Wall Street, and quickly jumped to European institutions. In 2008, the trajectory was even more global. Of course, marked differences also separate these episodes. In 1907, fabled financier J.P. Morgan exercised remarkable leadership to end the crisis, and to reassure depositors and investors that their savings and equity holdings were secure. Morgan calmed the waters so the panic would not spread. "This is the place to stop this trouble," he said of the Trust Company of America. Robert F.