how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

First rate account of America's civil war, 30 Mar 2005
If you want to know about the civil war,how it came about? where,when and what happened? who the key player's were?Then this is the book for you!I wanted a book that was informative, yet written in an easily absorbing way.It is vivid without being boring,the only downside is that you find it very hard to put down!

An good synthesis with interesting side articles, 30 Mar 2004
I read this volume aside "Battle cry of Freedom" from James McPherson, and although it is not as complete, it is quicker to read and contains the essential military developments of the civil war. What I really appreciate, though, are the quality of the illustrations (although some of the maps could have been better and more precise), but even more, the chapters aside the main events, focusing on specific portraits of civilians and soldiers living during this war. If I were to read this book again, I would read it before "Battle cry of Freedom", as a preliminary to understand it even better. Overall, I think this Osprey collection (Essential Histories) is excellent to awake (or not) your interest on a particular war or campaign and give you an incentive to do more research on a particular subject if you like the corresponding Osprey book, providing you a short but accurate bibliography for further reading, which is always useful for the amateur historian.

The idea that money makes the world go round has become so ingrained in popular consciousness that it has almost acquired the status of eternal truth. Which is possibly by why it has escaped close examination. Until now. And as Niall Ferguson's The Cash Nexus makes clear it is one that doesn't stand up to close scrutiny. That there is a link between money and politics is unarguable. In the early 1700s, when governments discovered the black art of servicing debt through bond issues and a central bank, they unlocked the doors to warfare and empire building on a grand scale, and the ability to raise money has remained integral to domestic and international politics ever since. The question that Ferguson asks is whether the link always holds good and that, as both Marxist and right-wing historians continue to maintain, all political life is driven by economic forces. Indeed, so entrenched is the belief that governments themselves believe it. Bill Clinton's electioneering slogan, "It's the economy, stupid" has become such a given that the Labour government appear to be using it as the basis for their new campaign. And yet, as Ferguson points out, if you look at the results of recent elections, you see that the axiom carries little weight. If it had, John Major would have been re-elected in 1997 and Al Gore would have swept home in 2000. Similarly, if poor economic performance was a guarantee of electoral disaster, Margaret Thatcher would have been voted out of office in 1983. So politics--or the pursuit of power--do exist as a separate entity. Partly this may be because most people are catastrophically hopeless at assessing their economic self-interest, and partly because people are motivated by forces over and beyond money. Whatever the reason, the consequences for the way we view the world are immense, and as in The Pity of War, where Ferguson challenged some of the conventional wisdoms of the First World War, he takes a provocative pen to many of the accepted norms of the 21st century. Class war is replaced by age war, with the teens losing out; the Americans have been too timid rather than too aggressive in their global policing; and petrol tax revolts are a political inevitability. The Cash Nexus is ambitious, entertaining and thought-provoking. What it isn't is a populist history-lite easy read. Some of the ideas are just too complex to be broadbrushed; but don't give up. --John Crace

how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

First rate account of America's civil war, 30 Mar 2005
If you want to know about the civil war,how it came about? where,when and what happened? who the key player's were?Then this is the book for you!I wanted a book that was informative, yet written in an easily absorbing way.It is vivid without being boring,the only downside is that you find it very hard to put down!

An good synthesis with interesting side articles, 30 Mar 2004
I read this volume aside "Battle cry of Freedom" from James McPherson, and although it is not as complete, it is quicker to read and contains the essential military developments of the civil war. What I really appreciate, though, are the quality of the illustrations (although some of the maps could have been better and more precise), but even more, the chapters aside the main events, focusing on specific portraits of civilians and soldiers living during this war. If I were to read this book again, I would read it before "Battle cry of Freedom", as a preliminary to understand it even better. Overall, I think this Osprey collection (Essential Histories) is excellent to awake (or not) your interest on a particular war or campaign and give you an incentive to do more research on a particular subject if you like the corresponding Osprey book, providing you a short but accurate bibliography for further reading, which is always useful for the amateur historian.

The cash nebulous, 30 Mar 2006
I purchased this book on the basis of the on-line reviews anticipating a study of financial history.

Whilst it is reasonable on the history of currency, banking, and international finance it drifts off badly into loose discussions of UK politics, democracy and development, and the rise of the US economy. None of this material is particularly convincing and is based far too much on citations.

Overall I found it a frustrating read. There is a too much of a feeling that the author is a moderator in a debate which he doesn't fully understand.

Hard going but worth the effort, 22 Jun 2003
The book's scope is much wider than its title would imply. The author analyzes why some regimes have been more successful than others during past 300 years. The book emphasizes importance of four institutions as the bases of financial strength (and long-term success) of the state:
- a tax-collecting bureaucracy
- a representative parliament
- a national debt
- a central bank

There is lot of intellectual gymnastics with figures and facts in the middle of the book that test your determination to go on. Those who persevere get rewarded with the interesting discussion in the end of the book about defense expenses as a insurance policy for the state and a need for a superpower policeman for the free world in order to make peace and prosperity to last.

Read and find out if you agree with the conclusions of the author.

An excellent book but it does tend to drift off in places, 28 Feb 2001
Overall an excellent book that look at the link of bond prices democracy, politics and a nation-states power. It is very informative and contains alot of data simply set out; especially useful if you just happening to be doing a degree at the time.

My favourite aspect of this book is the completely fresh look ( even if I don't agree with all of it ) it takes at national power rather than rehashing old books with little, if anything, new to say.

Saying that the book at times does drift off losing all sense of structure especially in the middle covering the links between political parties and various lobby groups.

This does not stop being easy to read and comprehend while still being extremely informative.

how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

First rate account of America's civil war, 30 Mar 2005
If you want to know about the civil war,how it came about? where,when and what happened? who the key player's were?Then this is the book for you!I wanted a book that was informative, yet written in an easily absorbing way.It is vivid without being boring,the only downside is that you find it very hard to put down!

An good synthesis with interesting side articles, 30 Mar 2004
I read this volume aside "Battle cry of Freedom" from James McPherson, and although it is not as complete, it is quicker to read and contains the essential military developments of the civil war. What I really appreciate, though, are the quality of the illustrations (although some of the maps could have been better and more precise), but even more, the chapters aside the main events, focusing on specific portraits of civilians and soldiers living during this war. If I were to read this book again, I would read it before "Battle cry of Freedom", as a preliminary to understand it even better. Overall, I think this Osprey collection (Essential Histories) is excellent to awake (or not) your interest on a particular war or campaign and give you an incentive to do more research on a particular subject if you like the corresponding Osprey book, providing you a short but accurate bibliography for further reading, which is always useful for the amateur historian.

The cash nebulous, 30 Mar 2006
I purchased this book on the basis of the on-line reviews anticipating a study of financial history.

Whilst it is reasonable on the history of currency, banking, and international finance it drifts off badly into loose discussions of UK politics, democracy and development, and the rise of the US economy. None of this material is particularly convincing and is based far too much on citations.

Overall I found it a frustrating read. There is a too much of a feeling that the author is a moderator in a debate which he doesn't fully understand.

Hard going but worth the effort, 22 Jun 2003
The book's scope is much wider than its title would imply. The author analyzes why some regimes have been more successful than others during past 300 years. The book emphasizes importance of four institutions as the bases of financial strength (and long-term success) of the state:
- a tax-collecting bureaucracy
- a representative parliament
- a national debt
- a central bank

There is lot of intellectual gymnastics with figures and facts in the middle of the book that test your determination to go on. Those who persevere get rewarded with the interesting discussion in the end of the book about defense expenses as a insurance policy for the state and a need for a superpower policeman for the free world in order to make peace and prosperity to last.

Read and find out if you agree with the conclusions of the author.

An excellent book but it does tend to drift off in places, 28 Feb 2001
Overall an excellent book that look at the link of bond prices democracy, politics and a nation-states power. It is very informative and contains alot of data simply set out; especially useful if you just happening to be doing a degree at the time.

My favourite aspect of this book is the completely fresh look ( even if I don't agree with all of it ) it takes at national power rather than rehashing old books with little, if anything, new to say.

Saying that the book at times does drift off losing all sense of structure especially in the middle covering the links between political parties and various lobby groups.

This does not stop being easy to read and comprehend while still being extremely informative.

Grayling is not a historian. And it shows., 18 Nov 2008
I am a huge fan of Grayling's philosophical writings, and as far as I am aware, I have read (and enjoyed) all of his published books. But this really was disappointing, despite my own active interest in human rights.

The main problem is this: Grayling is not a historian. And, more importantly, it shows. The author trudges through key figures and events in his "story of the struggles for liberty and rights" offering very little historical analysis along the way. His key point is this: all the rights and liberties we enjoy, only exist because of the struggles and sacrfices of those who have gone before us. Further, we would do well to remember this at a time when our governments seem determined to erode our liberties in the name of security. This, of course, is a worthy point, but I'm not sure that 272 long pages, which merely outline the factual circumstances of each struggle, individual and collective, is the most effective way to make this point.

Grayling has offered interesting and powerful, historically focused works in the past. "Among the Dead Cities" looks at the historical evidence and asks whether the allied policy of carpet bombing German cities during WWII was a moral crime. As with all his philosophical works, the result is a fascinating, thought-provoking read. But the difference between that and the current book is that in "Among the Dead Cities" he never takes his eye off his central philosophical question. As such, it is not a historical work, so much as a philosophical look at a particular historical episode.

Unfortunately, the same just cannot be said of this book. It is dry, uninspiring and, frankly, hard work. While Grayling's premise may be correct, the main lesson I took from the book is this: Grayling is not a historian. He should stick to what he does best.


A sorely needed refresher course, 11 Jan 2008
I have no hesitation in giving Professor Grayling's book five stars.

It is an education and vigorous refresher for anyone like myself who recognises names like Spinoza, Locke, Voltaire, Milton, de Tocqueville, but has only a hazy understanding of what they stand for, and only a patchy idea of the significance of the Glorious English Revolution of 1688 and the American and French revolutions, but has now in these times an uneasy feeling that the ideas and principles underpinning free societies are neglected. In as little as three hundred well written pages he explains it all.

I will let others extol the virtues of the book and here draw attention to one serious flaw, or to be kind to the author, to draw attention to an issue on which I wish he had said a lot more.

His priorities are wrong.

The book is exactly what it says it is "The Story of the Struggles for Liberty & Rights" but the opening and closing chapters discuss the threats to Liberty that we face today.

In the opening chapter he poses the question, in relation to the growing Muslim population in Europe, of how we deal with those whose ideas on Liberty and Rights are different from ours and who if they got their way would bring an end to the Liberty that we have painfully gained over the last 500 years. He doesn't answer this question.

Mistakenly, in my view, in these opening and closing chapters he concentrates on the threats to Liberty posed by the anti-terrorist measures taken by the US and UK governments.

As awful and as worrying some of these anti-terrorist measures are [1][2] they can at least be discussed. Your life will not be threatened, the Politically Correct (PC) roof will not fall on your head, respected national figures can and do state their views. But, these measures and the terrorism that brings them about are only symptoms, symptoms of an underlying religious malaise, and that is Islam as it mainly manifests itself in the world today.

He could say a lot more about the threat to Liberty from Islam. Perhaps his views are constrained by the observations he makes in relation to the persecution of minorities in Nazi Germany.

Religion is a very sensitive subject [3]. It is a sobering thought that a US presidential candidate who said openly that he wasn't too sure about God or that he was an atheist, wouldn't stand a chance. Could it be that the authors of the American Constitution, a beacon of Liberty, would be rejected by today's American voters?

Could we discuss openly and have a debate at a respected political level of the problems and potential problems caused by Islam in Liberal societies, and in the way we discuss measures to combat terrorism, discuss what we should and will do about it. I fear not.

We have started 2008 in the UK with a prime example of the difficulties. The Bishop of Rochester has drawn attention to the voluntary segregation of Muslims in the UK and the enclaves they have created which he says have become "no go" areas for Christians.

Of course, the bishop's use of the term "no-go" was a mistake. It has too many wrong meanings. The PC roof has fallen on his head, political figures from right, left and centre are falling over themselves to criticise or distance themselves from the bishop.

But the bishop is essentially right. There are a growing number of places which are growing in size in the UK where the culture around you is Islamic. Mohamed in its various spellings is now the most popular name for a boy in the UK. The bishop didn't say it, so I will say it for him. It wont be long before these Islamic communities will be demanding Sharia law. What then Liberty?

Not all Muslims, perhaps only a minority, believe and practice the aspects of their religion that are so inimical to free societies. But these beliefs and practices

- women are essentially male possessions

- death is a just punishment for apostasy and insulting Islam or the prophet

- that Islam trumps all other religions

- Muslims have a sacred duty to impose Islam everywhere, by force if necessary

to name a few of the worst, cast a dark shadow wherever Muslims live.

The bodies that represent Muslims are a cause of concern. Western suits and PR officers are no guarantee of a modern outlook or reasonableness. The secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain when asked if stoning was a bad thing said it "depended on the stones". He also thinks arranged marriages are a good idea and we in the UK should have them. His predecessor, whom the UK government rubbed shoulders with, is notorious for having said of Salman Rushdie that death was too good for him.

Perhaps a very great danger is not having a clear idea of what or who represents a form of Islam that can truly be part of a Liberal society [4]

These are the sorts of issues and threats that I wish Professor Grayling had given more space to and, from his philosophical standpoint, offered some ideas on how they can be dealt with.

Notes

[1] That a high American official made out a case for torture must have had Torquemada laughing in his grave.

[2] Professor Grayling is spot on in his criticism of the UK ID card scheme. I speak with some authority having studied the subject. Prof Grayling refers readers to the press in general to learn more about this nonsense, to which I would add and strongly recommend the Report and Evidence published by the UK Parliamentary Committee concerned with home affairs. The pages of my copy are stained with tears of laughter and rage.

[3] Having read this book I checked out Amazon readers comments on other works by Prof Grayling. I was shocked at the virulence of some of the attacks on him because he is, apparently, an atheist.

[4] Irshad Manjii in an excellent review of "Arguing the Just War in Islam" a recent book by John Kelsay, writes:

The moderates whom Kelsay has studied "do not in fact dissent from the militant judgement that current political arrangements are illegitimate. Some moderates agree with militants that "democracy" implies a kind of moral equivalence between Islam and other perspectives. And such a situation is dangerous not only for the standing of the Muslim community, but for the moral life of humankind"

[International Herald Tribune, 5-6 January, 2008]

I would add to this that 25 percent of UK Muslims sympathised with the London bombers.

how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

First rate account of America's civil war, 30 Mar 2005
If you want to know about the civil war,how it came about? where,when and what happened? who the key player's were?Then this is the book for you!I wanted a book that was informative, yet written in an easily absorbing way.It is vivid without being boring,the only downside is that you find it very hard to put down!

An good synthesis with interesting side articles, 30 Mar 2004
I read this volume aside "Battle cry of Freedom" from James McPherson, and although it is not as complete, it is quicker to read and contains the essential military developments of the civil war. What I really appreciate, though, are the quality of the illustrations (although some of the maps could have been better and more precise), but even more, the chapters aside the main events, focusing on specific portraits of civilians and soldiers living during this war. If I were to read this book again, I would read it before "Battle cry of Freedom", as a preliminary to understand it even better. Overall, I think this Osprey collection (Essential Histories) is excellent to awake (or not) your interest on a particular war or campaign and give you an incentive to do more research on a particular subject if you like the corresponding Osprey book, providing you a short but accurate bibliography for further reading, which is always useful for the amateur historian.

The cash nebulous, 30 Mar 2006
I purchased this book on the basis of the on-line reviews anticipating a study of financial history.

Whilst it is reasonable on the history of currency, banking, and international finance it drifts off badly into loose discussions of UK politics, democracy and development, and the rise of the US economy. None of this material is particularly convincing and is based far too much on citations.

Overall I found it a frustrating read. There is a too much of a feeling that the author is a moderator in a debate which he doesn't fully understand.

Hard going but worth the effort, 22 Jun 2003
The book's scope is much wider than its title would imply. The author analyzes why some regimes have been more successful than others during past 300 years. The book emphasizes importance of four institutions as the bases of financial strength (and long-term success) of the state:
- a tax-collecting bureaucracy
- a representative parliament
- a national debt
- a central bank

There is lot of intellectual gymnastics with figures and facts in the middle of the book that test your determination to go on. Those who persevere get rewarded with the interesting discussion in the end of the book about defense expenses as a insurance policy for the state and a need for a superpower policeman for the free world in order to make peace and prosperity to last.

Read and find out if you agree with the conclusions of the author.

An excellent book but it does tend to drift off in places, 28 Feb 2001
Overall an excellent book that look at the link of bond prices democracy, politics and a nation-states power. It is very informative and contains alot of data simply set out; especially useful if you just happening to be doing a degree at the time.

My favourite aspect of this book is the completely fresh look ( even if I don't agree with all of it ) it takes at national power rather than rehashing old books with little, if anything, new to say.

Saying that the book at times does drift off losing all sense of structure especially in the middle covering the links between political parties and various lobby groups.

This does not stop being easy to read and comprehend while still being extremely informative.

Grayling is not a historian. And it shows., 18 Nov 2008
I am a huge fan of Grayling's philosophical writings, and as far as I am aware, I have read (and enjoyed) all of his published books. But this really was disappointing, despite my own active interest in human rights.

The main problem is this: Grayling is not a historian. And, more importantly, it shows. The author trudges through key figures and events in his "story of the struggles for liberty and rights" offering very little historical analysis along the way. His key point is this: all the rights and liberties we enjoy, only exist because of the struggles and sacrfices of those who have gone before us. Further, we would do well to remember this at a time when our governments seem determined to erode our liberties in the name of security. This, of course, is a worthy point, but I'm not sure that 272 long pages, which merely outline the factual circumstances of each struggle, individual and collective, is the most effective way to make this point.

Grayling has offered interesting and powerful, historically focused works in the past. "Among the Dead Cities" looks at the historical evidence and asks whether the allied policy of carpet bombing German cities during WWII was a moral crime. As with all his philosophical works, the result is a fascinating, thought-provoking read. But the difference between that and the current book is that in "Among the Dead Cities" he never takes his eye off his central philosophical question. As such, it is not a historical work, so much as a philosophical look at a particular historical episode.

Unfortunately, the same just cannot be said of this book. It is dry, uninspiring and, frankly, hard work. While Grayling's premise may be correct, the main lesson I took from the book is this: Grayling is not a historian. He should stick to what he does best.


A sorely needed refresher course, 11 Jan 2008
I have no hesitation in giving Professor Grayling's book five stars.

It is an education and vigorous refresher for anyone like myself who recognises names like Spinoza, Locke, Voltaire, Milton, de Tocqueville, but has only a hazy understanding of what they stand for, and only a patchy idea of the significance of the Glorious English Revolution of 1688 and the American and French revolutions, but has now in these times an uneasy feeling that the ideas and principles underpinning free societies are neglected. In as little as three hundred well written pages he explains it all.

I will let others extol the virtues of the book and here draw attention to one serious flaw, or to be kind to the author, to draw attention to an issue on which I wish he had said a lot more.

His priorities are wrong.

The book is exactly what it says it is "The Story of the Struggles for Liberty & Rights" but the opening and closing chapters discuss the threats to Liberty that we face today.

In the opening chapter he poses the question, in relation to the growing Muslim population in Europe, of how we deal with those whose ideas on Liberty and Rights are different from ours and who if they got their way would bring an end to the Liberty that we have painfully gained over the last 500 years. He doesn't answer this question.

Mistakenly, in my view, in these opening and closing chapters he concentrates on the threats to Liberty posed by the anti-terrorist measures taken by the US and UK governments.

As awful and as worrying some of these anti-terrorist measures are [1][2] they can at least be discussed. Your life will not be threatened, the Politically Correct (PC) roof will not fall on your head, respected national figures can and do state their views. But, these measures and the terrorism that brings them about are only symptoms, symptoms of an underlying religious malaise, and that is Islam as it mainly manifests itself in the world today.

He could say a lot more about the threat to Liberty from Islam. Perhaps his views are constrained by the observations he makes in relation to the persecution of minorities in Nazi Germany.

Religion is a very sensitive subject [3]. It is a sobering thought that a US presidential candidate who said openly that he wasn't too sure about God or that he was an atheist, wouldn't stand a chance. Could it be that the authors of the American Constitution, a beacon of Liberty, would be rejected by today's American voters?

Could we discuss openly and have a debate at a respected political level of the problems and potential problems caused by Islam in Liberal societies, and in the way we discuss measures to combat terrorism, discuss what we should and will do about it. I fear not.

We have started 2008 in the UK with a prime example of the difficulties. The Bishop of Rochester has drawn attention to the voluntary segregation of Muslims in the UK and the enclaves they have created which he says have become "no go" areas for Christians.

Of course, the bishop's use of the term "no-go" was a mistake. It has too many wrong meanings. The PC roof has fallen on his head, political figures from right, left and centre are falling over themselves to criticise or distance themselves from the bishop.

But the bishop is essentially right. There are a growing number of places which are growing in size in the UK where the culture around you is Islamic. Mohamed in its various spellings is now the most popular name for a boy in the UK. The bishop didn't say it, so I will say it for him. It wont be long before these Islamic communities will be demanding Sharia law. What then Liberty?

Not all Muslims, perhaps only a minority, believe and practice the aspects of their religion that are so inimical to free societies. But these beliefs and practices

- women are essentially male possessions

- death is a just punishment for apostasy and insulting Islam or the prophet

- that Islam trumps all other religions

- Muslims have a sacred duty to impose Islam everywhere, by force if necessary

to name a few of the worst, cast a dark shadow wherever Muslims live.

The bodies that represent Muslims are a cause of concern. Western suits and PR officers are no guarantee of a modern outlook or reasonableness. The secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain when asked if stoning was a bad thing said it "depended on the stones". He also thinks arranged marriages are a good idea and we in the UK should have them. His predecessor, whom the UK government rubbed shoulders with, is notorious for having said of Salman Rushdie that death was too good for him.

Perhaps a very great danger is not having a clear idea of what or who represents a form of Islam that can truly be part of a Liberal society [4]

These are the sorts of issues and threats that I wish Professor Grayling had given more space to and, from his philosophical standpoint, offered some ideas on how they can be dealt with.

Notes

[1] That a high American official made out a case for torture must have had Torquemada laughing in his grave.

[2] Professor Grayling is spot on in his criticism of the UK ID card scheme. I speak with some authority having studied the subject. Prof Grayling refers readers to the press in general to learn more about this nonsense, to which I would add and strongly recommend the Report and Evidence published by the UK Parliamentary Committee concerned with home affairs. The pages of my copy are stained with tears of laughter and rage.

[3] Having read this book I checked out Amazon readers comments on other works by Prof Grayling. I was shocked at the virulence of some of the attacks on him because he is, apparently, an atheist.

[4] Irshad Manjii in an excellent review of "Arguing the Just War in Islam" a recent book by John Kelsay, writes:

The moderates whom Kelsay has studied "do not in fact dissent from the militant judgement that current political arrangements are illegitimate. Some moderates agree with militants that "democracy" implies a kind of moral equivalence between Islam and other perspectives. And such a situation is dangerous not only for the standing of the Muslim community, but for the moral life of humankind"

[International Herald Tribune, 5-6 January, 2008]

I would add to this that 25 percent of UK Muslims sympathised with the London bombers.

Vulcan to the skies!, 21 Nov 2006
Not only for aviation enthusiasts (although they will be truly captivated!) - for all men who are still boys glimpsing the sheer power and grace of this great British plane. The combination of photos and info is probably not technical enough for die-hard anoraks, but is more than enough to inspire awe in the rest of us. The actual book is quite small - an ideal stocking filler:)

We associate Wellington so much with the battle of Waterloo that it's easy to forget that, before the battle, he had had a long military career already and that, after it, he had an even longer career as politician, prime minister and pillar of the establishment. Richard Holmes's admirably clear and succinct biography of the Duke has a chapter on his youth as a slightly awkward loner from the Anglo-Irish nobility and a concluding chapter which races swiftly through the 37 years of his post-Waterloo life. However the bulk of the book, unsurprisingly, is given over to a description and analysis of his military exploits.

As viewers of his TV series and readers of his previous books will know, Holmes is a brilliant interpreter of battlefields and what took place on them. He has visited most of the sites of Wellington's battles, not only those in Europe but those in India where the young Arthur Wellesley, as he then was, gained his first experiences as a general. (Wellington himself, in later life, claimed that his finest military achievement was not Waterloo but the winning of the Battle of Assaye during the Maratha Wars in 1803.) He uses his knowledge of the battle sites and his familiarity with all the extensive literature on the Peninsular War and Waterloo to produce a vivid account of Wellington's string of successes as a general. As the quotes in this book from his writings and despatches show, Wellington had a gift for the striking phrase and for concise description of complicated events. It's a gift his biographer shares and Holmes has produced a very readable and enjoyable book. --Nick Rennison

how market speculation can destroy intelligence, 23 Feb 2006
this small book shows in a logical way how speculation can make intelligent people do stupid things.galbraith shows in detail how money can in a practical sense buys up the intelligence of those involved in it.the recent dot.com mania demonstrates galbraiths analysis at work,as people were swept away in the dot.com tide.galbraith is a true prophet,may he live to a hundred.

Bubble Story, 02 Jul 2001
IN THIS SMALL but witty and well-crafted book, Galbraith chronicles the major speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century tulipmania to the junk-bond follies of the eighties. The book was first published in 1990 and thus the recent dotcom-bubble burst is not covered. Nevertheless, the Harvard professor's book is still worth reading. A reason is that he claims to have identified common patterns in the history of financial euphoria. 'In small ways the history of the great speculative boom and its aftermath does change. Much, much more remains the same', he predicts.

The perennial features are these. Some seemingly new and desirable artifact or development captures the financial imagination of a large number of people (say, group 1). The arrival of tulips in Western Europe, gold in Louisiana, the advent of joint-stock companies (corporations), real estate in Florida, or the economic designs of Reagan are all examples. The price of the object of speculation goes up. The object when bought today is worth more tomorrow. This attracts new buyers and assures a further price increase. Those in group 1 are persuaded that the new price-enhancing circumstance is under control, and expect the market to stay up and go up, perhaps indefinitely. The individual or institution that discovered the novelty (in group 2) is thought to be ahead of the mob. Fewer in number, individuals of group 2 perceive the speculative mood of the moment, try to get the maximum reward from the increase as it continues, and plan to be out before the eventual crash. The affluence of group 2 is wrongly associated, by group 1, with a miraculous financial genius. When something triggers the ultimate reversal, group 2 decides now is time to get out. Group 1 finds its illusion abruptly destroyed. Both groups sell or try to sell. The market collapses.

Galbraith observes that, in this process, 'speculation buys up the intelligence of those involved'. The crowd converts the individual in group 1 from possessing reasonable good sense to stupidity. Those in group 2 also make errors of vanity by thinking they will beat the speculative game. It seems that 'all people are most credulous when they are most happy'. Reputable public and financial opinion reinforces euphoria by condemning those who express doubt or dissent by warning of a crash. The celebrated Yale economist Irving Fisher, for instance, spoke out sharply against Roger Babson, who foresaw the crash of 1929. But the critic must wait until after the crash for any approval, Galbraith laments.

Despite the fact that common features in speculative episodes recur, history counts little because a financial disaster is quickly forgotten by a new, self-confident generation. Something is perceived as a financial novelty merely because the financial memory is short: 'financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation'. Insightfully, Galbraith notices that all financial innovation involves the creation of debt leveraged against more limited assets. This is the case of banks, whose debt is leveraged on a given volume of hard cash. This is also the case of the holding companies created in the 1920s, whose stockholders issued bonds and preferred stock to buy other stocks. And this is the case, too, of the junk bonds of the mergers-and-acquisitions mania in the 1980s, when high-risk, higher-interest bonds were issued in greater volume against the credit of the companies being taken over. As Galbraith puts it: 'the world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version'.

However a crisis may strike at any moment whenever a debt is perceived to become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment. After the crash, group 1 expresses anger against the 'financial genius' of group 2. 'Financial genius is before the fall', Galbraith prophesies. Group 1 finally realizes that having more money may mean that a person in group 2 is indifferent to moral constraints. Group 2 could have even gone beyond the law, as far as leverage is concerned. Incarceration of some individuals of group 2 may follow. Leverage is seen as morally disputable at last.

Talks of regulation and reform follow. However, the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it will not be discussed. 'Nothing is more remarkable than this: in the aftermath of speculation, the reality will be all but ignored.' Why? Because it is easier for group 1 to blame one individual or a few individuals in group 2 than to take responsibility for its own widespread naivety. And also because there is a need to find a cause for the crash that is external to the market itself. After all, the market is believed to be 'a neutral and accurate reflection of external influences; it is not supposed to be subject to an inherent and internal dynamic of error'. The deficit in the federal budget was, for instance, blamed for the 1987 crash. Another anecdotal account of Black Monday has been that the crash was caused by portfolio insurance computer programs which sold stocks as the market went lower.

Galbraith's book is compulsory reading for economists, especially those working on behavioural finance or econophysics. Being an antidote to illusory financial euphoria, the book is thus of interest to the general public as well. Galbraith's own sense of déjà vu towards speculative financial bubbles enabled him to predict the crash of 19 October 1987. People really seem to be intrinsically unable to prevent getting stuck in the error-prone dynamics of bull markets, as in his 'bubble story'. But perhaps they have already learned some minor lessons on how to better protect themselves in the aftermath of crashes. Indeed despite the fact that the Black Monday crash was nearly twice as severe as the stock market collapse of 1929, it did not trigger a depression. Likewise the internet-bubble burst of 2000 had a surprisingly modest effect on wealth. Will we finally learn to learn from history?

ok as in introduction, but other texts provide more depth, 01 May 2001
I bought this book after having read, and enjoyed immensely, Edward Chancellor's "Devil Take the Hindmost". Chancellor's text is a very readable book which serves as an excellent intoduction to financial speculation and bubble-mania. I bought Galbraith on the expectation of some greater insights - Galbraith's book on the Great Crash of 1929 is after all the definitive work on that episode. What I got was an introductory essay on the subject with a few, but not enough (at least for me), acute words of wisdom from the great man.

I should have noted that this book is described as a primer. Neverthless, this is 100 page book that could easily have been fitted into half that with a proper font and pagination. One shouldn't judge a book by its length, rather its quality, but I have to say I was expecting rather more for my money.

All that said, Galbraith's book is an interesting read and his insights into the popular linking of money and intelligence in particular are well articulated. He also resists the temptation to say "I told you so", one of a very few who could rightly claim the foresight to do so.

This is not a bad book, merely an introductory essay. For the interested reader I would suggest jumping straight in with The Great Crash, or turning to Devil Take The Hindmost for a popularist, but nevertheless scholarly overview.

First rate account of America's civil war, 30 Mar 2005
If you want to know about the civil war,how it came about? where,when and what happened? who the key player's were?Then this is the book for you!I wanted a book that was informative, yet written in an easily absorbing way.It is vivid without being boring,the only downside is that you find it very hard to put down!

An good synthesis with interesting side articles, 30 Mar 2004
I read this volume aside "Battle cry of Freedom" from James McPherson, and although it is not as complete, it is quicker to read and contains the essential military developments of the civil war. What I really appreciate, though, are the quality of the illustrations (although some of the maps could have been better and more precise), but even more, the chapters aside the main events, focusing on specific portraits of civilians and soldiers living during this war. If I were to read this book again, I would read it before "Battle cry of Freedom", as a preliminary to understand it even better. Overall, I think this Osprey collection (Essential Histories) is excellent to awake (or not) your interest on a particular war or campaign and give you an incentive to do more research on a particular subject if you like the corresponding Osprey book, providing you a short but accurate bibliography for further reading, which is always useful for the amateur historian.

The cash nebulous, 30 Mar 2006
I purchased this book on the basis of the on-line reviews anticipating a study of financial history.

Whilst it is reasonable on the history of currency, banking, and international finance it drifts off badly into loose discussions of UK politics, democracy and development, and the rise of the US economy. None of this material is particularly convincing and is based far too much on citations.

Overall I found it a frustrating read. There is a too much of a feeling that the author is a moderator in a debate which he doesn't fully understand.

Hard going but worth the effort, 22 Jun 2003
The book's scope is much wider than its title would imply. The author analyzes why some regimes have been more successful than others during past 300 years. The book emphasizes importance of four institutions as the bases of financial strength (and long-term success) of the state:
- a tax-collecting bureaucracy
- a representative parliament
- a national debt
- a central bank

There is lot of intellectual gymnastics with figures and facts in the middle of the book that test your determination to go on. Those who persevere get rewarded with the interesting discussion in the end of the book about defense expenses as a insurance policy for the state and a need for a superpower policeman for the free world in order to make peace and prosperity to last.

Read and find out if you agree with the conclusions of the author.

An excellent book but it does tend to drift off in places, 28 Feb 2001
Overall an excellent book that look at the link of bond prices democracy, politics and a nation-states power. It is very informative and contains alot of data simply set out; especially useful if you just happening to be doing a degree at the time.

My favourite aspect of this book is the completely fresh look ( even if I don't agree with all of it ) it takes at national power rather than rehashing old books with little, if anything, new to say.

Saying that the book at times does drift off losing all sense of structure especially in the middle covering the links between political parties and various lobby groups.

This does not stop being easy to read and comprehend while still being extremely informative.

Grayling is not a historian. And it shows., 18 Nov 2008
I am a huge fan of Grayling's philosophical writings, and as far as I am aware, I have read (and enjoyed) all of his published books. But this really was disappointing, despite my own active interest in human rights.

The main problem is this: Grayling is not a historian. And, more importantly, it shows. The author trudges through key figures and events in his "story of the struggles for liberty and rights" offering very little historical analysis along the way. His key point is this: all the rights and liberties we enjoy, only exist because of the struggles and sacrfices of those who have gone before us. Further, we would do well to remember this at a time when our governments seem determined to erode our liberties in the name of security. This, of course, is a worthy point, but I'm not sure that 272 long pages, which merely outline the factual circumstances of each struggle, individual and collective, is the most effective way to make this point.

Grayling has offered interesting and powerful, historically focused works in the past. "Among the Dead Cities" looks at the historical evidence and asks whether the allied policy of carpet bombing German cities during WWII was a moral crime. As with all his philosophical works, the result is a fascinating, thought-provoking read. But the difference between that and the current book is that in "Among the Dead Cities" he never takes his eye off his central philosophical question. As such, it is not a historical work, so much as a philosophical look at a particular historical episode.

Unfortunately, the same just cannot be said of this book. It is dry, uninspiring and, frankly, hard work. While Grayling's premise may be correct, the main lesson I took from the book is this: Grayling is not a historian. He should stick to what he does best.


A sorely needed refresher course, 11 Jan 2008
I have no hesitation in giving Professor Grayling's book five stars.

It is an education and vigorous refresher for anyone like myself who recognises names like Spinoza, Locke, Voltaire, Milton, de Tocqueville, but has only a hazy understanding of what they stand for, and only a patchy idea of the significance of the Glorious English Revolution of 1688 and the American and French revolutions, but has now in these times an uneasy feeling that the ideas and principles underpinning free societies are neglected. In as little as three hundred well written pages he explains it all.

I will let others extol the virtues of the book and here draw attention to one serious flaw, or to be kind to the author, to draw attention to an issue on which I wish he had said a lot more.

His priorities are wrong.

The book is exactly what it says it is "The Story of the Struggles for Liberty & Rights" but the opening and closing chapters discuss the threats to Liberty that we face today.

In the opening chapter he poses the question, in relation to the growing Muslim population in Europe, of how we deal with those whose ideas on Liberty and Rights are different from ours and who if they got their way would bring an end to the Liberty that we have painfully gained over the last 500 years. He doesn't answer this question.

Mistakenly, in my view, in these opening and closing chapters he concentrates on the threats to Liberty posed by the anti-terrorist measures taken by the US and UK governments.

As awful and as worrying some of these anti-terrorist measures are [1][2] they can at least be discussed. Your life will not be threatened, the Politically Correct (PC) roof will not fall on your head, respected national figures can and do state their views. But, these measures and the terrorism that brings them about are only symptoms, symptoms of an underlying religious malaise, and that is Islam as it mainly manifests itself in the world today.

He could say a lot more about the threat to Liberty from Islam. Perhaps his views are constrained by the observations he makes in relation to the persecution of minorities in Nazi Germany.

Religion is a very sensitive subject [3]. It is a sobering thought that a US presidential candidate who said openly that he wasn't too sure about God or that he was an atheist, wouldn't stand a chance. Could it be that the authors of the American Constitution, a beacon of Liberty, would be rejected by today's American voters?

Could we discuss openly and have a debate at a respected political level of the problems and potential problems caused by Islam in Liberal societies, and in the way we discuss measures to combat terrorism, discuss what we should and will do about it. I fear not.

We have started 2008 in the UK with a prime example of the difficulties. The Bishop of Rochester has drawn attention to the voluntary segregation of Muslims in the UK and the enclaves they have created which he says have become "no go" areas for Christians.

Of course, the bishop's use of the term "no-go" was a mistake. It has too many wrong meanings. The PC roof has fallen on his head, political figures from right, left and centre are falling over themselves to criticise or distance themselves from the bishop.

But the bishop is essentially right. There are a growing number of places which are growing in size in the UK where the culture around you is Islamic. Mohamed in its various spellings is now the most popular name for a boy in the UK. The bishop didn't say it, so I will say it for him. It wont be long before these Islamic communities will be demanding Sharia law. What then Liberty?

Not all Muslims, perhaps only a minority, believe and practice the aspects of their religion that are so inimical to free societies. But these beliefs and practices

- women are essentially male possessions

- death is a just punishment for apostasy and insulting Islam or the prophet

- that Islam trumps all other religions

- Muslims have a sacred duty to impose Islam everywhere, by force if necessary

to name a few of the worst, cast a dark shadow wherever Muslims live.

The bodies that represent Muslims are a cause of concern. Western suits and PR officers are no guarantee of a modern outlook or reasonableness. The secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain when asked if stoning was a bad thing said it "depended on the stones". He also thinks arranged marriages are a good idea and we in the UK should have them. His predecessor, whom the UK government rubbed shoulders with, is notorious for having said of Salman Rushdie that death was too good for him.

Perhaps a very great danger is not having a clear idea of what or who represents a form of Islam that can truly be part of a Liberal society [4]

These are the sorts of issues and threats that I wish Professor Grayling had given more space to and, from his philosophical standpoint, offered some ideas on how they can be dealt with.

Notes

[1] That a high American official made out a case for torture must have had Torquemada laughing in his grave.

[2] Professor Grayling is spot on in his criticism of the UK ID card scheme. I speak with some authority having studied the subject. Prof Grayling refers readers to the press in general to learn more about this nonsense, to which I would add and strongly recommend the Report and Evidence published by the UK Parliamentary Committee concerned with home affairs. The pages of my copy are stained with tears of laughter and rage.

[3] Having read this book I checked out Amazon readers comments on other works by Prof Grayling. I was shocked at the virulence of some of the attacks on him because he is, apparently, an atheist.

[4] Irshad Manjii in an excellent review of "Arguing the Just War in Islam" a recent book by John Kelsay, writes:

The moderates whom Kelsay has studied "do not in fact dissent from the militant judgement that current political arrangements are illegitimate. Some moderates agree with militants that "democracy" implies a kind of moral equivalence between Islam and other perspectives. And such a situation is dangerous not only for the standing of the Muslim community, but for the moral life of humankind"

[International Herald Tribune, 5-6 January, 2008]

I would add to this that 25 percent of UK Muslims sympathised with the London bombers.

Vulcan to the skies!, 21 Nov 2006
Not only for aviation enthusiasts (although they will be truly captivated!) - for all men who are still boys glimpsing the sheer power and grace of this great British plane. The combination of photos and info is probably not technical enough for die-hard anoraks, but is more than enough to inspire awe in the rest of us. The actual book is quite small - an ideal stocking filler:)

Good but could have been better, 30 Aug 2007
Although I finished this book with more knowledge on Wellington than I had at the start, I felt the book dwelt too much on detailed descriptions of military encounters, rather than giving me an insight into the man himself. Whilst I accept that his battle field encounters did much to shape his character, there is just too little about his domestic life, the relationship he had with wife and children, the reasoning behind his marriage and its failure, and his subsequent life in retirement.

Whilst accepting and understanding that Richard Holmes is a brilliant military historian, and this is his sphere of knowledge, a bit more was needed on non military matters.

An enjoyable biography, but a bit irritating!, 22 Aug 2007
Richard Holmes is an eminent historian and a splendid TV presenter but, though I found his study of the great Duke of Wellington an enjoyable biography that I couldn't put down until it was finished, I also found myself being irritated on too many of the 303 pages by mis-spellings and stylistic and punctuation inconsistencies. An example of the latter was the mixed and varying use of inverted commas (quote marks). My own preference is for the end of a phrase or a sentence to appear thus: '................... end,' or '..................... end.' Too often the style was thus '........................ end', or '........................... end'. Mr Holmes ought to have made up his mind which way his work was to appear or his editor ought to have been sacked!

Another niggle was that the Duke's Hampshire home was named only once as 'Strathfieldsaye,' with '[sic]' to follow. Mr Holmes should have been aware that that was the original spelling and that 'Stratfield Saye' is the more modern name of the house and estate.

I mustn't criticise too much, however, because I learned a lot from a very good book and I recommend it to other lovers of our British history and other admirers of one of the greatest and most courageous Britons ever to have been born.

Wellington, 13 Jun 2006
This is probably the best book on Wellington you are likely to read. It is clear to read and full of detail. It covers Wellingtons military career, as well as his relationships and public life. The author obviously admires Wellington, but not to the extent where he is totally biased and cannot give an objective view. This is a fascinating read about a great military leader. Recommended.

wellington made easy, 12 Jan 2006
This book definately deserves 5 stars in my opinion, but only if we take it for what it is; a good general history of the man and his life.
A comparison in thickness with Elizabeth Longford's two volume classic clearly indicates that Holmes' book can't be exhaustive, but this is in no way a criticism in itself. In fact I would say that it is one of the book's strongest points. Wellington, the Iron Duke is extremely readable, almost addictive in the way only a great novel can be, but without recourse to dumbing down. Holmes manages to recount the Duke's life and deeds both on and off the battle field with enough detail to inform, yet without becoming boring or pedantic. Here we see not only the Iron willed disciplinarian but also the man who cried when he saw the slaughter of Badajoz. He also endevors to give a more balanced assessment of the context in which Wellington lived and fought in battle and in parliament than has often been done (particulary with reference to the peninsula) and allows us to see how Wellington's experiences and background helped to shape his world view.
In short Richard Holmes seems to be that rare animal: an academic who can really write and communicate with readers. Wellington, The Iron Duke may not be adequate for hisorical researchers, but it's certainly an excellent and informative read for the rest of us with an interest in the man and his world.